-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN IBM AIX(r) Buffer Overrun Vulnerability (revision for gethostbyname in Bulletin H-13) January 24, 1997 23:00 GMT Number H-24 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Buffer overrun condition in "gethostbyname()" library function. PLATFORM: IBM AIS(r) 3.2.x, 4.1.x, 4.2.x DAMAGE: If exploited, this vulnerability could be used to gain root access to the system. SOLUTION: Apply the patches described below. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made ASSESSMENT: publicly available. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start IBM-ERS Bulletin ] =============================================================================== ======= ============ ====== ====== ======= ============== ======= ======= === === ==== ====== ====== === =========== ======= ======= === =========== === ======= === === === ==== === ===== === ======= ============== ===== === ===== ======= ============ ===== = ===== EMERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICE SECURITY VULNERABILITY ALERT 24 January 1997 13:00 GMT Number: ERS-SVA-E01-1997:001.1 =============================================================================== NOTE The information in this Security Vulnerability Alert was originally released on 03 December 1996 as ERS-SVA-E01-1996:007.1. Since that time, two significant events have occurred: 1. An exploit script for this vulnerability has been made public. 2. An error in the AIX 4.2 APAR for this problem has been discovered, and a new version of the APAR has been released. =============================================================================== VULNERABILITY SUMMARY VULNERABILITY: Buffer overrun condition in "gethostbyname()" library function PLATFORMS: IBM AIX(r) 3.2.x, 4.1.x, 4.2.x SOLUTION: Apply the fixes described below. Due to a packaging problem, an incorrect fix for the AIX 4.2.x release was distributed. We strongly recommend that the fix be downloaded and installed again. THREAT: An explot for the PowerPC AIX platform has been released which allows super-user access to the system. =============================================================================== DETAILED INFORMATION I. Description In TCP/IP networks such as the Internet and many corporate networks, hosts are identified by 32-bit numbers called addresses. However, because these numbers are difficult to remember, names are also given to hosts. Although people use the names to refer to the hosts, computer software must translate these names into the numeric addresses in order to use them. The Domain Name System (DNS), also called "the name server," is the primary database used to perform these name-to-address (and address-to-name) translations. Other databases, such as the Network Information System (NIS, formerly called Yellow Pages) and the "hosts file" are also used on some systems. When a program on a UNIX system wants to look up a host's name and obtain its network address, it uses a library function called "gethostbyname()." This function takes a host name as a parameter, contacts the Domain Name System (or another source of information), and returns the host's address(es) to the program. This saves the programmer the trouble of writing the complex code to interface with the name server. Under certain conditions, the "gethostbyname()" library function provided with IBM AIX versions 3.2.x, 4.1.x, and 4.2.x can encounter a buffer overrun that allows information on the program stack to be corrupted. II. Impact Many set-user-id and set-group-id programs, as well as many network programs running with super-user privileges, make use of the "gethostbyname()" library function. Corrupting the program stack of these programs may allow arbitrary user-provided code to be executed inadvertently. If successfully exploited, this buffer overrun condition could be used to gain super-user access to the system. Such an action could be initiated over the network from a remote system, or by a user on the local system. Penetration through a firewall may also be possible, depending on which services and applications are permitted by the firewall system. A script that exploits a similar buffer overrun condition in the Sun Solaris 2.x version of "gethostbyname()" was publicly released in November, 1996. Sun Microsystems announced fixes for that condition in Security Bulletin 137, which was released on 20 Nov 96. A script that exploits a similar buffer overrun condition in the IBM AIX version of "gethostbyname()" was publicly released in January, 1997. Fixes are described below. III. Solutions ***** ***** NOTE ***** ***** Due to a packaging error in the original APAR for AIX 4.2, you should ***** check that bos.rte.libc is at version 4.2.0.7 or later. If not, you ***** should retrieve APAR IX62144 again and re-apply it. ***** ***** This packaging error affected the AIX 4.2 APAR ONLY. The AIX 3.2 and ***** AIX 4.1 APARS were not affected. ***** The following Automated Program Analysis Reports (APARs) for IBM AIX are now available to address the concerns described above: AIX 3.2.x --------- APAR - IX60927 (PTF - U443452,U444191,U444206,U444213,U444233,U444244) To determine if you have this PTF on your system, run the following command: lslpp -lB U443452 U444191 U444206 U444213 U444233 U444244 AIX 4.1.x --------- APAR - IX61019 To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following command: instfix -ivk IX61019 The bos.rte.libc fileset should be 4.1.4.18 or later. AIX 4.2.x --------- APAR - IX62144 To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following command: instfix -ivk IX62144 The bos.rte.libc fileset should be 4.2.0.7 or later. IBM AIX APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via the FixDist program), or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist, and to obtain fixes via the Internet, please reference http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/ or send electronic mail to "aixserv@austin.ibm.com" with the word "FixDist" in the "Subject:" line. =============================================================================== [ End IBM-ERS Bulletin ] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of IMB-ERS, CERT/CC, AUSCERT, Sun Microsystems, & Marko Laakso for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. 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A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. 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LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) H-16: HP-UX Security Vulnerabilities (chfn, Remote Watch) H-06a: Sun libc/libnsl vulnerabilities (Sun Bulletin #00137a) H-17: cron/crontab Buffer Overrun Vulnerabilities H-18: Denial-of-Service Attack via ping H-19: HP Software Installation Programs Vulnerability H-20: Vulnerability in IRIX csetup H-21: HP Security Vulnerabilities (newgrp, authentication, passwor H-22: talkd Buffer Overrun Vulnerability H-23: Sendmail MIME Conversion Buffer Overrun Vulnerability H-24: IBM AIX(r) "gethostbyname()" Buffer Overrun Vulnerability RECENT CIAC NOTES ISSUED (Previous Notes available from CIAC) Notes 07 - 3/29/95 A comprehensive review of SATAN Notes 08 - 4/4/95 A Courtney update Notes 09 - 4/24/95 More on the "Good Times" virus urban legend Notes 10 - 6/16/95 PKZ300B Trojan, Logdaemon/FreeBSD, vulnerability in S/Key, EBOLA Virus Hoax, and Caibua Virus Notes 11 - 7/31/95 Virus Update, Hats Off to Administrators, America On-Line Virus Scare, SPI 3.2.2 Released, The Die_Hard Virus Notes 12 - 9/12/95 Securely configuring Public Telnet Services, X Windows, beta release of Merlin, Microsoft Word Macro Viruses, Allegations of Inappropriate Data Collection in Win95 Notes 96-01 - 3/18/96 Java and JavaScript Vulnerabilities, FIRST Conference Announcement, Security and Web Search Engines, Microsoft Word Macro Virus Update -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMxtckLnzJzdsy3QZAQFIogQArO7LbOWzLN0Et2WJGRckIH1GwW4K52+9 vLEQkFnijl23/TDrq2Fd7vX+msX6usrkNEU1LLnv1r2l5Cnq5XHUOByesrk/Jm9j 0rVo5f9nBWcyF6gz5371ac8mbqqRw0dcbbsqNXFh+8TWi6lDUYJGejgOdbUY58fy XEJvb3PouHU= =RQKV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----