-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI IRIX df, pset, and eject Buffer Overrun Vulnerabilities March 31, 1998 17:00 GMT Number H-61b ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Three vulnerabilities have been identified on the SGI IRIX operating system: (1) df program, (2) pset program, and (3) eject program. PLATFORM: All SGI systems running the following corresponding versions of IRIX: (1) IRIX 5.3, 6.2, and 6.3; (2) IRIX 5.3 and 6.2; and (3) Irix 6.2. Other versions may be vulnerable. DAMAGE: All three vulnerabilities may allow local users to gain root privileges. SOLUTION: Apply the suggested workarounds listed below. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Exploit information involving these vulnerabilities have been ASSESSMENT: made publicly available. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Appended to H-61a on March 31, 1998 with additional patch information from Silicon Graphics Inc. for (2) pset Buffer Overrun] [ Appended to H-61 on November 20,1997 with additional patch information from Silicon Graphics Inc. for (1) df Buffer Overrun, and (3) eject Buffer Overrun] [ Start AUSCERT Advisories ] 1. df Buffer Overrun Vulnerability =========================================================================== AA-97.19 AUSCERT Advisory SGI IRIX df Buffer Overrun Vulnerability 26 May 1997 Last Revised: -- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in df(1), distributed under IRIX 5.3, 6.2 and 6.3. Other versions may also be vulnerable. This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges. Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly available. At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor patches are made available. This advisory will be updated as more information becomes available. - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Description df(1) is a program used to display statistics about the amount of used and free disc space on file systems. Due to insufficient bounds checking on arguments which are supplied by users, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the df program while it is executing. By supplying a carefully designed argument to the df program, intruders may be able to force df to execute arbitrary commands. As df is setuid root, this may allow intruders to run arbitrary commands with root privileges. Sites can determine if this program is installed by using: % ls -l /sbin/df df is installed by default in /sbin. Sites are encouraged to check for the presence of this program regardless of the version of IRIX installed. Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly available. 2. Impact Local users may gain root privileges. 3. Workarounds/Solution AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of this vulnerability in df by immediately applying the workaround given in Section 3.1. If the df functionality is required by non-root users, AUSCERT recommends applying the workaround given in Section 3.2. Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be installed when they are made available. 3.1 Remove setuid and non-root execute permissions To prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability described in this advisory, AUSCERT recommends that the setuid permissions be removed from the df program immediately. As df will no longer work for non-root users, it is recommended that the execute permissions for them also be removed. # ls -l /sbin/df -r-sr-xr-x 1 root sys 23136 Nov 22 1994 /sbin/df # chmod 500 /sbin/df # ls -l /sbin/df -r-x------ 1 root sys 23136 Nov 22 1994 /sbin/df 3.2 Install df wrapper AUSCERT has developed a wrapper to help prevent programs from being exploited using the vulnerability described in this advisory. Sites which have a C compiler can obtain the source, compile and install the wrapper as described in Section 3.2.1. For sites without a C compiler, AUSCERT has made pre-compiled binaries available (Section 3.1.2). 3.2.1 Installing the wrapper from source The source for the wrapper, including installation instructions, can be found at: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/ overflow_wrapper.c This wrapper replaces the df program and checks the length of the command line arguments which are passed to it. If an argument exceeds a certain predefined value (MAXARGLEN), the wrapper exits without executing the df command. The wrapper program can also be configured to syslog any failed attempts to execute df with arguments exceeding MAXARGLEN. For further instructions on using this wrapper, please read the comments at the top of overflow_wrapper.c. When compiling overflow_wrapper.c for use with df, AUSCERT recommends defining MAXARGLEN to be 32. The MD5 checksum for the current version of overflow_wrapper.c can be retrieved from: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/CHECKSUM The CHECKSUM file has been digitally signed using the AUSCERT PGP key. 3.2.2 Installing the wrapper binaries Pre-compiled wrapper binary is provided for sites that wish to install the wrapper but do not have a C compiler available. AUSCERT has compiled the wrapper on IRIX 5.3, however later versions of IRIX should be able to use the wrapper binary without recompilation. The following compile time options have been used to create the binaries: REAL_PROG='"/sbin/df.real"' MAXARGLEN=32 SYSLOG More information on these options can be found in Section 3.1.1 and in the overflow_wrapper.c source code. The pre-compiled binaries for the wrapper program can be retrieved from: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/AA-97.19-df_wrapper.tar.Z The MD5 checksum for AA-97.19-df_wrapper.tar.Z is: MD5 (AA-97.19-df_wrapper.tar.Z) = 9d21e6358129cccbe3768757a5361f56 AA-97.19-df_wrapper.tar.Z contains a README file with installation instructions, as well as a pre-compiled binary. Sites are encouraged to carefully read the installation notes in the README file before installation. - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ Appended Silicon Graphics Advisory ] - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: IRIX df Buffer Overrun Vulnerability Title: AUSCERT Advisory AA-97.19 and CERT Advisory CA-97.21 Number: 19970505-02-PX Date: November 18, 1997 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ------------------------ - ---- Issue Specifics --- - ------------------------ The df(1) program is used to provide information about disk space usage on a system. The df(1) program is setuid root and as part of normal usage accepts user arguments to operate. It has been determined that an appropriately crafted set of arguments could be input to the df(1) program allowing execution of arbitrary user commands with root privileges. This resulting buffer overflow condition is considered a security vulnerability. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - --------------- - ---- Impact --- - --------------- The df(1) program (/sbin/df) is installed on all IRIX systems by default. A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability. With a local account the vulnerability can be exploited both locally and remotely. This vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root privileges. This security issue has been publically disclosed and discussed in several public forums including the BUGTRAQ mailing list. Additionally, security advisories AUSCERT AA-97.19 and CERT CA-97.21 have been publically released on the issue. - --------------------------- - ---- Temporary Solution --- - --------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing the permissions of the df program. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Change the permissions on the df program. # /bin/chmod 500 /sbin/df ************ *** NOTE *** ************ Removing the setuid root permissions from the df program will prevent non-root users and applications from using the df program. 3) Return to previous level. # exit $ - ----------------- - ---- Solution --- - ----------------- OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x unknown not avail Note 1 IRIX 4.x unknown not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.3 yes 2224 IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.2 yes 2177 IRIX 6.3 yes 2232 IRIX 6.4 yes 2233 NOTES 1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section. Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2177 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 24281 8 README.patch.2177 Algorithm #2 (sum): 27018 8 README.patch.2177 MD5 checksum: 7A3DF720DD7D6B1316E9937050233280 Filename: patchSG0002177 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43678 1 patchSG0002177 Algorithm #2 (sum): 29631 1 patchSG0002177 MD5 checksum: F97FBC0C9E17C9BFFE4ECC03924D8250 Filename: patchSG0002177.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 17436 115 patchSG0002177.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 24229 115 patchSG0002177.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: F01742532D483B02920F2837DB992CCA Filename: patchSG0002177.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 20506 2 patchSG0002177.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 59240 2 patchSG0002177.idb MD5 checksum: E52E021C27786A8047B95E0477B3B946 Filename: README.patch.2224 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 06375 23 README.patch.2224 Algorithm #2 (sum): 65399 23 README.patch.2224 MD5 checksum: A8965CB89FF91CCE1BEC0EA31F057F2B Filename: patchSG0002224 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32725 10 patchSG0002224 Algorithm #2 (sum): 11598 10 patchSG0002224 MD5 checksum: E40BC7206484A9CC583C67F8BEDCDB1A Filename: patchSG0002224.eoe1_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43776 2095 patchSG0002224.eoe1_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 16531 2095 patchSG0002224.eoe1_sw MD5 checksum: B538973E5982C82B7450D02CCAC3F601 Filename: patchSG0002224.eoe2_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 23026 643 patchSG0002224.eoe2_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 24004 643 patchSG0002224.eoe2_sw MD5 checksum: 6FCDDD383A115B97F9A884474AEFD3BD Filename: patchSG0002224.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 46992 18 patchSG0002224.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 4590 18 patchSG0002224.idb MD5 checksum: 16F15C4EBB396F49B62361D030801058 Filename: README.patch.2232 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 30727 12 README.patch.2232 Algorithm #2 (sum): 55743 12 README.patch.2232 MD5 checksum: DD9402D2434B1513A3B9886D70CD9243 Filename: patchSG0002232 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55916 3 patchSG0002232 Algorithm #2 (sum): 20486 3 patchSG0002232 MD5 checksum: FE63680542E429EA91D33AA15EB06537 Filename: patchSG0002232.eoe_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43804 36 patchSG0002232.eoe_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 27383 36 patchSG0002232.eoe_man MD5 checksum: 6EE21B2D5362295BDC20D5F84BA7DEC4 Filename: patchSG0002232.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 03690 421 patchSG0002232.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 11833 421 patchSG0002232.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: C5AD8C10999347F8FA67871B5B98CB63 Filename: patchSG0002232.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 38374 4 patchSG0002232.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 4337 4 patchSG0002232.idb MD5 checksum: 0610B31450652A09F343E2B1ED3E939A Filename: README.patch.2233 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 51881 11 README.patch.2233 Algorithm #2 (sum): 41695 11 README.patch.2233 MD5 checksum: 5D7F90A9AE9F2A483059E6D8D08DF317 Filename: patch2233.pgp.and.chksums Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00000 0 patch2233.pgp.and.chksums Algorithm #2 (sum): 0 0 patch2233.pgp.and.chksums MD5 checksum: D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E Filename: patchSG0002233 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18405 3 patchSG0002233 Algorithm #2 (sum): 23610 3 patchSG0002233 MD5 checksum: 462695A8E5958C4B6A78960F001A2351 Filename: patchSG0002233.eoe_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43804 36 patchSG0002233.eoe_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 27383 36 patchSG0002233.eoe_man MD5 checksum: 6EE21B2D5362295BDC20D5F84BA7DEC4 Filename: patchSG0002233.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 24542 347 patchSG0002233.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 6782 347 patchSG0002233.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: B5D1408146E7B71B1F5A8290ABCF5A4F Filename: patchSG0002233.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 50085 3 patchSG0002233.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 41850 3 patchSG0002233.idb MD5 checksum: B41E8A31941E47BD46682CFB4641882F - ------------------------- - ---- Acknowledgments --- - ------------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the worldwide Internet community and the AUSCERT and CERT Coordination Center organizations for their assistance in this matter. - ------------------------------------------------------------ - ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ------------------------------------------------------------ If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNHIfB7Q4cFApAP75AQG/1gP/UP5/e4H9kx1eqx+Pk3PGrhRITsVwVhaZ V3Faarq9+Vs0U0tz1zzUH3vDOk6eMMMnoDDjU60XOxfIyNA35QEq1Z3mknz7dPD2 ++irDfCmqO6JFN6aQETEv1FyEfKfHgy9Pd6LtLPtkHwmK6yRK5IHJG8rqz2pl9WM 6T2RauaqUJQ= =XJJ6 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End Silicon Graphics Advisory ] 2. pset Buffer Overrun Vulnerability =========================================================================== AA-97.20 AUSCERT Advisory SGI IRIX pset Buffer Overrun Vulnerability 27 May 1997 Last Revised: -- - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in pset(1M), distributed under IRIX 5.3 and 6.2. Other versions may also be vulnerable. This vulnerability may allow local users to gain the privileges of group sys. These privileges may then be leveraged to gain root privileges. Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly available. At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor patches are made available. This advisory will be updated as more information becomes available. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. Description pset(1M) is a program used to display and modify information concerning the use of processor sets in the current system. The pset command is used on multi-processor systems to restrict the execution of different classes of jobs. Due to insufficient bounds checking on arguments which are supplied by users, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the pset program while it is executing. By supplying a carefully designed argument to the pset program, intruders may be able to force pset to execute arbitrary commands. As pset is setgid sys, this may allow intruders to run arbitrary commands with the privileges of group sys. This may then be leveraged to gain root privileges. Sites can determine if this program is installed by using: % ls -l /sbin/pset pset is installed by default in /sbin. Sites are encouraged to check for the presence of this program regardless of the version of IRIX installed. Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly available. 2. Impact This vulnerability may allow local users to gain the privileges of group sys. These privileges may then be leveraged to gain root privileges. 3. Workarounds/Solution AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of this vulnerability in pset by immediately applying the workaround given in Section 3.1. If the pset functionality is required by non-root users, AUSCERT recommends applying the workaround given in Section 3.2. Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be installed when they are made available. 3.1 Remove setgid and non-root execute permissions To prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability described in this advisory, AUSCERT recommends that the setgid permissions be removed from the pset program immediately. As pset will no longer work for non-root users, it is recommended that the execute permissions for them also be removed. # ls -l /sbin/pset -rwsr-sr-x 1 root sys 31704 Nov 22 1994 /sbin/pset # chmod 500 /sbin/pset # ls -l /sbin/pset -r-x------ 1 root sys 31704 Nov 22 1994 /sbin/pset 3.2 Install pset wrapper AUSCERT has developed a wrapper to help prevent programs from being exploited using the vulnerability described in this advisory. Sites which have a C compiler can obtain the source, compile and install the wrapper as described in Section 3.2.1. For sites without a C compiler, AUSCERT has made pre-compiled binaries available (Section 3.2.2). 3.2.1 Installing the wrapper from source The source for the wrapper, including installation instructions, can be found at: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/ overflow_wrapper.c This wrapper replaces the pset program and checks the length of the command line arguments which are passed to it. If an argument exceeds a certain predefined value (MAXARGLEN), the wrapper exits without executing the pset command. The wrapper program can also be configured to syslog any failed attempts to execute pset with arguments exceeding MAXARGLEN. For further instructions on using this wrapper, please read the comments at the top of overflow_wrapper.c. When compiling overflow_wrapper.c for use with pset, AUSCERT recommends defining MAXARGLEN to be 32. The MD5 checksum for the current version of overflow_wrapper.c can be retrieved from: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/CHECKSUM The CHECKSUM file has been digitally signed using the AUSCERT PGP key. 3.2.2 Installing the wrapper binaries Pre-compiled wrapper binary is provided for sites that wish to install the wrapper but do not have a C compiler available. AUSCERT has compiled the wrapper on IRIX 5.3, however later versions of IRIX should be able to use the wrapper binary without recompilation. The following compile time options have been used to create the binaries: REAL_PROG='"/sbin/pset.real"' MAXARGLEN=32 SYSLOG More information on these options can be found in Section 3.2.1 and in the overflow_wrapper.c source code. The pre-compiled binaries for the wrapper program can be retrieved from: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/AA-97.20-pset_wrapper.tar.Z The MD5 checksum for AA-97.20-pset_wrapper.tar.Z is: MD5 (AA-97.20-pset_wrapper.tar.Z) = 875367aec70936fc5f4531b0ba8ebc03 AA-97.20-pset_wrapper.tar.Z contains a README file with installation instructions, as well as a pre-compiled binary. Sites are encouraged to carefully read the installation notes in the README file before installation. 4. Additional measures Most Unix systems ship with numerous programs which have setuid or setgid privileges. Often the functionality supplied by these privileged programs is not required by many sites. The large number of privileged programs that are shipped by default are to cater for all possible uses of the system. AUSCERT encourages sites to examine all the setuid/setgid programs and determine the necessity of each program. If a program does not absolutely require the setuid/setgid privileges to operate (for example, it is only run by the root user), the setuid/setgid privileges should be removed. Furthermore, if a program is not required at your site, then all execute permissions should be removed. A sample command to find all setuid/setgid programs is (run as root): # find / \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -type f -exec ls -l {} \; It is AUSCERT's experience that many vulnerabilities are being discovered in setuid/setgid programs which are not necessary for the correct operation of most systems. Sites can increase their security by removing unnecessary setuid/setgid programs. For example, the functionality provided by the pset program is not needed by many sites. If sites had previously disabled this program, they would not have been susceptible to this latest vulnerability. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ [ Append Silicon Graphics Advisory ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: pset Buffer Overrun Vulnerability Title: AUSCERT AA-97.20, CERT CA-97.21 Number: 19970506-02-PX Date: March 26, 1998 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ----------------------- - --- Issue Specifics --- - ----------------------- Under normal operation, the pset(1M) program is used to display and manage proccessor set information. Unfortunately, a buffer overrun has been discovered in the pset(1M) program which could allow arbitrary commands to be run as the privileged user root. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - -------------- - --- Impact --- - -------------- The pset(1M) program is installed by default on IRIX 5.x through 6.3 . IRIX 6.4 does not have the pset(1M) program. With a local account, the pset(1M) buffer overrun vulnerability can be exploited locally and remotely. The pset(1M) buffer overrun vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root privileges. The pset(1M) buffer overrun vulnerability has been publicly discussed in Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists and also reported in AUSCERT AA-97.20 and CERT CA-97.21. - -------------------------- - --- Temporary Solution --- - -------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing the permissions of the pset(1M) program. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Change the permissions on the pset(1M) program. # /bin/chmod 500 /sbin/pset ************ *** NOTE *** ************ Removing permissions from /sbin/pset will prevent non-root users from using the pset(1M) program 3) Return to previous level. # exit % - ---------------- - --- Solution --- - ---------------- OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no not avail Note 1 IRIX 4.x no not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.3 yes 2176 IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.2 yes 2459 IRIX 6.3 yes 2792 IRIX 6.4 no NOTES 1) upgrade to currently supported IRIX operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section. Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2176 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45198 9 README.patch.2176 Algorithm #2 (sum): 63297 9 README.patch.2176 MD5 checksum: A0305D199A83509F2356204DD4D5A4CA Filename: patchSG0002176 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 48278 1 patchSG0002176 Algorithm #2 (sum): 29497 1 patchSG0002176 MD5 checksum: 271D2085A6666CD6B3F0B7288A802789 Filename: patchSG0002176.eoe1_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 09555 36 patchSG0002176.eoe1_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 47593 36 patchSG0002176.eoe1_sw MD5 checksum: 8332B895C7CC954CD9D8D57D3C834331 Filename: patchSG0002176.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 01856 1 patchSG0002176.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 33647 1 patchSG0002176.idb MD5 checksum: CB1BD24A25D09DE321FA9D2844AF4035 Filename: README.patch.2459 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 64958 8 README.patch.2459 Algorithm #2 (sum): 46142 8 README.patch.2459 MD5 checksum: CDE4AAAD19550272112CC45C994C2816 Filename: patchSG0002459 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40511 2 patchSG0002459 Algorithm #2 (sum): 41842 2 patchSG0002459 MD5 checksum: C60F579FEC78F06CD4932C01F4A8EC74 Filename: patchSG0002459.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15575 78 patchSG0002459.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 27593 78 patchSG0002459.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 18BD7723AFE4C421BF5A951F88794218 Filename: patchSG0002459.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54991 2 patchSG0002459.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 47185 2 patchSG0002459.idb MD5 checksum: 4E15A06EFDBDDAEDD37867CECA904FC5 Filename: README.patch.2792 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33572 8 README.patch.2792 Algorithm #2 (sum): 20950 8 README.patch.2792 MD5 checksum: 60FBC74C162FFB23E6441C2F336C0CAB Filename: patchSG0002792 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 64174 1 patchSG0002792 Algorithm #2 (sum): 29815 1 patchSG0002792 MD5 checksum: 2582C992777A6065E3746BD1ABE193C0 Filename: patchSG0002792.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 56738 78 patchSG0002792.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 46753 78 patchSG0002792.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 3F01ED1B48B1CA62C0ED58DA24C118AF Filename: patchSG0002792.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 07275 2 patchSG0002792.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 46019 2 patchSG0002792.idb MD5 checksum: 9CC15F8952DA8ABAE23AD077751A3FC5 - ------------------------ - --- Acknowledgments --- - ------------------------ Silicon Graphics wishes to thank AUSCERT, CERT Coordination Center and the Internet community for their assistance in this matter. - ----------------------------------------------------------- - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ----------------------------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNRrLWrQ4cFApAP75AQGweQP/ezwPSdg5pVh9uDA+ktVMMo/yETYeQuh7 yYidXZ+gvHJNv6mMtgcMPu80QWOx+rZlr5m/2NGFyzSVgkqV/lr9y4I2k6nRTKQU 2sSw/fJQSNDz2P+mPudZUiViKqEJG08OW97k8fbi69zEOBBsHO5Q0A8G9WuvWSXq rI8FH8uXcIA= =wPoL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End Silicon Graphics Advisory ] 3. eject Buffer Overrun Vulnerability =========================================================================== AA-97.21 AUSCERT Advisory SGI IRIX eject Buffer Overrun Vulnerability 27 May 1997 Last Revised: -- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in eject(1), distributed under IRIX 6.2. Other versions may also be vulnerable. This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges. Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly available. At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor patches are made available. This advisory will be updated as more information becomes available. - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Description eject(1) is a program used to eject a removable media device, such as floppy, CDROM, or tape. If the floppy or CDROM is mounted, eject will first try to unmount it. Due to insufficient bounds checking on arguments which are supplied by users, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the eject program while it is executing. By supplying a carefully designed argument to the eject program, intruders may be able to force eject to execute arbitrary commands. As eject is setuid root, this may allow intruders to run arbitrary commands with root privileges. Sites can determine if this program is installed by using: % ls -l /usr/sbin/eject eject is installed by default in /usr/sbin. Sites are encouraged to check for the presence of this program regardless of the version of IRIX installed. Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly available. 2. Impact Local users may gain root privileges. 3. Workarounds/Solution AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of this vulnerability in eject by immediately applying the workaround given in Section 3.1. If the eject functionality is required by non-root users, AUSCERT recommends applying the workaround given in Section 3.2. Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be installed when they are made available. 3.1 Remove setuid and non-root execute permissions To prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability described in this advisory, AUSCERT recommends that the setuid permissions be removed from the eject program immediately. As eject will no longer have its full functionality for non-root users, it is recommended that the execute permissions be also removed for these users. # ls -l /usr/sbin/eject -rwsr-xr-x 1 root sys 45892 Nov 28 15:09 /usr/sbin/eject # chmod 500 /usr/sbin/eject # ls -l /usr/sbin/eject -r-x------ 1 root sys 45892 Nov 28 15:09 /usr/sbin/eject 3.2 Install wrapper AUSCERT has developed a wrapper to help prevent programs from being exploited using the vulnerability described in this advisory. Sites which have a C compiler can obtain the source, compile and install the wrapper as described in Section 3.2.1. For sites without a C compiler, AUSCERT has made pre-compiled binaries available (Section 3.2.2). 3.2.1 Installing the wrapper from source The source for the wrapper, including installation instructions, can be found at: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/ overflow_wrapper.c This wrapper replaces the eject program and checks the length of the command line arguments which are passed to it. If an argument exceeds a certain predefined value (MAXARGLEN), the wrapper exits without executing the eject command. The wrapper program can also be configured to syslog any failed attempts to execute eject with arguments exceeding MAXARGLEN. For further instructions on using this wrapper, please read the comments at the top of overflow_wrapper.c. When compiling overflow_wrapper.c for use with eject, AUSCERT recommends defining MAXARGLEN to be 32. The MD5 checksum for the current version of overflow_wrapper.c can be retrieved from: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/CHECKSUM The CHECKSUM file has been digitally signed using the AUSCERT PGP key. 3.2.2 Installing the wrapper binaries Pre-compiled wrapper binary is provided for sites that wish to install the wrapper but do not have a C compiler available. AUSCERT has compiled the wrapper on IRIX 5.3, however later versions of IRIX should be able to use the wrapper binary without recompilation. The following compile time options have been used to create the binaries: REAL_PROG='"/usr/sbin/eject.real"' MAXARGLEN=32 SYSLOG More information on these options can be found in Section 3.2.1 and in the overflow_wrapper.c source code. The pre-compiled binaries for the wrapper program can be retrieved from: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/AA-97.21-eject_wrapper.tar.Z The MD5 checksum for AA-97.21-eject_wrapper.tar.Z is: MD5 (AA-97.21-eject_wrapper.tar.Z) = 276bf0f51c89e54d4c584a9e8dd9265d AA-97.21-eject_wrapper.tar.Z contains a README file with installation instructions, as well as a pre-compiled binary. Sites are encouraged to carefully read the installation notes in the README file before installation. 4. Additional measures Most Unix systems ship with numerous programs which have setuid or setgid privileges. Often the functionality supplied by these privileged programs is not required by many sites. The large number of privileged programs that are shipped by default are to cater for all possible uses of the system. AUSCERT encourages sites to examine all the setuid/setgid programs and determine the necessity of each program. If a program does not absolutely require the setuid/setgid privileges to operate (for example, it is only run by the root user), the setuid/setgid privileges should be removed. Furthermore, if a program is not required at your site, then all execute permissions should be removed. A sample command to find all setuid/setgid programs is (run as root): # find / \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -type f -exec ls -l {} \; It is AUSCERT's experience that many vulnerability are being discovered in setuid/setgid programs which are not necessary for the correct operation of most systems. Sites can increase their security by removing unnecessary setuid/setgid programs. For example, if sites had previously removed the setuid permissions for the eject program, they would not have been susceptible to this latest vulnerability. - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ Appended Silicon Graphics Advisory ] - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: IRIX eject Buffer Overrun Vulnerability Title: AUSCERT Advisory AA-97.21 and CERT Advisory CA-97.21 Number: 19970507-02-PX Date: November 18, 1997 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ------------------------ - ---- Issue Specifics --- - ------------------------ The eject(1) program is used to eject removable media such as floppy, CDROM, and tape. The eject(1) program is setuid root and as part of normal usage accepts user arguments to operate. It has been determined that an appropriately crafted set of arguments could be input to the eject(1) program allowing execution of arbitrary user commands with root privileges. This resulting buffer overflow condition is considered a security vulnerability. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - --------------- - ---- Impact --- - - ------------- The eject(1) program (/usr/sbin/eject) is installed on all IRIX systems by default. A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability. With a local account the vulnerability can be exploited both locally and remotely. This vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root privileges. This security issue has been publically disclosed and discussed in several public forums including the BUGTRAQ mailing list. Additionally, security advisories AUSCERT AA-97.21 and CERT CA-97.21 have been publically released on the issue. - --------------------------- - ---- Temporary Solution --- - --------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing the permissions of the eject program. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Change the permissions on the eject program. # /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/eject ************ *** NOTE *** ************ Removing the setuid root permissions from the eject program will prevent non-root users and applications from using the eject program. 3) Return to previous level. # exit $ - ----------------- - ---- Solution --- - ----------------- OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x unknown not avail Note 1 IRIX 4.x unknown not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.3 yes 2228 IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.2 yes 2177 IRIX 6.3 yes 2232 IRIX 6.4 yes 2233 NOTES 1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section. Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2177 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 24281 8 README.patch.2177 Algorithm #2 (sum): 27018 8 README.patch.2177 MD5 checksum: 7A3DF720DD7D6B1316E9937050233280 Filename: patchSG0002177 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43678 1 patchSG0002177 Algorithm #2 (sum): 29631 1 patchSG0002177 MD5 checksum: F97FBC0C9E17C9BFFE4ECC03924D8250 Filename: patchSG0002177.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 17436 115 patchSG0002177.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 24229 115 patchSG0002177.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: F01742532D483B02920F2837DB992CCA Filename: patchSG0002177.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 20506 2 patchSG0002177.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 59240 2 patchSG0002177.idb MD5 checksum: E52E021C27786A8047B95E0477B3B946 Filename: README.patch.2228 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 56233 7 README.patch.2228 Algorithm #2 (sum): 12603 7 README.patch.2228 MD5 checksum: 30D3A289BD8219F65094F5C6D0906D00 Filename: patchSG0002228 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32199 1 patchSG0002228 Algorithm #2 (sum): 26600 1 patchSG0002228 MD5 checksum: 1D2A2E79B74B0A5BDEE7775C44E766D8 Filename: patchSG0002228.eoe1_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 28849 53 patchSG0002228.eoe1_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 11773 53 patchSG0002228.eoe1_sw MD5 checksum: DBFBCD02E45A9A9468EBAEB115908B1D Filename: patchSG0002228.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 04872 1 patchSG0002228.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 34402 1 patchSG0002228.idb MD5 checksum: E99CCA436F10736924B10F9D9D6A5978 Filename: README.patch.2232 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 30727 12 README.patch.2232 Algorithm #2 (sum): 55743 12 README.patch.2232 MD5 checksum: DD9402D2434B1513A3B9886D70CD9243 Filename: patchSG0002232 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55916 3 patchSG0002232 Algorithm #2 (sum): 20486 3 patchSG0002232 MD5 checksum: FE63680542E429EA91D33AA15EB06537 Filename: patchSG0002232.eoe_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43804 36 patchSG0002232.eoe_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 27383 36 patchSG0002232.eoe_man MD5 checksum: 6EE21B2D5362295BDC20D5F84BA7DEC4 Filename: patchSG0002232.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 03690 421 patchSG0002232.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 11833 421 patchSG0002232.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: C5AD8C10999347F8FA67871B5B98CB63 Filename: patchSG0002232.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 38374 4 patchSG0002232.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 4337 4 patchSG0002232.idb MD5 checksum: 0610B31450652A09F343E2B1ED3E939A Filename: README.patch.2233 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 51881 11 README.patch.2233 Algorithm #2 (sum): 41695 11 README.patch.2233 MD5 checksum: 5D7F90A9AE9F2A483059E6D8D08DF317 Filename: patch2233.pgp.and.chksums Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00000 0 patch2233.pgp.and.chksums Algorithm #2 (sum): 0 0 patch2233.pgp.and.chksums MD5 checksum: D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E Filename: patchSG0002233 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18405 3 patchSG0002233 Algorithm #2 (sum): 23610 3 patchSG0002233 MD5 checksum: 462695A8E5958C4B6A78960F001A2351 Filename: patchSG0002233.eoe_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43804 36 patchSG0002233.eoe_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 27383 36 patchSG0002233.eoe_man MD5 checksum: 6EE21B2D5362295BDC20D5F84BA7DEC4 Filename: patchSG0002233.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 24542 347 patchSG0002233.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 6782 347 patchSG0002233.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: B5D1408146E7B71B1F5A8290ABCF5A4F Filename: patchSG0002233.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 50085 3 patchSG0002233.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 41850 3 patchSG0002233.idb MD5 checksum: B41E8A31941E47BD46682CFB4641882F - ------------------------- - ---- Acknowledgments --- - ------------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the worldwide Internet community and the AUSCERT and CERT Coordination Center organizations for their assistance in this matter. - ------------------------------------------------------------ - ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ------------------------------------------------------------ If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNHIgZrQ4cFApAP75AQHJrwP/XiXIri9rwgQeTAI0kisDRD8S8HMINT5A kBh6ajmDlJgE9fZus4r+dkb2zWiTI3iLWaOvZcjswBHY0BRrJZCXgpHfi1IyhJ2P 5S77I+j+/YErCN65vFAiaKaj1Wj713dTSHxjUdoECUmfkX8IJgcMDvQbRVcptIsE 2g+MVnjdiXg= =fuer - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End Silicon Graphics Advisory ] [ End AUSCERT Advisories ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of AUSCERT and Silicon Graphic Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 510-422-8193 FAX: +1 510-423-8002 STU-III: +1 510-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/ Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53) Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) H-51: Vulnerability in libXt H-52: IRIX csetup Program Vulnerability H-53: Vulnerability in webdist.cgi H-54: Vulnerability in xlock H-55: IRIX netprint Program Security Vulnerability H-56: Solaris 2.x lp temporary files creation Vulnerability H-57: Windows NT/95 Out of Band Data Exploit H-58: IRIX runpriv Program Vulnerability H-59: Solaris 2.x ps Buffer Overflow Vulnerability H-60: Vulnerability in metamail -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBNHS9ArnzJzdsy3QZAQHAhgQA4X2iEpdsNDFCVH+6bRTPoVWm6Kx0LqoF jLKSNxIeejYIJHFyccnY0LSdlmG3cZE2BKY3SXYFwz0f3JlkpUrEUJHFtS55ysry NPJ+4GQGZ4N0IIgyzYbTEQEs3ZCwM9UzMags4WqhnpYm3moimZbuoRw/hrdqA6XP z4bd8OwtCPQ= =LK/L -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----