-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI IRIX ioconfig(1M) and disk_bandwidth(1M) Vulnerability July 22, 1998 22:00 GMT Number I-076 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: SGI has identified a vulnerability in the ioconfig(1M) and disk_bandwidth(1M) programs. PLATFORM: All IRIX 6.4 S2MP Origin and Onyx2 systems. DAMAGE: If exploited, a local user could gain root access. SOLUTION: Follow the steps listed below to restrict permissions. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY This vulnerability has been publicly discussed in Usenet ASSESSMENT: newsgroups and mailing lists. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ] - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: IRIX 6.4 ioconfig(1M) and disk_bandwidth(1M) Vulnerability Number: 19980701-01-P Date: July 20, 1998 _____________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - - ------------------------ - - ---- Issue Specifics --- - - ------------------------ The IRIX ioconfig(1M) program assigns logical controller numbers to all I/O devices on a Silicon Graphics Origin or Onyx2 system. The IRIX disk_bandwidth(1M) program is used to determine the number of I/O operations that can be performed on a given disk device on an Origin or Onyx2 system. Both programs are normally only used by IRIX System administrators. Unfortunately, a vulnerability has been discovered in both ioconfig(1M) and disk_bandwidth(1M) programs that can lead to a root compromise of the system. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - - --------------- - - ---- Impact --- - - --------------- The ioconfig(1M)/disk_bandwidth(1M) programs are installed by default on all IRIX 6.4 S2MP Origin and Onyx2 systems. A local user account on the vulnerable system is required in order to exploit the ioconfig(1M)/disk_bandwidth(1M) vulnerability locally and remotely. This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists. - - ----------------- - - ---- Solution --- - - ----------------- The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by restricting permissions of the ioconfig(1M)/disk_bandwidth(1M) programs to the root user. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Verify the vulnerable ioconfig(1M)/disk_bandwidth(1M) programs are installed. Only IRIX 6.4 S2MP for Origin/Onyx2 is vulnerable. # uname -R 6.4 S2MP+OCTANE 3) Remove permissions on the vulnerable ioconfig(1M) and disk_bandwidth(1M) programs. # /bin/chmod 500 /sbin/ioconfig # /bin/chmod 500 /sbin/disk_bandwidth ************ *** NOTE *** ************ Removing permissions from the vulnerable programs will prevent non-root users from accessing ioconfig(1M) and disk_bandwidth(1M). 4) Verify the new permissions on the program. Note that the program size may be different depending on release. # ls -al /sbin/ioconfig /usr/sbin/disk_bandwidth -r-x------ 1 root sys 34024 Feb 20 16:53 ioconfig -r-x------ 1 root sys 17604 Dec 18 1997 disk_bandwidth 5) Return to previous user level. # exit % - - ------------------------- - - ---- Acknowledgments --- - - ------------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the Internet community at large for their assistance in this matter. - - ------------------------------------------------------------ - - ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - - ------------------------------------------------------------ If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNbPJCLQ4cFApAP75AQGkPQP/baaHH5TYuMzJCkyj1ZyaMb2onb6wOQ1B fearTK4dWE+mJ3G72V3TpPwPu4DJYKSs/xdGlaeW7bWB505efj6mQdY97L3+B0SI 9HbdsS4pyHMPTeVJH+pjh/wr9mD81elaNgzvXVMIBsUNb/8Xz8wrFJjSikPQWgmo y6JaCXW48jk= =3ID2 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. 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CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. 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Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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