__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Center ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Multiple Vendor CDE dtspcd Process Buffer Overflow [Internet Security Systems Security Advisory ISS-101] November 21, 2001 01:00 GMT Number M-019 [Revised 3 December 2001] [Revised 10 January 2002] [Revised 17 January 2002] [Revised 22 February 2002] [Revised 17 April 2002] ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A buffer overflow condition exists in the connection negotiation routine within the dtspcd daemon of the Common Desktop Environment (CDE). PLATFORM: Multiple versions of UNIX running CDE. This includes but is not limited to HP Unix, and SGI (this will be updated as more patches become available). DAMAGE: An attacker can execute arbitrary code with up to root privileges. SOLUTION: Apply patches available, or Apply workaround described below. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. This is a common service, used by most ASSESSMENT: versions of UNIX, and is a remotely exploitable root compromise. This is fairly easy to exploit. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/m-019.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.securityfocus.com/advisories/3653 PATCHES: for an up to date list of vendors and patches, see the following URL: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-31.html#vendors - 3 December 2001 - SGI IRIX patches available ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/20011107-01-P - 10 January 2002 - Sun Solaris and SunOS patches are now available: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doctype=coll&doc=secbull/214&type=0&nav=sec.sba - 17 January 2002 - Hewlett-Packard patches are now available: ftp://dtspcd:dtspcd@hprc.external.hp.com/dtspcd/ - 17 April 2002 - Compaq Corp. patches are now available: http://ftp.support.compaq.com/patches/.new/html/SSRT-541.shtml ______________________________________________________________________________ [Revision 02/22/02: Hewlett-Packard revises bulletin] [Revision 04/17/02: Compaq Corp. releases patches] [***** Start Multiple Vendor Security Bulletins *****] [***** Start Internet Security Systems Security Advisory ISS-101 *****] Internet Security Systems Security Advisory November 12, 2001 Multi-Vendor Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in CDE Subprocess Control Service Synopsis: Internet Security Systems (ISS) X-Force has discovered a buffer overflow in the Subprocess Control Server (dtspcd) in all Unix variants running CDE (Common Desktop Environment) system. The vulnerability in the dtspcd daemon may allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on a target system with super user privilege. Affected Versions: Many Unix vendors are affected by this vulnerability. ISS X-Force has been working with CERT on this issue. Please refer to the CERT advisory at the following address for the current list of vulnerable versions: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-31.html Description: CDE is the default X-Windows GUI environment shipped with newer versions of Sun Solaris and many other Unix variants. The Subprocess Control Server daemon is not intended to be run by normal users and is spawned by other components within the CDE system. Dtspcd is started by the Internet services daemon (inetd) when a CDE client attempts to create a process on the daemon's host. A buffer overflow condition exists in the connection negotiation routine within dtpscd. A remote attacker can generate a specially crafted CDE client request to take advantage of the flaw and overflow exploit code onto the heap. The attacker can use this exploit code to execute arbitrary commands on the target system. The Subprocess Control Server daemon is enabled by default on all operating systems with CDE installed. This process is run by the "root" user and accepts remote connections by default. Recommendations: This advisory was tentatively scheduled for release in December 2001. The issue was made public in the following announcement before most vendors were able to make patches available: ftp://stage.caldera.com/pub/security/openunix/CSSA-2001-SCO.30/ ISS X-Force encourages all affected users to check with your individual vendors for patch availability. Users should take steps to disable or limit access to the vulnerable service until patches are made available. ISS RealSecure Network Sensor customers can configure a Connection Event for port 6112 to detect potential attacks. For more information on configuring Connection Events, refer to the RealSecure 6.0 Network Sensor Policy Guide, or the RealSecure 5.x Network Sensor User Guide. ISS RealSecure Server Sensor customers can configure Server Sensor to block access attempts to the dtspc port. The following steps describe how to add a Firecell rule to RealSecure Server Sensor (Solaris and Linux) to block access attempts to the dtspc port. X-Force recommends that administrators investigate the implications of blocking dtspc in their environments before applying this rule. 1. Open the server sensor policy to which you want to add this signature. 2. Select the Protect tab, open the Protect folder, and then open the Firecell folder. 3. Select the TCP Inbound section. 4. Click Add to create a new signature. 5. Type a name for the firecell signature, e.g. Block_dtspcd, and then click OK. The new signature is added to the policy in the TCP Inbound section. 6. Select the signature that you just created. The properties of the signature appear in the right pane. 7. Set the priority of the event in the Priority box. 8. In the Port number field, type 6112. 9. In the IP address field, select ANY ADDRESS. 10. In the Actions section, select Action (1) In the range of IP addresses, drop the packet and generate the responses. 11. In the Response section, select the responses you want the sensor to take when a match to this signature occurs. 12. Save and apply the policy to the sensor. ISS X-Force will provide specific detection and assessment support for this vulnerability in upcoming X-Press Updates for RealSecure Network Sensor and Internet Scanner. ISS will also provide detection support in an upcoming signature update for BlackICE products. Additional Information: The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CAN-2001-0803 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for security problems. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-31.html http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/172583 http://xforce.iss.net/static/7396.php Credits: This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Chris Spencer of the ISS X-Force. Internet Security Systems would like to thank CERT for their response and handling of this vulnerability. ______ About Internet Security Systems (ISS) Internet Security Systems is a leading global provider of security management solutions for the Internet, protecting digital assets and ensuring safe and uninterrupted e-business. With its industry-leading intrusion detection and vulnerability assessment, remote managed security services, and strategic consulting and education offerings, ISS is a trusted security provider to more than 8,000 customers worldwide including 21 of the 25 largest U.S. commercial banks and the top 10 U.S. telecommunications companies. Founded in 1994, ISS is headquartered in Atlanta, GA, with additional offices throughout North America and international operations in Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. For more information, visit the Internet Security Systems web site at www.iss.net or call 888-901-7477. Copyright (c) 2001 Internet Security Systems, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this Alert electronically. It is not to be edited in any way without express consent of the X-Force. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this Alert in any other medium excluding electronic medium, please e-mail xforce@iss.net for permission. Disclaimer The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the author be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this information is at the user's own risk. X-Force PGP Key available at: http://xforce.iss.net/sensitive.php as well as on MIT's PGP key server and PGP.com's key server. Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to: X-Force xforce@iss.net of Internet Security Systems, Inc. [***** End Internet Security Systems Security Advisory ISS-101 *****] [***** Start HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY SECURITY BULLETIN: #00175 *****] Document ID HPSBUX0111-175 Date Loaded 20020220 Title Sec. Vulnerability in dtspcd (rev. 2) ----------------------------------------------------------------- HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY SECURITY BULLETIN #00175 Originally issued 12 Nov. 2001 **Revision 01** 16 Jan. 2002 **Revision 02** 20 Feb. 2002 ----------------------------------------------------------------- The information in the following Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. Hewlett-Packard Company will not be liable for any consequences to any customer resulting from customer's failure to fully implement instructions in this Security Bulletin as soon as possible. ------------------------------------------------------------------ PROBLEM Buffer overflow in dtspcd PLATFORM HP9000 Series 700/800 running HP-UX releases 10.10, 10.20, 10.24, 11.00, 11.04, and 11.11. DAMAGE Possible unauthorized access, possible increased privileges. ** Rev.1 ** SOLUTION Install the appropriate patch for the HP-UX release --->>>> 10.10 PHSS_25785 --->>>> 10.20 PHSS_25786 ** Rev.2 ** --->>>> 10.24 PHSS_26029 --->>>> 11.00 PHSS_25787 ** Rev.2 ** --->>>> 11.04 PHSS_26029 --->>>> 11.11 PHSS_25788 ** Rev.1 ** ** Rev.2 ** MANUAL ACTIONS None AVAILABILITY ** Rev.1 ** ** Rev.2 ** --->>>> The patches for 10.10, 10.20, 10.24, 11.00, 11.04, --->>>> 11.11 are available now. CHANGE SUMMARY ** Rev.1 ** Patches available for 10.10, 10.20, 11.00, 11.11. CHANGE SUMMARY ** Rev.2 ** Patches available for 10.24 and 11.04. ------------------------------------------------------------------ A. Background A buffer overflow has been reported in dtspcd. It may be possible to exploit this overflow to gain unauthorized access. B. Fixing the problem ** Rev.1 ** ** Rev.2 ** --->>>> Patches available for 10.10, 10.20, 10.24, --->>>> 11.00, 11.04, 11.11 C. Recommended solution ** Rev.1 ** ** Rev.2 ** --->>>> Install the appropriate patch for 10.10, 10.20, --->>>> 10.24, 11.00, 11.04, 11.11. --->>>> Note Some of the patches have dependencies on other patches. --->>>> This is documented in the patch text. ** Rev.2 ** --->>>> All patches are now available. The ftp site which had --->>>> temporary fix files will be deleted. D. To subscribe to automatically receive future NEW HP Security Bulletins from the HP IT Resource Center via electronic mail, do the following Use your browser to get to the HP IT Resource Center page at http//itrc.hp.com Use the 'Login' tab at the left side of the screen to login using your ID and password. Use your existing login or the "Register" button at the left to create a login, in order to gain access to many areas of the ITRC. Remember to save the User ID assigned to you, and your password. In the left most frame select "Maintenance and Support". Under the "Notifications" section (near the bottom of the page), select "Support Information Digests". To -subscribe- to future HP Security Bulletins or other Technical Digests, click the check box (in the left column) for the appropriate digest and then click the "Update Subscriptions" button at the bottom of the page. or To -review- bulletins already released, select the link (in the middle column) for the appropriate digest. To -gain access- to the Security Patch Matrix, select the link for "The Security Bulletins Archive". (near the bottom of the page) Once in the archive the third link is to the current Security Patch Matrix. Updated daily, this matrix categorizes security patches by platform/OS release, and by bulletin topic. Security Patch Check completely automates the process of reviewing the patch matrix for 11.XX systems. For information on the Security Patch Check tool, see http//www.software.hp.com/cgi-bin/swdepot_parser.cgi/cgi/ displayProductInfo.pl?productNumber=B6834AA" The security patch matrix is also available via anonymous ftp ftp.itrc.hp.com~ftp/export/patches/hp-ux_patch_matrix On the "Support Information Digest Main" page click on the "HP Security Bulletin Archive". E. To report new security vulnerabilities, send email to security-alert@hp.com Please encrypt any exploit information using the security-alert PGP key, available from your local key server, or by sending a message with a -subject- (not body) of 'get key' (no quotes) to security-alert@hp.com. Permission is granted for copying and circulating this Bulletin to Hewlett-Packard (HP) customers (or the Internet community) for the purpose of alerting them to problems, if and only if, the Bulletin is not edited or changed in any way, is attributed to HP, and provided such reproduction and/or distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes. Any other use of this information is prohibited. HP is not liable for any misuse of this information by any third party. ________________________________________________________________ -----End of Document ID HPSBUX0111-175-------------------------------------- [***** End HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY SECURITY BULLETIN: #00175 *****] Potential Workarounds: Until patches are provided for other versions of Unix, One way to limit this vulnerability is to use TCP Wrappers (or similar "wrapping" technology). This can be configured to limit access to the dtpscd daemon from untrusted networks/systems. dtspcd typically listens on port 6112/tcp. Another option (or in addition to above) is to use packet filtering technology such as network firewalls to reduce the availability of the service to the Internet (Note: firewalls are only one component of an effective security system; there are risks unwanted traffic will still get through). Finally, if the dtspcd daemon is not necessary for operations, disable and remove from configuration. By default, CIAC recommends any unused services be disabled, as dictated by best security practices. [***** End Multiple Vendor Security Bulletins *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Internet Security Systems for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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