__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Center ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI Multiple Local SendMail Vulnerability [SGI Security Advisory 20011101-01-I] November 20, 2001 23:00 GMT Number M-020 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Due to programming bugs in Sendmail, local users can manipulate the mail queue on their system. PLATFORM: All SGI platforms and SGI systems with Sendmail versions before 8.12.1, without the "RestrictQRun" option enabled. DAMAGE: A user can obtain unauthorized access to mail. Sensitive data could be revealed. Mail may be lost by the setting of specific flags and the mail system may be compromised. SOLUTION: A patch is not currently available. Apply the temporary solution as specified by SGI. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is LOW. A local user account is required. ASSESSMENT: ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/m-020.shtml ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start SGI Security Advisory 20011101-01-I *****] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SGI Security Advisory Title: Multiple Local Sendmail Vulnerabilities Number: 20011101-01-I Reference: CVE CAN-2001-0714 and CAN-2001-0715 Date: November 19, 2001 ______________________________________________________________________________ SGI provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. SGI recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. SGI provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall SGI be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ----------------------- - --- Issue Specifics --- - ----------------------- The Sendmail mail delivery subsystem is vulnerable to multiple local attacks that lead to information loss, disclosure of possibly sensitive information and possible mail system compromise. Sendmail versions before 8.12.1, without the "RestrictQRun" option enabled, allow local users to obtain potentially sensitive information about the mail queue by setting flags to enable debug mode. All versions of Sendmail allow any user to process the whole mail queue unless this feature is disabled by the administrator. Due to a programming bug, specific attacker-specified mail delivery options will be honored. It is possible to, for example, force Sendmail to drop queue contents by setting initial message hop count above the limit. Systems that do not allow users to run the queue ("RestrictQRun" option) are not vulnerable to these exploits. "RestrictQRun" is not set by default. SGI has investigated these issues and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. - -------------- - --- Impact --- - -------------- The sendmail daemon is installed by default on IRIX. A local user account on the vulnerable system is required in order to exploit the sendmail daemon. These sendmail vulnerabilities were assigned the following CVEs: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0714 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0715 This issue was reported by BindView RAZOR team: http://razor.bindview.com/publish/advisories/adv_sm812.html These sendmail vulnerabilities have been publicly discussed in Usenet newsgroups and security mailing lists. - -------------------------- - --- Temporary Solution --- - -------------------------- The steps below can be used to configure sendmail so that users are not allowed to run the queue. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Edit the file /etc/sendmail.mc # vi /etc/sendmail.mc {Add the following line} define(`confPRIVACY_FLAGS', `restrictqrun')dnl {Save the file and exit} 3) Rebuild the sendmail.cf file from the modified sendmail.mc file. # /usr/etc/configmail mc2cf 4) Stop and restart sendmail # /etc/init.d/mail stop # /etc/init.d/mail start 5) Return to previous level. # exit % - ---------------- - --- Solution --- - ---------------- Currently, there are no patches available from SGI to address these issues. SGI recommends following the steps from the Temporary Solution section to disable users from being able to run the queue. All versions of IRIX are vulnerable to these exploits unless the above steps are taken. - ------------- - --- Links --- - ------------- SGI Security Advisories can be found at: http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/ SGI Security Patches can be found at: http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/patches/ SGI patches for IRIX can be found at the following patch servers: http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/ SGI freeware updates for IRIX can be found at: http://freeware.sgi.com/ SGI fixes for SGI open sourced code can be found on: http://oss.sgi.com/projects/ SGI patches and RPMs for Linux can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/linux/ or http://oss.sgi.com/projects/sgilinux-combined/download/security-fixes/ SGI patches for Windows NT or 2000 can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/nt/ IRIX 5.2-6.4 Recommended/Required Patch Sets can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/patchset/ IRIX 6.5 Maintenance Release Streams can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html IRIX 6.5 Software Update CDs can be obtained from: http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/ The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/ For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirrors patches.sgi.com security FTP repository) lags behind and does not do a real-time update. - ------------------------ - --- Acknowledgments ---- - ------------------------ SGI wishes to thank the BindView RAZOR team and the users of the Internet Community at large for their assistance in this matter. - ----------------------------------------- - --- SGI Security Information/Contacts --- - ----------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to security-info@sgi.com. ------oOo------ SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/ The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL: http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to security-info@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ . ------oOo------ If there are general security questions on SGI systems, email can be sent to security-info@sgi.com. For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBO/mti7Q4cFApAP75AQGavwP/RO2wE5KpBAA+Rr0qtc2QH3RyQ3+Xmjug r39LBDC2QWWBP9rG9TCKZKujMiaLDPdvBiHRfLc//gctra92d2h1PrJO6Ca/LDl5 emYEbuUmRnTNjcl9nXwIJe/+4qb5q9l2niWCtJx6iykKAeuHXjzGIBYYhGIbddSN gOPYmStA6gE= =KhaE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [***** End SGI Security Advisory 20011101-01-I *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of SGI for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. 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