__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Sun Solaris Buffer Overflow in lpq(1B) Command [Sun(sm) Alert Notification 52443] April 1, 2003 20:00 GMT Number N-068 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A buffer overflow exists in the lpq(1B) command. PLATFORM: * Solaris 2.6 * Solaris 7 DAMAGE: By carefully crafting overflow data, a local attacker could run arbitrary code with root privilege. SOLUTION: Apply workaround or patches as stated in Sun's Alert Notification. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. An attacker would need a legitimate account ASSESSMENT: on the target machine to upgrade the privileges as described. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-068.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/ retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%2F52443&zone_32=category%3Asecurity ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start Sun(sm) Alert Notification 52443 *****] Sun(sm) Alert Notification Sun Alert ID: 52443 Synopsis: Solaris Security Vulnerability due to a Buffer Overflow in lpq(1B) Category: Security Product: Solaris BugIDs: 4236546 Avoidance: Patch State: Resolved Date Released: 31-Mar-2003 Date Closed: 31-Mar-2003 Date Modified: 31-Mar-2003 1. Impact Local unprivileged users may be able to gain unauthorized root access due to a buffer overflow in the lpq(1B) command. This issue is described in NSFOCUS Security Bulletin SA2003-02 available from http://www.nsfocus.com/english/homepage/sa2003-02.htm. Sun acknowledges with thanks, NSFOCUS Information Technology, for bringing this issue to our attention. 2. Contributing Factors This issue can occur in the following releases: SPARC Platform Solaris 2.6 without patch 106235-12 Solaris 7 without patch 107115-12 x86 Platform Solaris 2.6 without patch 106236-12 Solaris 7 without patch 107116-12 Note: Solaris 2.5.1 will not be evaluated regarding the potential impact of the issue described in this Sun Alert document. Solaris 8 and Solaris 9 are not impacted by this issue. 3. Symptoms There are no symptoms that would show the buffer overflow in lpq(1B) has been exploited to gain unauthorized root access to a host. Failed attempts to exploit lpq(1B) might result in a core file being generated. If file(1) was run on this core, it would show that it was produced from lpq(1B). Solution Summary Top 4. Relief/Workaround To work around the described issue, remove the set-user-ID bit from lpstat(1). The lpq(1B) command is a symbolic link to lpstat(1) . This can be done with the following command as the root user: # /usr/bin/chmod u-s /usr/bin/lpstat Note: Removing the set-user-ID bit from the lpstat(1) binary will prevent unprivileged users from displaying information about the print service. 5. Resolution This issue is addressed in the following releases: SPARC Platform Solaris 2.6 with patch 106235-12 or later Solaris 7 with patch 107115-12 or later x86 Platform Solaris 2.6 with patch 106236-12 or later Solaris 7 with patch 107116-12 or later This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS" basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations, warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these agreements. Copyright 2000-2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved. [***** End Sun(sm) Alert Notification 52443 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems, Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) N-058: Vulnerabilities in Webmin/Usermin N-059: Integer overflow in Sun RPC XDR library routines N-060: Vulnerabilities in Tomcat 3.3.1 N-061: OpenSSL Timing-based Attacks on RSA Keys N-062: MIT krb5 Buffer overrun and underrun in Principal Name Handling N-063: Microsoft Windows Script Engine Vulnerability N-064: Sun Buffer Overflow in Web Connector Module of Application Server N-065: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Lotus Notes and Domino N-066: RealPlayer PNG Deflate Heap Corruption Vulnerability N-067: Sendmail MTA Buffer Overflow Vulnerability