__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Microsoft Buffer Overrun in Kernel Message Handling Vulnerability [Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-013] April 16, 2003 19:00 GMT Number N-077 [Revised 28 May 2003] ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A flaw has been discovered in the way the kernel passes error messages to a debugger. PLATFORM: Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition Microsoft Windows 2000 Microsoft Windows XP DAMAGE: A local attacker could potentially gain elevated privileges, including root privileges, and execute arbitrary code. SOLUTION: Apply appropriate Microsoft patch. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. A local attacker could exploit this ASSESSMENT: vulnerability to take any action on the system including deleting data, adding accounts with administrative access, or reconfiguring the system. The local attacker would need to be able to logon interactively to the system, either at the console or through a terminal session. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-077.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url =/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-013.asp ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-013 *****] Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-013 Buffer Overrun in Windows Kernel Message Handling could Lead to Elevated Privileges (811493) Originally posted: April 16, 2003 Updated: May 28, 2003 Summary Who should read this bulletin: Administrators of Microsoft® Windows NT® 4.0, Windows® 2000 and Windows® XP systems. Impact of vulnerability: Local Elevation of Privilege Maximum Severity Rating: Important Recommendation: Customers should install the patch at the earliest opportunity. Affected Software: Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition Microsoft Windows 2000 Microsoft Windows XP Non Affected Software: Windows Server 2003 End User Bulletin: An end user version of this bulletin is available at: http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/ms03-013.asp. Technical details Technical description: Microsoft re-issued this bulletin on May 28, 2003 to advise on the availability of an updated Windows XP Service Pack 1 patch. This revised patch corrects the performance issues that some customers experienced with the original Windows XP Service Pack 1 patch. Microsoft originally issued this bulletin on April 16, 2003. Subsequent to that date, Microsoft received reports of performance problems with the patch from some Windows XP Service Pack 1 customers. This original Windows XP Service Pack 1 patch did address the security vulnerability discussed in this security bulletin. Microsoft investigated this performance issue and confirmed that there could be performance problems when the original patch was applied to Windows XP Service Pack 1 systems. Microsoft has published a Knowledge Base article, 819634, that describes the known circumstances that can cause the performance problems to manifest themselves with the original patch. Microsoft has subsequentially re-issued the Windows XP Service Pack 1 patch to correct the performance problems. This revised patch can be downloaded from the locations described later in this bulletin. The Windows kernel is the core of the operating system. It provides system level services such as device and memory management, allocates processor time to processes and manages error handling. There is a flaw in the way the kernel passes error messages to a debugger. A vulnerability results because an attacker could write a program to exploit this flaw and run code of their choice. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to take any action on the system including deleting data, adding accounts with administrative access, or reconfiguring the system. For an attack to be successful, an attacker would need to be able to logon interactively to the system, either at the console or through a terminal session. Also, a successful attack would require the introduction of code in order to exploit this vulnerability. Because best practices recommends restricting the ability to logon interactively on servers, this issue most directly affects client systems and terminal servers. Mitigating factors: * A successful attack requires the ability to logon interactively to the target machine, either directly at the console or through a terminal session. * Properly secured servers would be at little risk from this vulnerability. Standard best practices recommend only allowing trusted administrators to log onto such systems interactively; without such privileges, an attacker could not exploit the vulnerability. Severity Rating: Windows NT 4.0 Important Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition Important Windows 2000 Important Windows XP Important The above assessment is based on the types of systems affected by the vulnerability, their typical deployment patterns, and the effect that exploiting the vulnerability would have on them. Vulnerability identifier: CAN-2003-0112 Tested Versions: Microsoft tested Windows NT4, Windows 2000 and Windows XP to assess whether they are affected by these vulnerabilities. Previous versions are no longer supported, and may or may not be affected by these vulnerabilities. Patch availability Download locations for this patch * Windows NT 4.0: * All except Japanese NEC and Chinese - Hong Kong * Japanese NEC * Chinese - Hong Kong * Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition: * All * Windows 2000: * All except Japanese NEC * Japanese NEC * Windows XP: * 32-bit Edition * 64-bit Edition Additional information about this patch Installation platforms: * The Windows NT 4.0 patch can be installed on systems running Service Pack 6a. * The Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition patch can be installed on systems running Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition Service Pack 6. * The Windows 2000 patch can be installed on systems running Windows 2000 Service Pack 2 or Service Pack 3. * The patch for Windows XP can be installed on systems running Windows XP Gold or Service Pack 1. Inclusion in future service packs: The fix for this issue will be included in Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 and Windows XP Service Pack 2. Reboot needed: Yes Patch can be uninstalled: Yes Superseded patches: * The Windows 2000 patch supercedes the Windows 2000 patch discussed in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-007. * The Windows NT 4.0 and Windows XP patches do not supercede any other patches. Verifying patch installation: * Windows NT 4.0: To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that all files listed in the file manifest in Knowledge Base article 811493 are present on the system. * Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition: To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that all files listed in the file manifest in Knowledge Base article 811493 are present on the system. * Windows 2000: To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that the following registry key has been created on the machine: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Updates\Windows 2000\SP4\Q811493. To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information provided in the following registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Updates\Windows 2000\SP4\Q811493\Filelist. * Windows XP: * If installed on Windows XP Gold: To verify that the patch has been installed, confirm that the following registry key has been created on the machine: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP1\Q811493. To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information provided in the following registry key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP1\Q811493\Filelist. * If installed on Windows XP Service Pack 1: To verify that the patch has been installed, confirm that the following registry key has been created on the machine: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP2\Q811493. To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information provided in the following registry key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP2\Q811493\Filelist. Caveats: None. Localization: Localized versions of this patch are available at the locations discussed in “Patch Availability”. Obtaining other security patches: Patches for other security issues are available from the following locations: * Security patches are available from the Microsoft Download Center, and can be most easily found by doing a keyword search for "security_patch". * Patches for consumer platforms are available from the WindowsUpdate web site Other information: Acknowledgments Microsoft thanks Oded Horovitz of Entercept™ Security Technologies for reporting this issue to us and working with us to protect customers. Support: * Microsoft Knowledge Base article 811493 discusses this issue. Knowledge Base articles can be found on the Microsoft Online Support web site. * Technical support is available from Microsoft Product Support Services. There is no charge for support calls associated with security patches. Security Resources: The Microsoft TechNet Security Web Site provides additional information about security in Microsoft products. Disclaimer: The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. Revisions: * V1.0 April 16, 2003: Bulletin Created. * V1.1 April 17, 2003: Included correct patch supercedence information for Windows 2000. * V1.2 April 23, 2003: Added information regarding performance related issues with Windows XP SP1 patch * V1.2 April 23, 2003: Added link to KB article that discusses performance related issues with Windows XP SP1 patch * V2.0 May 28, 2003: Re-issued to advise of availability of revised Windows XP SP1 patch to correct performance issues [***** End Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-013 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. 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