__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Sun Solaris 8 LDAP Clients May Log the Proxy Agent User's Password as Clear Text [Sun Alert ID: 55380] July 22, 2003 19:00 GMT Number N-124 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Local unprivileged users may be able to gain access to the password of the privileged proxy agent on Solaris 8 systems configured as LDAP (see ldap(1)) clients. PLATFORM: Solaris 8 DAMAGE: The password of the privileged proxy agent user may be sent to the syslog daemon (syslogd(1M)) and logged in clear text. SOLUTION: Apply patch or workaround as stated in Sun's Alert. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. Lightweight Directory Access Protocol ASSESSMENT: (LDAP) is widely implemented in systems. A local user account is required to exploit this vulnerability. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-124.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/ retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%2F55380&zone_32=category%3Asecurity ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start Sun Alert ID: 55380 *****] Sun(sm) Alert Notification Sun Alert ID: 55380 Synopsis: Solaris 8 LDAP Clients May Log the Proxy Agent User's Password as Clear Text Category: Security Product: Solaris BugIDs: 4861279 Avoidance: Patch State: Resolved Date Released: 18-Jul-2003 Date Closed: 18-Jul-2003 Date Modified: 1. Impact Local unprivileged users may be able to gain access to the password of the privileged proxy agent on Solaris 8 systems configured as LDAP (see ldap(1)) clients. 2. Contributing Factors This issue can occur in the following releases: SPARC Platform * Solaris 8 with patch 108993-18 through 108993-20 and without patch 108993-21 or later x86 Platform * Solaris 8 with patch 108994-18 through 108994-20 and without patch 108994-21 or later This issue may only occur with Solaris 8 systems configured as LDAP clients. To check if the system is configured as an LDAP client, use the following command: $ ldapclient -l NS_LDAP_FILE_VERSION= 1.0 NS_LDAP_BINDDN= cn=proxyagent,ou=profile,dc=blr03-01,dc=india,dc=sun,dc=com NS_LDAP_BINDPASSWD= {NS1}3d1a48e906c04161baa4 NS_LDAP_SERVERS= 1XX.1XX.233.128 NS_LDAP_SEARCH_BASEDN= dc=blr03-01,dc=india,dc=Sun,dc=COM NS_LDAP_AUTH= NS_LDAP_AUTH_SIMPLE NS_LDAP_SEARCH_REF= NS_LDAP_FOLLOWREF NS_LDAP_SEARCH_SCOPE= NS_LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL NS_LDAP_SEARCH_TIME= 30 NS_LDAP_PROFILE= s8prof1 Notes: * Solaris 2.6, 7 and 9 are not affected * Patch 108994-21 was not issued for standard distribution 3. Symptoms The password of the privileged proxy agent user may be sent to the syslog daemon (syslogd(1M)) and logged in clear text. Solution Summary 4. Relief/Workaround To work around the described issue, edit the "/etc/syslog.conf" file and remove the string "*.err" to prevent the proxy agent user's password from being logged. Change: *.err;kern.debug;mail.crit /var/adm/messages to kern.debug;mail.crit /var/adm/messages Note: Removing the "*.err;" level from the "/etc/syslog.conf" file will result in certain error messages not getting logged. See the syslog.conf(4) man page for more details. 5. Resolution This issue is addressed in the following releases: SPARC Platform * Solaris 8 with patch 108993-21 or later x86 Platform * Solaris 8 with patch 108994-21 or later This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS" basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations, warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these agreements. Copyright 2000-2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved. [***** End Sun Alert ID: 55380 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems, Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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