__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Sun Security Issue Involving the Solaris sadmind(1M) Daemon [Sun Alert ID: 56740] September 16, 2003 18:00 GMT Number N-148 [REVISED 19 Mar 2004] [REVISED 25 Mar 2004] [REVISED 08 Apr 2004] ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Forged AUTH_SYS credentials might be accepted by sadmind(1M), thus allowing privilege escalation. PLATFORM: SPARC & x86: Solaris 7, 8, 9, Trusted Solaris 7, 8 DAMAGE: A local or remote unprivileged user may be able to execute arbitrary commands. SOLUTION: Change configuration for authentication. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. The attacker has to already have an account ASSESSMENT: on the system. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-148.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: Sun Security Alert ID: 56740 http://au.sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-56740-1 ______________________________________________________________________________ REVISION HISTORY: 03/19/04 - Updated Sun Alert ID: 56740 to reflect modifications on 03/17/04, that include changes to the Contributing Factors and Resolution sections. 03/25/04 - Updated Sun Alert ID: 56740 to reflect modifications on 03/24/04, that include changes to the Resolution section. 04/08/04 - Updated Sun Alert ID: 56740 to reflect modifications on 04/06/04, that include changes to the Contributing Factors and Resolution section. [***** Start Sun Alert ID: 56740 *****] Sun(sm) Alert Notification Sun Alert ID: 56740 Synopsis: Security Issue Involving the Solaris sadmind(1M) Daemon Category: Security Product: Solaris BugIDs: 4079984 Avoidance: Workaround, Patch State: Resolved Date Released: 15-Sep-2003, 17-Mar-2004, 18-Mar-2004 Date Closed: 15-Sep-2003 Date Modified: 17-Mar-2004, 18-Mar-2004, 06-Apr-2004 1. Impact A local or remote unprivileged user may be able to execute arbitrary commands with the permissions of the sadmind(1M) daemon on Solaris systems which have sadmind(1M) enabled in inetd.conf(4). The sadmind(1M) daemon normally runs with "root" (uid 0) privileges. If the sadmind(1M) daemon is utilizing the default security level authentication mechanism of AUTH_SYS (see secure_rpc(3NSL)), users may be able to forge AUTH_SYS credentials as described in the sadmind(1M) man page. An exploit has been discovered in the wild and this Sun Alert is to raise awareness of the default sadmind(1M) configuration on Solaris systems. Sun acknowledges, with thanks, iDefense for working with us on this issue. 2. Contributing Factors This issue can occur in the following releases: SPARC Platform Solaris 7 without patch 116456-01 Trusted Solaris 7 Solaris 8 without patch 116455-01 Trusted Solaris 8 04/01 and 12/02 Solaris 9 without patch 116453-01 x86 Platform Solaris 7 without patch 116457-02 Trusted Solaris 7 Solaris 8 without patch 116442-01 Trusted Solaris 8 04/01 and 12/02 Solaris 9 without patch 116454-01 Sites which have sadmind(1M) enabled in inetd.conf(4) with strong authentication (-S 2) are not affected by this issue. To determine if sadmind(1M) is enabled on the system, the following command can be run: $ grep sadmind /etc/inet/inetd.conf 100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind This shows the sadmind(1M) daemon enabled with the default security level authentication mechanism. Note: Previous releases of Solaris and Trusted Solaris which shipped with sadmind(1M) included the same default sadmind(1M) entry in the inetd.conf(4) file. 3. Symptoms If the described issue occurs, the sadmind(1M) entry in the inetd.conf(4) will be enabled (not commented out) and will not be configured to use strong (AUTH_DES -- see secure_rpc(3NSL)) authentication. The following example shows a system which is utilizing weak (AUTH_SYS) authentication and is affected by this issue: $ grep sadmind /etc/inet/inetd.conf 100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind The following example shows a system which is utilizing strong (AUTH_DES) authentication and is not affected by this issue: $ grep sadmind /etc/inet/inetd.conf 100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind -S 2 The following example shows a system which is not utilizing sadmind(1M) as the sadmind entry has been commented out from the inetd.conf(4) file and is not affected by this issue: $ grep sadmind /etc/inet/inetd.conf #100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind 4. Relief/Workaround To workaround this issue, either disable the sadmind(1M) on the systems or enable strong (AUTH_DES) authentication by adding "-S 2" to the sadmind(1M) entry of the inetd.conf(4) file. To disable sadmind(1M) on a Solaris system, do the following: 1. Edit the "/etc/inetd.conf" file and comment out the following line by adding the "#" symbol to the beginning of the line as follows: #100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind 2. Tell the inetd(1M) process to reread the newly modified "/etc/inetd.conf" file by sending it a hangup signal, SIGHUP: # /usr/bin/pkill -HUP inetd To enable strong (AUTH_DES) authentication for sadmind(1M) on a Solaris system, do the following: 1. Edit the "/etc/inetd.conf" file and append "-S 2" to the end of the sadmind line as follows: 100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind -S 2 2. Tell the inetd(1M) process to reread the newly modified "/etc/inetd.conf" file by sending it a hangup signal, SIGHUP: # /usr/bin/pkill -HUP inetd 5. Resolution This issue is addressed in the following releases: SPARC Platform Solaris 7 with patch 116456-01 or later Solaris 8 with patch 116455-01 or later Trusted Solaris 8 07/03 Solaris 9 with patch 116453-01 or later x86 Platform Solaris 7 with patch 116457-02 or later Solaris 8 with patch 116442-01 or later Trusted Solaris 8 07/03 Solaris 9 with patch 116454-01 or later Note: For the Trusted releases the resolution is to use the workaround above. Change History 17-Mar-2004: Updated Contributing Factors and Resolution sections 18-Mar-2004: 24-Mar-2004 Updated Resolution section 06-Apr-2004 Updated Contributing Factors and Resolution sections Updated Contributing Factors and Resolution sections This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS" basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations, warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE NFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these agreements. Copyright 2000-2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved. [***** End Sun Alert ID: 56740 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. 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