__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Microsoft Buffer Overrun in MDAC Function Could Allow Code Execution [MS04-003] January 13, 2004 20:00 GMT Number O-053 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) provides the underlying functionality for a number of database operations, such as connecting to remote databases and returning data to a client. For example, when a client system on a network tries to see a list of computers that are running SQL Server and that reside on the network, it sends a broadcast request to all the devices that are on the network. Due to a flaw in a specific MDAC component, an attacker could respond to this request with a specially crafted packet that could cause a buffer overflow. PLATFORM: Microsoft Data Access Components 2.5 (included with Microsoft Windows 2000) Microsoft Data Access Components 2.6 (included with Microsoft SQL Server 2000) Microsoft Data Access Components 2.7 (included with Microsoft Windows XP) Microsoft Data Access Components 2.8 (included with Microsoft Windows Server 2003) Microsoft Data Access Components 2.8 (included with Microsoft Windows Server 64-Bit Edition) DAMAGE: An attacker could cause a buffer overflow and gain the same level of privileges that are on the system program that initiated the broadcast request. SOLUTION: Install the security update. NOTE--This update replaces the security updates contained in the following bulletin: MS03-033 (CIAC Bulletin N-136). ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. An attacker could gain the same level of ASSESSMENT: privileges that are on the system program that initiated the broadcast request. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/o-053.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url= /technet/security/bulletin/MS04-003.asp CVE/CAN: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name= CVE-2003-0903 ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start MS04-003 *****] Microsoft Security Bulletin MS04-003 Buffer Overrun in MDAC Function Could Allow Code Execution (832483) Issued: January 13, 2004 Version: 1.0 Summary Who should read this document: Customers who are using Microsoft® Windows® Impact of vulnerability: Remote code execution Maximum Severity Rating: Important Recommendation: Customers should install this security update at their earliest opportunity. Security Update Replacement: This update replaces the one that is provided in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-033. Caveats: None Tested Software and Security Update Download Locations: Affected Software: Microsoft Data Access Components 2.5 (included with Microsoft Windows 2000) Microsoft Data Access Components 2.6 (included with Microsoft SQL Server 2000) Microsoft Data Access Components 2.7 (included with Microsoft Windows XP) Microsoft Data Access Components 2.8 (included with Microsoft Windows Server 2003) Note The same update applies to all these versions of MDAC - Download the Update Microsoft Data Access Components 2.8 (included with Windows Server 2003 64-Bit Edition) - Download the Update The software listed above has been tested to determine if the versions are affected. Other versions either no longer include security patch support or may not be affected. Please review the Microsoft Support Lifecycle Web site to determine the support lifecycle for your product and version. Technical Details Technical description: Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) is a collection of components that provides the underlying functionality for a number of database operations, such as connecting to remote databases and returning data to a client. When a client system on a network tries to see a list of computers that are running SQL Server and that reside on the network, it sends a broadcast request to all the devices that are on the network. Because of a vulnerability in a specific MDAC component, an attacker could respond to this request with a specially-crafted packet that could cause a buffer overflow. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same level of privileges over the system as the program that initiated the broadcast request. The actions an attacker could carry out would be dependent on the permissions under which the program using MDAC ran. If the program ran with limited privileges, an attacker would be limited accordingly; however, if the program ran under the local system context, the attacker would have the same level of permissions. Since the original version of MDAC on your system may have changed from updates available on the Microsoft Web site, we recommend using the following tool to determine the version of MDAC you have on your system: Microsoft Knowledge Base article 301202 "HOW TO: Check for MDAC Version" discusses this tool and explains how to use it. Also, Microsoft Knowledge Base article 231943 discusses the release history of the different versions of MDAC. Mitigating factors: For an attack to be successful an attacker would have to simulate a SQL server that is on the same IP subnet as the target system. When a client system on a network tries to see a list of computers that are running SQL Server and that reside on the network, it sends a broadcast request to all the devices that are on the network. A target system must initiate such a broadcast request to be vulnerable to an attack. An attacker would have no way of launching this first step but would have to wait for anyone to enumerate computers that are running SQL Server on the same subnet. Also, a system is not vulnerable by having these SQL management tools installed. Code executed on the client system would only run under the privileges of the client program that made the broadcast request. Severity Rating: Microsoft Data Access Components 2.5 (included with Windows 2000) Important Microsoft Data Access Components 2.6 (included with SQL Server 2000) Important Microsoft Data Access Components 2.7 (included with Windows XP) Important Microsoft Data Access Components 2.8 (included with Windows Server 2003) Important The above assessment is based on the types of systems that are affected by the vulnerability, their typical deployment patterns, and the effect that exploiting the vulnerability would have on them. Vulnerability identifier: CAN-2003-0903 Workarounds Microsoft has tested the following workarounds. These workarounds will not correct the underlying vulnerability. However, they help block known attack vectors. Workarounds may reduce functionality in some cases; in such cases, the reduction in functionality is identified below. Block UDP port 1434 from accepting inbound traffic. Block UDP port 1434 on your system's network interface from accepting inbound traffic. For example, to block network traffic that originates from a Windows 2000-based computer that comes from UDP 1434 to this host, type the following at the command line: ipsecpol -w REG -p "Block UDP 1434 Filter" -r "Block Inbound UDP 1434 Rule" -f *=0:1434:UDP -n BLOCK -x See Microsoft Knowledge Base article 813878 "How to Block Specific Network Protocols and Ports by Using IPSec" for more information about IPsec and the technology that this workaround uses. Impact of Workaround: SQL client systems would no longer be able to initiate SQL broadcast requests. For example, tools like SQL Enterprise Manager use broadcast requests to enumerate all SQL Server instances on a subnet. The workaround would also prevent connections to non-default instances of SQL Server. An example of non-default instances of SQL server is additional instances of SQL server that are installed on the same computer. Obtaining other security updates: Updates for other security issues are available from the following locations: Security updates are available from the Microsoft Download Center, and can be most easily found by doing a keyword search for "security_patch". Updates for consumer platforms are available from the WindowsUpdate Web site. Support: Technical support is available from Microsoft Product Support Services at 1-866-PCSAFETY for customers in the U.S. and Canada. There is no charge for support calls that are associated with security updates. International customers can get support from their local Microsoft subsidiaries. There is no charge for support associated with security updates. Information on how to contact Microsoft support is available at the International Support Web Site. Security Resources: The Microsoft TechNet Security Web Site provides additional information about security in Microsoft products. Microsoft Software Update Services Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA): Please view Knowledge Base Article 306460 for list of security updates that have detection limitations with the MBSA tool. Windows Update Windows Update Catalog: Please view Knowledge Base Article 323166 for more information on the Windows Update Catalog. Office Update Software Update Services (SUS): Microsoft Software Update Services (SUS) enables administrators to quickly and reliably deploy the latest critical updates and security updates to Windows® 2000 and Windows Server™ 2003-based servers, as well as to desktop computers running Windows 2000 Professional or Windows XP Professional. For information about how to deploy this security update with Software Update Services, visit the Software Update Services Web site. Systems Management Server (SMS): Systems Management Server can provide assistance deploying this security update. For information about Systems Management Server visit the SMS Web Site. Disclaimer: The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. Revisions: V1.0 January 13, 2004: Bulletin published [***** End MS04-003 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) O-043: Red Hat Updated Kernel Packages O-044: Sun Security Issue Involving the tcsh(1) ls-F Builtin on Solaris 8 O-045: Red Hat 'mremap()' function Vulnerability O-046: HP 'ypxfrd' daemon Vulnerability O-047: Debian 'nd' WebDAV command line Buffer Overflow Vulnerability O-048: Debian fsp Buffer Overflow Vulnerability O-049: Red Hat Updated CVS Packages Fix Minor Security Issue O-050: Cisco Vulnerabilities in H.322 Message Processing O-051: Microsoft Buffer Overflow in ISA Server 2000 O-052: Microsoft Vulnerability in Exchange Server 2003 Could Lead to Privilege Escalation