__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Vulnerability May Allow Users With the "File System Management" RBAC Profile to Gain Elevated Privileges [Sun Alert ID: 102514] August 21, 2006 22:00 GMT Number Q-289 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A security vulnerability in the default Role-Based Access Control configuration associated with the "File System Management" profile may allow a local user who has been assigned that profile to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the "root" user. PLATFORM: Solaris 9 Operating System Solaris 8 Operating System DAMAGE: May allow a local user to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the "root" user. SOLUTION: Apply current patches. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. A local user could execute arbitrary ASSESSMENT: commands with the privileges of root. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/q-289.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-102514-1&searchclause=%22category:security%22%2420%22availability,%2420security%22%2420category:security ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start Sun Alert ID: 102514 *****] Document Audience: PUBLIC Document ID: 102514 Title: Security Vulnerability May Allow Users With the "File System Management" RBAC Profile to Gain Elevated Privileges Copyright Notice: Copyright © 2006 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All Rights Reserved Update Date: Mon Aug 21 00:00:00 MDT 2006 Status Issued Description Top Sun(sm) Alert Notification * Sun Alert ID: 102514 * Synopsis: Security Vulnerability May Allow Users With the "File System Management" RBAC Profile to Gain Elevated Privileges * Category: Security * Product: Solaris 9 Operating System, Solaris 8 Operating System * BugIDs: 4742992 * Avoidance: Patch, Workaround * State: Resolved * Date Released: 21-Aug-2006 * Date Closed: 21-Aug-2006 * Date Modified: 1. Impact A security vulnerability in the default Role-Based Access Control (RBAC, see rbac(5)) configuration associated with the "File System Management" profile may allow a local user who has been assigned that profile to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the "root" user. In addition, a security vulnerability in the format(1M) command may allow a local user who has been granted the "File System Management" RBAC profile (or any custom profile which would allow the user to run the format(1M) command with "root" privileges) to write to the device files associated with local disks with the privileges of the root user. 2. Contributing Factors These issues can occur in the following releases: SPARC Platform * Solaris 8 without patch 108975-10 * Solaris 9 without patch 113072-08 x86 Platform * Solaris 8 without patch 108976-10 * Solaris 9 without patch 114423-07 Notes: 1. Solaris 10 is not impacted by this issue. 2. These issues are only present when at least one non-root user on the system has been granted a profile allowing them to run the format(1M) command with root privileges, for example, the "File System Management" profile. The assignment of profiles to users is configured in the user_attr(4) database. For example, if the host is configured to only use a local file for this database, users with the "File System Management" profile can be identified with a command such as the following: $ grep 'File System Management' /etc/user_attr For hosts which are configured via nsswitch.conf(4) to use a source other than a local file for the user_attr(4) database, please refer to the relevant documentation for that source (for example, ldap(1), ypfiles(4) or nis+(1)). To determine if an individual user has been granted a profile which contains the format(1M) command, the profiles(1) command can be used as in the following example: $ profiles -l testuser | grep /usr/sbin/format usr/sbin/format uid=0 If the host is configured to only use a local file for the exec_attr(4) database, a command similar to the following can be run to determine which profiles grant privileged access to the format(1M) utility: $ grep format /etc/security/exec_attr File System Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/format:euid=0 For hosts which are configured via nsswitch.conf(4) to use a source other than a local file for the exec_attr(4) database, please refer to the relevant documentation for that source (for example, ypfiles(4) or nis+(1)). 3. Symptoms There are no predictable symptoms that would indicate this issue has been exploited to gain elevated privileges or to write to a host's disks. Solution Summary Top 4. Relief/Workaround To work around these issues until patches can be applied, remove references to the 'format' command from the exec_attr(4) database. (However, this will result in those users no longer being granted privileged access to the format command). For example, if the host is configured to only use a local file for the exec_attr(4) database, a '#' symbol can be inserted at the beginning of lines in the "/etc/security/exec_attr" file which reference the 'format' command: $ grep /usr/sbin/format /etc/security/exec_attr #File System Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/format:euid=0 For hosts which are configured via nsswitch.conf(4) to use a source other than a local file for the exec_attr(4) database, please refer to the relevant documentation for that source (for example, ypfiles(4) or nis+(1)). 5. Resolution These issues are addressed in the following releases: SPARC Platform * Solaris 8 with patch 108975-10 or later * Solaris 9 with patch 113072-08 or later x86 Platform * Solaris 8 with patch 108976-10 or later * Solaris 9 with patch 114423-07 or later This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS" basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations, warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. 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[***** End Sun Alert ID: 102514 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. 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