__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Multiple Vulnerabilities in the IOS FTP Server [Cisco Security Advisory Document ID: 90782] May 10, 2007 15:00 GMT Number R-239 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: The Cisco IOS FTP Server feature contains multiple vulnerabilities that can result in a denial of service (DoS) condition, improper verification of user credentials, and the ability to retrieve or write any file from the device filesystem, including the device's safed configuration. This configuration file may include passwords or other sensitive information. PLATFORM: Cisco devices running IOS and configured for FTP server functionality are affected by these issues. DAMAGE: Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized, remote users to access the filesystem on the IOS device, cause the affected device to reload, or execute arbitrary code. SOLUTION: Upgrade to the appropriate version. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. May allow unauthorized, remote users to ASSESSMENT: access the filesystem on the IOS device, cause the affected device to reload, or execute arbitrary code. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/r-239.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070509- iosftp.shtml ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start Cisco Security Advisory Document ID: 90782 *****] Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in the IOS FTP Server Document ID: 90782 Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20070509-iosftp http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070509-iosftp.shtml Revision 1.1 For Public Release 2007 May 09 1600 UTC (GMT) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Please provide your feedback on this document. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contents Summary Affected Products Details Vulnerability Scoring Details Impact Software Version and Fixes Workarounds Obtaining Fixed Software Exploitation and Public Announcements Status of this Notice: FINAL Distribution Revision History Cisco Security Procedures -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary The Cisco IOS FTP Server feature contains multiple vulnerabilities that can result in a denial of service (DoS) condition, improper verification of user credentials, and the ability to retrieve or write any file from the device filesystem, including the device's saved configuration. This configuration file may include passwords or other sensitive information. The IOS FTP Server is an optional service that is disabled by default. Devices that are not specifically configured to enable the IOS FTP Server service are unaffected by these vulnerabilities. This vulnerability does not apply to the IOS FTP Client feature. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070509-iosftp.shtml. Affected Products Vulnerable Products Cisco devices running IOS and configured for FTP server functionality are affected by these issues. IOS versions based on 11.3, 12.0, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3 and 12.4 contain the IOS FTP server feature. The IOS FTP server feature was removed via CSCsg16908. Only certain IOS releases based on the above IOS trains contain the IOS FTP server feature. For a device running Cisco IOS to be vulnerable, the following command must be present in the device configuration: ftp-server enable Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable Cisco devices that do not run IOS are not affected. Cisco IOS devices that do not have the FTP server feature enabled are not affected. Cisco IOS XR is not affected. No other Cisco devices are known to be affected. Details Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the IOS FTP Server feature. These vulnerabilities are documented with the following Cisco bug IDs: CSCek55259 - Improper authorization checking in IOS FTP server CSCse29244 - IOS reload when transferring files via FTP Due to these issues with the IOS FTP server, the feature is being removed. Cisco is considering adding fully featured and secure FTP server functionality at a later date. The IOS FTP Server feature removal is addressed with Cisco bug ID CSCsg16908. Vulnerability Scoring Details Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Cisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco PSIRT will set the bias in all cases to normal. Customers are encouraged to apply the bias parameter when determining the environmental impact of a particular vulnerability. CVSS is a standards based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html. Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss. CSCek55259 - Improper authorization checking in IOS FTP Calculate the environmental score of CSCek55259 CVSS Base Score - 10 Access Vector Access Complexity Authentication Confidentiality Impact Integrity Impact Availability Impact Impact Bias Remote Low Not Required Complete Complete Complete Normal CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3 Exploitability Remediation Level Report Confidence Functional Official-Fix Confirmed CSCse29244 - IOS reload when transferring files via FTP Calculate the environmental score of CSCse29244 CVSS Base Score - 2.0 Access Vector Access Complexity Authentication Confidentiality Impact Integrity Impact Availability Impact Impact Bias Remote Low Required None None Complete Normal CVSS Temporal Score - 1.7 Exploitability Remediation Level Report Confidence Functional Official-Fix Confirmed Impact Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized, remote users to access the filesystem on the IOS device, cause the affected device to reload, or execute arbitrary code. Unauthorized users could retrieve the device's startup-config file from the filesystem. This file may contain information that could allow the attacker to gain escalated privileges. Repeated exploitation of the vulnerabilities could lead to an extended Denial of Service (DoS). Software Version and Fixes When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild" and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label). Software releases that are not listed in the below table are not affected. For more information on the terms "Rebuild" and "Maintenance," consult the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html. Major Release Availability of Repaired Releases Affected 12.0-Based Release Rebuild Maintenance 12.0 Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(40a) or later 12.0T Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(40a) or later 12.0XC Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(40a) or later 12.0XK Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(40a) or later 12.0WC 12.0(5)WC17 Affected 12.1-Based Release Rebuild Maintenance 12.1 Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(40a) or later 12.1T Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(40a) or later 12.1XH Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(40a) or later 12.1XM Vulnerable; migrate to 12.3(21)or later Affected 12.2-Based Release Rebuild Maintenance 12.2 12.2(40a) 12.2(46) 12.2T Vulnerable; migrate to 12.3(21) or later 12.2XA Vulnerable; migrate to 12.3(21) or later 12.2XG Vulnerable; migrate to 12.3(21) or later 12.2XT Vulnerable; migrate to 12.3(21) or later 12.2ZF Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.2ZH Vulnerable; contact TAC 12.2ZJ Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.2ZL Vulnerable; contact TAC 12.2ZN Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later Affected 12.3-Based Release Rebuild Maintenance 12.3 12.3(21) 12.3B Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.3T Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.3TPC Vulnerable; contact TAC 12.3XA Vulnerable; contact TAC 12.3XC Vulnerable; contact TAC 12.3XD Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.3XE Vulnerable; contact TAC 12.3XF Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.3XG Vulnerable; contact TAC 12.3XH Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.3XK Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.3XQ Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.3XR Vulnerable; contact TAC 12.3XS Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.3XX 12.3(8)XX2d 12.3YA Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(12) or later 12.3YD Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(11)T or later 12.3YG Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(11)T or later 12.3YH Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(11)T or later 12.3YI Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(11)T or later 12.3YK Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(11)T or later 12.3YM Vulnerable; contact TAC 12.3YS Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(11)T or later 12.3YT Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(11)T or later 12.3YZ Vulnerable; contact TAC Affected 12.4-Based Release Rebuild Maintenance 12.4 12.4(10b) 12.4(3g) 12.4(7d) 12.4(8c) 12.4(12) 12.4SW Vulnerable; contact TAC 12.4T 12.4(4)T6 12.4(6)T6 12.4(9)T2 12.4(11)T 12.4XA Vulnerable; migrate to 12.4(6)T6 or later 12.4XC 12.4(4)XC6 12.4XD 12.4(4)XD4 12.4XE 12.4(6)XE2 Workarounds Customers can disable the use of the IOS FTP Server feature by executing the following command in configuration mode: no ftp-server enable Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-air-20070509-iosftp.shtml Alternative File Transfer Mechanisms Cisco IOS supports multiple methods for transferring files to and from the device. One such method is Secure Copy (SCP). SCP is supported on Cisco IOS images that support strong cryptography. More information on the SCP feature can be found at the following url: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6350/products_configuration_guide_ chapter09186a00804831d0.html Another alternative is using the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server in IOS. Information on configuring the TFTP server can be found here: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1835/products_configuration_guide _chapter09186a00800ca738.html#wp1000912 If disabling the IOS FTP Server is not feasible, customers can limit FTP access to the device via one of the following mechanisms: Infrastructure ACLs (iACL) Although it is often difficult to block traffic transiting your network, it is possible to identify traffic which should never be allowed to target your infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the border of your network. Infrastructure ACLs are considered a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The ACL example shown below should be included as part of the deployed infrastructure access-list which will protect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range. A sample access list for devices running Cisco IOS is below: !--- Permit FTP services from trusted hosts destined !--- to infrastructure addresses. access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_HOSTS MASK INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES MASK eq 21 access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_HOSTS MASK INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES MASK eq 20 !--- Deny FTP packets from all other sources destined to infrastructure addresses. access-list 150 deny tcp any INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES MASK eq 21 access-list 150 deny tcp any INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES MASK eq 20 !--- Permit all other traffic to transit the device. access-list 150 permit IP any any interface serial 2/0 ip access-group 150 inThe white paper entitled "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for infrastructure protection access lists. This white paper can be obtained here: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/iacl.html. Receive ACLs (rACL) For distributed platforms, Receive ACLs may be an option starting in Cisco IOS Software Versions 12.0(21)S2 for the 12000 (GSR), 12.0(24)S for the 7500, and 12.0(31)S for the 10720. The Receive ACL protects the device from harmful traffic before the traffic can impact the route processor. Receive ACLs are designed to only protect the device on which it is configured. On the 12000, transit traffic is never affected by a receive ACL. Because of this, the destination IP address "any" used in the example ACL entries below only refer to the router's own physical or virtual IP addresses. On the 7500 and 10720, transit traffic with IP options set will be subject to the Receive ACL and permitted or denied accordingly. Receive ACLs are considered a network security best practice, and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security, as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The white paper entitled "GSR: Receive Access Control Lists" will help you identify and allow legitimate traffic to your device and deny all unwanted packets: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/racl.html. The following is the receive path ACL written to permit this type of traffic from trusted hosts: !--- Permit FTP from trusted hosts allowed to the RP. access-list 151 permit tcp TRUSTED_ADDRESSES MASK any eq 21 access-list 151 permit tcp TRUSTED_ADDRESSES MASK any eq 20 !--- Deny FTP from all other sources to the RP. access-list 151 deny tcp any any eq 21 access-list 151 deny tcp any any eq 20 !--- Permit all other traffic to the RP. !--- according to security policy and configurations. access-list 151 permit ip any any !--- Apply this access list to the 'receive' path. ip receive access-list 151Control Plane Policing (CoPP) The Control Plane Policing (CoPP) feature may be used to mitigate these vulnerabilities. In the following example, only FTP traffic from trusted hosts and with 'receive' destination IP addresses is permitted to reach the route processor (RP). It should be noted that dropping traffic from unknown or untrusted IP addresses may affect hosts with dynamically assigned IP addresses from connecting to the Cisco IOS device. access-list 152 deny tcp TRUSTED_ADDRESSES MASK any eq 21 access-list 152 deny tcp TRUSTED_ADDRESSES MASK any eq 20 access-list 152 permit tcp any any eq 20 access-list 152 permit tcp any any eq 21 access-list 152 deny ip any any ! class-map match-all COPP-KNOWN-UNDESIRABLE match access-group 152 ! ! policy-map COPP-INPUT-POLICY class COPP-KNOWN-UNDESIRABLE drop ! control-plane service-policy input COPP-INPUT-POLICYIn the above CoPP example, the ACL entries that match the exploit packets with the "permit" action result in these packets being discarded by the policy-map "drop" function, while packets that match the "deny" action are not affected by the policy-map drop function. CoPP is available in Cisco IOS release trains 12.0S, 12.2SX, 12.2S, 12.3T, 12.4, and 12.4T. Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be found at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6642/products_white_paper0900aecd804fa16a.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com" for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows: +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) e-mail: tac@cisco.com Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a customer. Status of this Notice: FINAL THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070509-iosftp.shtml. In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients: cust-security-announce@cisco.com first-teams@first.org bugtraq@securityfocus.com vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org cisco@spot.colorado.edu cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History Revision 1.1 2007-May-09 Minor grammatical and style edits Revision 1.0 2007-May-09 Initial public release [***** End Cisco Security Advisory Document ID: 90782 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Cisco for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. 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