

IDIOT - Users Guide.

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Abstract

This manual gives a detailed technical description of the IDIOT intrusion detection system from the COAST Laboratory at Purdue University. It is intended to help anyone who wishes to use, extend or test the IDIOT system. Familiarity with security issues, and intrusion detection in particular, is assumed.

Chapter 1

Introduction

This document is the users guide for the IDIOT intrusion detection system developed at the COAST Laboratory.

This section will remain short because a much better description of what IDIOT is, the design goals and the model it works under can be found in the documents included in the `doc/IDIOT` directory in the IDIOT distribution.

The files in that directory are:

kumar-spaf-overview.ps [KS94] This report examines and classifies the characteristics of signatures used in misuse intrusion detection. The document describes a generalized model for matching intrusion signatures based on Colored Petri Nets. This is the first document you should read. We recommend that you stop reading this guide now and return here when you have finished reading that document.

kumar-intdet-phddiss.ps [Kum95] Sandeep Kumar's original Ph.D. thesis. An in-depth description of intrusion detection, the theoretical considerations behind IDIOT, and a description of the model that was used to implement IDIOT.

taxonomy.ps [KS95] This report classifies UNIX vulnerabilities based on the signatures required to detect them, and gives the best overview on how to write IDIOT patterns with examples from real UNIX vulnerabilities. We recommend that you read this document last before you start writing patterns of your own.

IDIOT_work.ps [ES96b] This report outlines the structure of IDIOT, explaining how the components fit and work together. It also describes results from profiling IDIOT against two audit trails and suggests possible approaches to optimizing the program.

debugging_IDIOT.ps [ES96a] This report describes changes made to IDIOT code which allow a greater flexibility in the amount and type of debugging information generated. It also describes a sample IDIOT program that has been included and a utility for separating the debugging information based on its origin, pattern or server.

Chapter 2

Quick Start

The information in this chapter will help you get IDIOT running as fast as possible. However, we suggest that you read the rest of the material in this document before you attempt to use IDIOT.

The following steps must be executed to install IDIOT correctly:

- Read this document at least once
- Edit the Makefile to set the appropriate values for your site
- Give the command “make C2_app1”
- Make sure that `praudit` is in your path
- Run IDIOT

For the rest of this section we give an example of how to install and run IDIOT for the first time.

We start in a directory that contains only the IDIOT tar file:

```
solaria 51 % pwd
./mordor/home/gollum/IDIOT

solaria 52 % ls
idiot.tar
```

Extract the files from the tar file:

```
solaria 53 % tar xfv idiot.tar
x doc, 0 bytes, 0 tape blocks
x doc/manual, 0 bytes, 0 tape blocks
x doc/manual/docs.ps, 135856 bytes, 266 tape blocks
x doc/IDIOT, 0 bytes, 0 tape blocks
x doc/IDIOT/kumar-intdet-phddiss.ps, 903856 bytes, 1766 tape blocks
x doc/IDIOT/kumar-spaf-overview.ps, 673780 bytes, 1316 tape blocks
x doc/IDIOT/taxonomy.ps, 645109 bytes, 1260 tape blocks
x C2_patterns, 0 bytes, 0 tape blocks
x C2_patterns/creating-setid-scripts, 440 bytes, 1 tape blocks
x C2_patterns/executing-progs, 1618 bytes, 4 tape blocks
x C2_patterns/lpr_copy_files, 1295 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x C2_patterns/print-mknods, 918 bytes, 2 tape blocks
x C2_patterns/setuid-writes-setuid, 3026 bytes, 6 tape blocks
x C2_patterns/writing-to-executable-files, 2671 bytes, 6 tape blocks
x C2_patterns/writing-to-nonowned-files, 1711 bytes, 4 tape blocks
x apps, 0 bytes, 0 tape blocks
x apps/profile.C, 1831 bytes, 4 tape blocks
x apps/jig.C, 1625 bytes, 4 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns, 0 bytes, 0 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/3-failed-logins, 1166 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/access-open-to-same-path-diff-inodes, 4522 bytes, 9 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/bin-mail, 2534 bytes, 5 tape blocks
```

```

x other_C2_patterns/clarke-wilson, 2813 bytes, 6 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/dir-browser, 1266 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/dont-follow-sym-links, 2938 bytes, 6 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/failed-su, 307 bytes, 1 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/finger, 1041 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/le, 1525 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/passwd-Fattack, 1593 bytes, 4 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/priv-pgm-in-userspace, 575 bytes, 2 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/rcw, 2185 bytes, 5 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/setid-pgms-cant-spawn-shell, 1076 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/shell-script-attack, 532 bytes, 2 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/tftp, 1239 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/timing-attack, 1122 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x other_C2_patterns/writing-to-nonowned-dot-files, 1057 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x audit_trails, 0 bytes, 0 tape blocks
x audit_trails/creating-setid-scripts.audit_trail, 42632 bytes, 84 tape blocks
x audit_trails/executing-progs.audit_trail, 20389 bytes, 40 tape blocks
x audit_trails/lpr_copy_files.audit_trail, 1125555 bytes, 2199 tape blocks
x audit_trails/print-mknods.audit_trail, 23070 bytes, 46 tape blocks
x audit_trails/setuid-writes-setuid.audit_trail, 15496 bytes, 31 tape blocks
x audit_trails/writing-to-executable-files.audit_trail, 8975 bytes, 18 tape blocks
x audit_trails/writing-to-nonowned-files.audit_trail, 8376 bytes, 17 tape blocks
x C2_Server.C, 15997 bytes, 32 tape blocks
x DL_list.h, 2807 bytes, 6 tape blocks
x pattern.l, 8072 bytes, 16 tape blocks
x C2_Server.h, 3425 bytes, 7 tape blocks
x Expr.C, 14448 bytes, 29 tape blocks
x praudit.h, 3174 bytes, 7 tape blocks
x C2_appl.C, 5500 bytes, 11 tape blocks
x IP_Server.C, 47532 bytes, 93 tape blocks
x C2_events.h, 12287 bytes, 24 tape blocks
x showaudit.pl, 16986 bytes, 34 tape blocks
x utilities.C, 4086 bytes, 8 tape blocks
x utils.h, 3248 bytes, 7 tape blocks
x Makefile, 9519 bytes, 19 tape blocks
x DL_llist.C, 1087 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x abs_class.h, 1282 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x pat.y, 74752 bytes, 146 tape blocks
x DL_llist.h, 1445 bytes, 3 tape blocks
x pattern.h, 14607 bytes, 29 tape blocks
x README, 24 bytes, 1 tape blocks

```

```

solaria 54 % ls
C2_Server.C      DL_list.h      audit_trails/  praudit.h
C2_Server.h     Expr.C         doc/           showaudit.pl*
C2_appl.C       IP_Server.C    idiot.tar      utilities.C
C2_events.h     Makefile      other_C2_patterns/  utils.h
C2_patterns/   README        pat.y
DL_llist.C     abs_class.h   pattern.h
DL_llist.h     apps/         pattern.l

```

Make the C2_appl application:

```

solaria 56 % /usr/local/gnu/make C2_appl
/opt/SUNWsprow/bin/CC -xpg +d -c C2_appl.C
"C2_appl.C", line 138: Warning (Anachronism): Formal argument patternfile of type char*
in call to C2_Server::parse_file(char*) is being passed const char*.
"C2_appl.C", line 138: Note: Type "CC -migration" for more on anachronisms.
"C2_appl.C", line 144: Warning (Anachronism): Formal argument file of type char* in call
to C2_Server::dlink_file(char*) is being passed const char*.
2 Warning(s) detected.
/opt/SUNWsprow/bin/CC -xpg +d -c C2_Server.C
"/usr/include/sys/sysmacros.h", line 104: Warning (Anachronism): Attempt to redefine
major without using #undef.
"/usr/include/sys/sysmacros.h", line 104: Note: Type "CC -migration" for more on
anachronisms.
"/usr/include/sys/sysmacros.h", line 109: Warning (Anachronism): Attempt to redefine
minor without using #undef.
"/usr/include/sys/sysmacros.h", line 115: Warning (Anachronism): Attempt to redefine
makedev without using #undef.
3 Warning(s) detected.
yacc -d -v pat.y
2 rules never reduced

conflicts: 11 shift/reduce, 2 reduce/reduce
/opt/SUNWsprow/bin/CC -xpg +d -c -o yacc.o y.tab.c
"pattern.h", line 432: Warning (Anachronism): Temporary created for argument newt in
call to Table<int>::push(int&).
"pattern.h", line 432: Note: Type "CC -migration" for more on anachronisms.
1 Warning(s) detected.
lex pattern.l
/opt/SUNWsprow/bin/CC -xpg +d -c -o lex.o lex.yy.c
"pattern.h", line 432: Warning (Anachronism): Temporary created for argument newt in
call to Table<int>::push(int&).

```

```

"pattern.h", line 432: Note: Type "CC -migration" for more on anachronisms.
1 Warning(s) detected.
/opt/SUNWsprow/bin/CC      -c -xpg  +d Expr.C -o Expr.o
"pattern.h", line 432: Warning (Anachronism): Temporary created for argument newt in
  call to Table<int>::push(int&).
"pattern.h", line 432: Note: Type "CC -migration" for more on anachronisms.
1 Warning(s) detected.
/opt/SUNWsprow/bin/CC      -xpg  +d -c utilities.C
/opt/SUNWsprow/bin/CC      -xpg  +d C2_appl.o C2_Server.o yacc.o lex.o Expr.o \
  utilities.o -ldl -lrwtool -lgen -o C2_appl

```

Make sure that the `praudit` command is in the execution path.

```

solaria % which praudit
/usr/sbin/praudit
solaria 65 % set path=($path /usr/sbin)

```

Run the `C2_appl` application to test the program. In this case we will compile, link and run a sample pattern and audit trail shipped with IDIOT. Parse the pattern:

```

solaria 57 % ./C2_appl
tini> parse C2_patterns/creating-setid-scripts
Parsing file C2_patterns/creating-setid-scripts
-----
Inside stmt reduced expr: printf("User id %d has successfully setid'ed %file %s\n",
  unified_tok->get_RUID(), unified_tok->get_FULL_NAME())
-----
-----
Inside stmt reduced expr: (((eve->ERR() == 0) &&
unified_tok->assign_RUID(eve->RUID())) &&
unified_tok->assign_FULL_NAME(eve->OBJ())) &&
eve->OBJ_NEWMODS() > 511)
-----
-----
Parsing transition chmod
-----
start          -> chmod
               <-
after_chmod    ->
               <- chmod
-----
CC -pic -G -g -o cr_setid_pgms.so cr_setid_pgms.C
"cr_setid_pgms.C", line 290: Warning (Anachronism): Formal argument val of type char*
  in call to C2_cr_setid_pgms-Token::assign_FULL_NAME(char*) is being passed const char*.
"cr_setid_pgms.C", line 290: Note: Type "CC -migration" for more on anachronisms.
1 Warning(s) detected.
Done compiling cr_setid_pgms.C
Inside create pattern.
Instantiated new pattern instance for cr_setid_pgms

```

Link the resulting compiled pattern:

```

tini> dlink /homes/gollum/IDIOT/cr_setid_pgms.so
Linking file /homes/gollum/IDIOT/cr_setid_pgms.so
Inside create pattern.

```

Run the pattern with the corresponding audit trail.

```

tini> run audit_trails/creating-setid-scripts.audit_trail
Showaudit: will execute the following command: tail +0 audit_trails/creating-setid-scripts.audit_trail | praudit -r |
User id 833 has successfully setid'ed file /.mordor/home/gollum/aaa.aaa
User id 833 has successfully setid'ed file /.mordor/home/gollum/bbb.bbb
User id 833 has successfully setid'ed file /.mordor/home/gollum/ccc.ccc
User id 833 has successfully setid'ed file /.mordor/home/gollum/ddd.ddd
Showaudit: No of dropped events = 147
Showaudit: Could not follow the next audit file at ./showaudit.pl line 92.

```

NOTE: If you get an error message of the form `Don't handle events of type 0 yet!` then IDIOT was not able to open the audit trail. Verify that the `praudit` program is in your path and try again.

Chapter 3

IDIOT Patterns

There are currently three classes of pattern being shipped with IDIOT. They are:

1. *Written and tested patterns.* These are patterns that we have written and tested and can present audit trails known to trigger the patterns.
2. *Written but not tested.* These patterns were written but could not be tested either through lack of time or limitations in the underlying audit trail.
3. *Theoretical patterns.* These patterns are written to demonstrate a particular point, but cannot be handled by the IDIOT system currently.

Each of the following sections describes the different pattern types.

3.1 Written and Tested patterns

These patterns have been written and tested. They are shipped as working patterns to demonstrate IDIOT's capabilities, and to be used in a real environment.

These patterns can be found in the `C2_patterns` directory. The audit trails to exercise these patterns are in a directory `audit_trails` under the main IDIOT distribution directory. Each pattern has an associated audit file named `<pattern_name>_audit_file` in the `audit_trails` directory.

3.1.1 Detecting when programs create setuid programs. PATTERN:creating-setid-scripts

Very few programs should create setuid files and system administrators often run programs that search the file system looking for unauthorized setuid files. This pattern will warn when a program creates a seuid file.

Vulnerabilities detected

Many vulnerabilities can *sometimes* be detected with this pattern.

State machine

Figure 3.1 illustrates the pattern.




Figure 3.1: State machine

Pattern being used

```
pattern cr_setid_pgms "Monitor creation of setid programs." priority 7
state start, after_chmod;
str FULL_NAME;
int RUID;
post_action {
    printf("User id %d has successfully setid'ed file %s\n", RUID, FULL_NAME);
}

trans chmod(CHMOD)
<- start;
-> after_chmod;
|_ {
    this[ERR] = 0 && RUID = this[RUID] && FULL_NAME = this[OBJ] &&
    this[OBJ_NEWMODS] > 511;
}
end chmod;
end cr_setid_pgms;
```

Note: the final clause in this guard would be best written as:

```
(this[OBJ_NEWMODS] & 06000) && (this[OBJ_NEWMODS] & 0111)
```

Discussion

The pattern described in this document was tested under Solaris 2.4 using the BSM C2 audit trail generated by the `auditd` daemon.

An attacker, a user called *gollum*, ran the following exploit script.

```
#!/bin/sh

touch aaa.aaa
touch bbb.bbb
touch ccc.ccc
touch ddd.ddd

chmod 2750 aaa.aaa    # setgid
chmod 4755 bbb.bbb   # setuid
chmod ugo+xs ccc.ccc # setuid and setgid
chmod 6007 ddd.ddd   # undefined (setuid and segid
                    # but not executable)

# Get rid of the files created
rm aaa.aaa bbb.bbb ccc.ccc ddd.ddd
```


The execution of IDIOT server with the audit trail generated for user *gollum* produces the following output:

```
User id 833 has successfully setid'ed file /.mordor/home/gollum/aaa.aaa
User id 833 has successfully setid'ed file /.mordor/home/gollum/bbb.bbb
User id 833 has successfully setid'ed file /.mordor/home/gollum/ccc.ccc
User id 833 has successfully setid'ed file /.mordor/home/gollum/ddd.ddd
```

3.1.2 Detecting the execution of attack programs. PATTERN: executing-progs

Sometimes users import attack scripts and run them with little or no modifications. We can detect the execution of well known attack scripts and programs by searching for well-known program names.

Vulnerabilities detected

CA-93:14 Internet Security Scanner will scan sites for potential security holes.

CA*** Crack tool for obtaining passwords.

State machine

Figure 3.2 illustrates the pattern.




Figure 3.2: State machine

Pattern being used

```
extern str Basename(str);

pattern ex_prt_pgms "Watch for executions of cops/gimme etc." priority 7
state start, after_exec;
str FULL_PROG, PROG;
int RUID;

post_action {
    printf("User id %d has successfully executed %s\n", RUID, FULL_PROG);
}

/*
 * The routine Basename is defined as a call to the system function
 * basename. Given a pointer to a null-terminated character string that
 * contains a path name, basename() returns a pointer to the last element
 * of the path. Trailing "/" characters are deleted.
 */
trans exec(EXECVE)
<- start;
-> after_exec;
|_ { this[ERR] = 0 && RUID = this[RUID] && PROG = Basename(this[PROG]) &&
```

```

        FULL_PROG = this[PROG] &&
        (PROG =~ "cops" || PROG =~ "gimme" || PROG =~ "crack"); }
    end exec;
end execute_particular_pgms;

```

Note: this pattern can also detect the [CA-95:06] advisory on the SATAN tool. This can be done by adding `PROG =~ "satan"` to the last clause in the guard.

Discussion

How does this pattern work? It is composed of essentially one transition — when an EXECVE occurs, it checks to see if the executed program is one of the prohibited list. If it is, then the pattern has terminated, and the post action is taken. This prints out a friendly informational message.

We need to know two things while executing this pattern; the name of the program being exec'd and the user id of the user executing the program. When the `execve` system call is executed, the name of the program to execute is specified. This is recorded in the audit file. We can access this program name using the `this[PROG]` construct, which returns the program name from this audit record. We record the full program name in the variable `FULL_PROG` so it can be displayed in the post action. This variable is of type `str`, which is a string class from the Rogue Wave library.

The user id is returned using the `this[RUID]` construct. It extracts the `uid` field of the audit record. We assign it to a local variable so it can be displayed later in the post action.

To actually detect running a specific program, we use the pattern matching operator `=~` . This works as in PERL. In this case, we are only interested in exactly the filename specified.

The pattern described in this document was tested under Solaris 2.4 using the BSM C2 audit trail generated by the `auditd` daemon. An attacker, a user called *gollum*, has the following files in his home directory:

```

gollum % ls -l
-rwxrw-r-- 2 gollum gollum      10 Nov 26 18:13 crack*
-rwxrw-r-- 1 gollum gollum      45 Nov 26 18:14 exploit*
-rwxrw-r-- 2 gollum gollum      10 Nov 26 18:13 hidden_hard*
lrwxrwxrwx 1 gollum gollum       5 Nov 26 18:14 hidden_sym -> crack*

```

The `exploit` script executed contains the commands:

```

#!/bin/sh
./crack
./hidden_sym
./hidden_hard

```

The execution of IDIOT on the audit trail generated for user *gollum* on produces the following output:

```

User id 833 has successfully executed /.mordor/home/gollum/crack
User id 833 has successfully executed /.mordor/home/gollum/crack

```

The program has detected two of the three executions of the program `crack`. In fact, the two instances detected are the first two lines of the `exploit` script. It is unfortunate that we cannot detect which execution produces which line of output. As shown next, the audit trail events generated for both are identical.

```
header,118,2,execve(2),,Sun Nov 26 18:16:12 1995, + 258009000 msec
path,/.mordor/home/gollum/crack
attribute,100764,gollum,gollum,38535233,40582,0
subject,gollum,gollum,gollum,gollum,gollum,17720,18887,0 5 solaria
return,success,0
```

```
header,119,2,execve(2),,Sun Nov 26 18:16:12 1995, + 348002000 msec
path,/.mordor/home/gollum/crack
attribute,100764,gollum,gollum,38535233,40582,0
subject,gollum,gollum,gollum,gollum,gollum,17721,18887,0 5 solaria
return,success,0
```

3.1.3 lpr can copy a file over any arbitrary file: PATTERN: lpr_copy_files

The line printer program can be made to overwrite arbitrary files on the system. `lpr` is a setuid root program that copies files to print into the spooler directory. The files are then printed from the spooler directory. If the `-s` option is used, the `lpr` program creates a link to the file in the spool directory. However, the temporary names created in the spool directory will wrap around after 1000 print jobs.

By forcing these names to wrap around, the `lpr` program can copy an arbitrary file over a link which points to a destination file. This will cause the destination file to be overwritten, even if the user did not have permission to access that file.

Vulnerabilities detected

8lgm -Advisory-3.UNIX.lpr.19-Aug-1991 `lpr` can overwrite any arbitrary file.

State machine

Figure 3.3 illustrates the pattern.




Figure 3.3: Detect `lpr` copying arbitrary files

Pattern being used

```
/*
 * lpr_copy_files
 *
 * Detects if lpr tries to overwrite a file outside of /usr/spool
 *
 * [8lgm]-Advisory-3.UNIX.lpr.19-Aug-1991
 *
 * Mark Crosbie February 1996
 */

extern int inTree(str, str);
extern int true_print(str);
```

```

extern int strmatch(str, str);

pattern lpr_copy_files "lpr copies files not in spool dir" priority 7

state start, after_lpr_exec, after_copy;
str PROG, FILE;

int RUID, PID;

post_action {
    printf("User %d attempted to copy over file %s\n", RUID, FILE);
}

/* the invariant states that we will delete tokens in the state
 * machine once the process exits. If lpr exits, there's no point
 * continuing to try to match for the attack.
 */

neg invariant first_inv /* negative invariant */
state start_inv, final;

trans exit(EXIT)
    <- start_inv;
    -> final;
    | _ { PID = this[PID]; }
end exit;
end first_inv;

trans exec_lpr(EXECVE)
    <- start;
    -> after_lpr_exec;
    | _ {
        this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && PROG = this[PROG] &&
        RUID = this[RUID] &&
        (strmatch(".*lpr", this[PROG]) = 1) && this[EUID] = 0;
    }
end exec_lpr;

trans do_copy(CREAT)
    <- after_lpr_exec;
    -> after_copy;
    | _ {
        this[ERR] = 0 && this[PID] = PID && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (inTree("^/var/spool/", this[OBJ]) = 0);
    }
end do_copy;

end lpr_copy_files;

```

Discussion

The `lpr` command is a `setuid` root program that places files in the spool directory on behalf of users. Typically it places a copy of the file in the spool directory, but if given the `-s` option, it will create a symbolic link to the file in the spool directory. If given the `-q` option, it will place the file in the directory, but not enqueue it for printing.

The files in the spool directory have a very predictable name. The name of a spool file starts with `cf` for a control file and `df` for its associated data file. For example, executing the command `lpr -Poz -q -s .aliases` (where `oz` is the name of our local printer), creates the two files in the `/var/spool/lpq/oz` directory:

```

-rw-rw---- 1 daemon daemon 152 Feb 19 17:54 cfA278yavin.cs.purdue.edu
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root daemon 23 Feb 19 17:54 dfA278yavin.cs.purdue.edu -> /home/mcrosbie/.aliases

```

The number after the `cfA` and `dfA` part of the file names will increment after every print command. Thus, after a thousand print commands, the file `dfA278yavin.cs.purdue.edu` will be reused.

The essence of this attack is to create a link in the spool directory to a file you want to overwrite. Then, execute a thousand prints until the number in the spool directory filename wraps around, then print the file

you want to overwrite with. The `lpr` program will write over the existing link, and as it is `setuid root`, it can overwrite whatever that link pointed to.

The IDIOT pattern presented above detects this attack by seeing if the `lpr` program overwrites any files outside of the `/var/spool` directory tree. If so, it prints a warning. The audit trail in Solaris encodes the final destination filename when accessing a link, so this is available to the pattern.

A sample run is shown below:

```
tini> run audit_data/lpr_copy_files.audit_data
Showaudit: will execute the following command: tail +0 audit_data/lpr_copy_files.audit_data | praudit -r |
Showaudit: No of dropped events = 123
User 727 attempted to copy over file /home/mcrosbie/tmp/overwriteme
User 727 attempted to copy over file /home/mcrosbie/tmp/overwriteme
tini> Program ended
```

3.1.4 Print all executions of `mknod`. PATTERN: `print-mknods`

If a user creates a device, it is possible to access the disk or other system resources without proper authorization. For example, if a user created a device in a local directory with the same device numbers as the root disk, then that user could access and change any information on the disk.

Pattern State Machine

The state machine is very simple and is shown in Figure 3.4.




Figure 3.4: State machine for detecting `mknodes`

Pattern code

```
/*
 * print-mknods
 *
 * Print all successful mknods
 *
 * Mark Crosbie November 1995
 */

/* returns TRUE if the mode of the file corresponds to a block special
 * or char special file - is it a device?
 */
extern int isdev(int);

pattern mknod "Print all successful mknods" priority 7
state start, after_mknod;
int RUID, DEV;

/* path of the device the user created */
str PATH;

/* report creating a device */
```

```

post_action {
    printf("User id %d successfully created a device in %s.\n", RUID, PATH);
}

/* only one transition needed - if we see a MKNOD event then see if
 * the user has successfully created a device
 */
trans makenode(MKNOD)
<- start;
-> after_mknod;
|_ {
    /* isdev() returns TRUE if the device mode used in the mknod()
     * indicates a device type (either char or block special)
     */
    this[ERR] = 0 && isdev(this[DEV_MODE]) = 1 &&
    RUID = this[RUID] && PATH = this[OBJ];
}
end makenode;
end mknod;

```

Discussion

When a device is created, the `mknod` command is used. A parameter specifies the mode used to create the device. If this mode indicates that this is a block special or character special file, then the message is printed.

A utility routine `isdev()` is used to check the mode of the device being created. If this is special file (i.e. a device), `isdev()` returns TRUE. If this occurs, and the MKNOD succeeded, then the user ID and path of the device are recorded and displayed.

Output from IDIOT

IDIOT produces the following output when presented with the attack audit trail:

```

tini> run audit_data/mknod.audit_data
Showaudit: will execute the following command: tail +0
audit_data/mknod.audit_data | praudit -r |
User id 0 successfully created a device in
/home/mcrosbie/myIDIOT/audit_data/xxx.
Showaudit: No of dropped events = 79

```

3.1.5 Detecting when setuid programs write to setuid or executable programs. PATTERN: setuid-writes-setuid

Very few setuid programs should write to other setuid or executable files, and many attack scenarios share these characteristics. Rogue setuid programs will often create setuid shells or alter system owned executable programs to alter their behavior. Hence, it is desirable to detect whenever such behavior and report it as suspicious.

This pattern will warn when a setuid program creates or opens a seuid file (or executable program) for write. It will also report when a setuid program opens a setuid or executable file for read only, using the `open` system call, and specifies that the file should be created if it does not already exist.

Vulnerabilities detected

Many of the vulnerabilities listed below can *sometimes* be detected with this pattern. In particular, when any of these setuid programs creates or opens a setuid or executable file.

8lgm-Advisory-3.UNIX.lpr.19-Aug-1991 Any user with access to `lpr` can alter system files and thus become root. We can only detect the vulnerability if `lpr` creates or opens for write a setuid or executable file.

8lgm-Advisory-11.UNIX.sadc.07-Jan-1992 `sadc` can be used to create files in normally unwritable directories. `sadc` normally runs `egid sys`, and therefore can be used to create files in group `sys` writeable directories. We can only detect the vulnerability if `sadc` creates or opens for write a setuid or executable file.

8lgm-Advisory-5.UNIX.mail.24-Jan-1992 A race condition exists in `binmail`, which allows files to be created in arbitrary places on the filesystem. These files can be owned by arbitrary (usually system) users. We can only detect the vulnerability if `binmail` creates or opens for write a setuid or executable file.

8lgm-Advisory-6.UNIX.mail2.2-May-1994 The old race condition still exists in the patched `binmail`, which allows files to be created in arbitrary places on the filesystem. These files can be owned by arbitrary (usually system) users. We can only detect the vulnerability if `binmail` creates or opens for write a setuid or executable file.

8lgm-Advisory-15.UNIX.mail3.28-Nov-1994 A hole in `binmail` allows files to be created as root. We can only detect the vulnerability if `binmail` creates or opens for write a setuid or executable file.

CA-95:05 Sendmail Vulnerabilities February 22, 1995. This advisory supersedes all previous CERT advisories on `sendmail`. The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of several problems with `sendmail`, one of which is widely known. The problems occur in many versions of `sendmail`. We can only detect the vulnerability if `sendmail` creates or opens for write a setuid or executable file.

CA-95:08 Sendmail v.5 Vulnerability August 17, 1995. In `sendmail` version 5, there is a vulnerability that intruders can exploit to create files, append to existing files, or execute programs. We can only detect the vulnerability if `sendmail` creates or opens for write a setuid or executable file.

State machine

Figure 3.5 illustrates the pattern.

Pattern being used

```
extern int isexec(int), issid(int);

/*
 * Very few setuid programs should write to other setuid or executable
 * files. This pattern will warn when a setuid program creates or
 * opens a seuid file (or executable program) for write.
 */
pattern setuidwritessetuid "setuid program writes to a setuid or executable file" priority 10
int PID;
str FILE;
str PROGRAM;
state start, after_exec, violation;

post_action {
    printf("setuid program %s created/opened for write the setuid or executable file %s.\n",
        PROGRAM, FILE);
}
```




Figure 3.5: State machine


```

neg invariant first_inv /* negative invariant */
state start_inv, final;

trans exit(EXIT)
  <- start_inv;
  -> final;
  | _ { PID = this[PID]; }
end exit;
end first_inv;

trans exec(EXECVE)
  <- start;
  -> after_exec;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1
        && PROGRAMME = this[PROG]; }
end exec;

trans mod3(CREAT)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod3;

trans mod4(OPEN_RW)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod4;

trans mod5(OPEN_RWC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod5;

trans mod6(OPEN_RWTC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod6;

trans mod7(OPEN_RWT)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod7;

trans mod8(OPEN_W)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod8;

trans mod9(OPEN_WC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod9;

trans mod10(OPEN_WTC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod10;

trans mod11(OPEN_WT)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod11;

trans mod12(OPEN_RC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod12;

```

```
end setuidwritessetuid;
```

Discussion

The pattern described in this document was tested under Solaris 2.4 using the BSM C2 audit trail generated by the `auditd` daemon. The following `setuid` programs were created:

```
/* Program: test1 */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>

main() {
    /* create a setuid executable file */
    creat("test1.c1", S_ISUID | S_IRWXU | S_IWGRP );
}

/* Program: test2 */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>

main() {
    /* Create a setuid program */
    open("test2.c1", O_CREAT, S_ISUID | S_IRWXU | S_IWGRP );
    /* Open the setuid program created by program test1 */
    open("test1.c1", O_RDWR);
}
```

An attacker, a user called `gollum`, ran these two program in order.

The execution of the IDIOT server on the audit trail generated for user `gollum` on produces the following output:

```
setuid program /home/krsul/test1 created/opened for write the
setuid or executable file /.mordor/home/gollum/test1.c1.
setuid program /home/krsul/test2 created/opened for write the
setuid or executable file /.mordor/home/gollum/test2.c1.
setuid program /home/krsul/test2 created/opened for write the
setuid or executable file /.mordor/home/gollum/test1.c1.
```

3.1.6 Writing to Executable Files. PATTERN: writing-to-executable-files

Writing to an executable file is often evidence of viral behaviour. A virus may attempt to affect a program by inserting code at the start of the file which will be executed before the program contained in the code. This is very common on MSDOS machines. However, a UNIX system may still be vulnerable to this type of attack if executable files are left in place with write permission for users or groups.

Vulnerabilities detected

Any activity in which an executable file is written to.

Pattern State Machine

The pattern is very simple. For each process that is EXECed, the pattern detects writes to a file by that process that has the execute permission bits set. If such a write is detected, the pattern has fired. Figure 3.6 shows this.




Figure 3.6: State machine for pattern to detect viral behaviour

Pattern code

```
/*
 * writing-to-executable-files
 *
 * Detect programs writing to executable files which may be an
 * indication of viral behaviour
 *
 * Mark Crosbie February, 1996
 */

extern int isexec(int);
extern int true_print(str);

pattern virus "Programs writing to executable files (viral behavior)" priority 10

int PID, EUID; /* pattern local variables. may be initialized. */

str FILE, PROG;

state start, after_exec, violation;

/* post action simply reports on attack */
post_action {
    printf("Program %s running as EUID %d wrote to the executable file %s.\n",
        PROG, EUID, FILE);
}

/* There can be >= 1 invariants */
```

```

/* this invariant kills a token if its corresponding parent exits */
neg invariant first_inv /* negative invariant */
state start_inv, final;

trans exit(EXIT)
  <- start_inv;
  -> final;
  | _ { PID = this[PID]; }
end exit;
end first_inv;

/* pattern description follows */

/* EXECVE is the event type of the transition - executing a process */
trans exec(EXECVE)
  <- start;
  -> after_exec;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && PROG = this[PROG] &&
        EUID = this[EUID]; }
end exec;

/* OPEN_RW - open a file for read or write */
trans mod4(OPEN_RW)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]); }
end mod4;

trans mod5(OPEN_RWC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]); }
end mod5;

trans mod6(OPEN_RWTC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]); }
end mod6;

trans mod7(OPEN_RWT)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]); }
end mod7;

trans mod8(OPEN_W)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && /* if this operation succeeded */
        PID = this[PID] && /* and this PID matches that of the exec */
        FILE = this[OBJ] && /* remember this filename */
        isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]); } /* if this file is executable */
end mod8;

trans mod9(OPEN_WC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]); }
end mod9;

trans mod10(OPEN_WTC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]); }
end mod10;

trans mod11(OPEN_WT)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]); }
end mod11;

end virus;

```

The pattern seems complex, but is essentially very simple. The pattern starts by detecting the execution of a new process using the EXECVE transition. From this `after_exec` state, it detects any open calls that could potentially write over a file which has its execute permission bits set. The `isexec` function is in `utilities.C` and returns TRUE if a file is executable. This can be computed by information about the opened file stored in the audit trail. The types of open call detected are:

- OPEN_W open for write.
- OPEN_WC open for write and create if not present.
- OPEN_WT open for write and truncate to zero size if present.
- OPEN_WTC open for write and create and truncate to zero size.
- OPEN_RW open for read or write.
- OPEN_RWC open for read or write and create if not present.
- OPEN_RWT open for read or write and truncate to zero length.
- OPEN_RWTC open for read or write and create if not present and truncate to zero size.

If any of these occur and the file is executable, we could have potential viral activity on the system. It could also indicate an attempt to install a trojan horse on the system. This would be a version of a program that had similar functionality but installed a malicious piece of code.

Discussion

The pattern will only detect a process being executed that overwrites executables. A series of shell commands to overwrite an executable won't be detected, because each shell command results in a new process with a new PID. The PID attribute of the tokens won't be unifiable.

Why does this pattern not detect WRITE events? In the Solaris BSM audit trail the write events are subsumed under the OPEN event. So the audit trail for a write looks as follows (output of `praudit`):

```
header,136,2,open(2) - read,write,,Tue Feb 20 18:53:34 1996, + 846005000 msec
path,/home/mcrosbie/myIDIOT/audit_data/executable
attribute,100711,mcrosbie,mcrosbie,8388638,193085,0
subject,-2,mcrosbie,mcrosbie,mcrosbie,mcrosbie,20085,0,0 0 0.0.0.0
return,success,4
```

The audit trail was gathered with the `fw` audit mask flag. This gathers data about file writes. The open call is recorded, but the write call is not. The above audit trail corresponds to the following code fragment from `exploit-write.c`

```
if( (fd=open("./executable", O_RDWR) < 0) {
    perror(" open: ");
    exit(1);
}

printf("Exploit: writing to executable...\n");
if( write(fd, "abcdef", 6) < 6) {
    perror(" write: ");
    exit(1);
}
```

Thus, we are forced to detect writes to executable files by detecting the opening of the file, and not the actual write.

This pattern can also be written without the `EXECVE` transition. In effect it would then check every write on the system to see if it overwrites an executable file.

3.1.7 Writing to nonowned files. PATTERN: writing-to-nonowned-files

Users often create files in their home directories that are world writable. This is often because of a `umask` setting that does not disable the world write bits. Or, users may be sharing information via world writable files. Either way, this is a potential avenue for attack, as any information can be written into a non-owned file for later retrieval. This may allow an attacker to hide stolen information or plant a trojan horse in another user's directory. In the worst case, an attacker could place a `++` into a world-writable `.rhosts` file owned by another user, leaving that user's account open to abuse.

Pattern State Machine

The state machine for this pattern is presented in Figure 3.7.




Figure 3.7: State machine for pattern to detect writing to nonowned files

Pattern code

The code for the pattern is as follows:

```

/*
 * writing-to-nonowned-files
 *
 * Check a if a process is writing to files which it doesn't
 * own.
 *
 * This could indicate potential viral activity
 *
 * Mark Crosbie February 1996
 */

extern int true_print(str);

pattern unwanted_writes "Writing to nonowned files" priority 7

    nodup state start, final; /* only two states needed */

    int PID, EUID; /* record pertinent information about process */

    str PATH;

    post_action {
        printf("Pid %d, user id %d wrote %s, a nonowned file.\n", PID, EUID, PATH);
    }

/* for each type of write event recorded in the audit trail, see if
 * the owner of the file and EUID of the process doing the write
 * differ. If so, this indicates overwriting a non-owned file.
 */

trans writel(OPEN_W)
  <- start;
  -> final;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && /* the action succeeded */
        this[OBJ_OWNER] != this[EUID] && /* ownerships don't match */
        PID = this[PID] && /* remember PID of this process */
        EUID = this[EUID] && /* remember EUID of user */
        PATH = this[OBJ]; /* remember path to file being overwritten */
    }
end writel;

trans write2(OPEN_WC)
  <- start;
  -> final;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && this[OBJ_OWNER] != this[EUID] && PID = this[PID] &&
        EUID = this[EUID] && PATH = this[OBJ];
    }
end write2;

trans write3(OPEN_WT)
  <- start;
  -> final;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && this[OBJ_OWNER] != this[EUID] && PID = this[PID] &&
        EUID = this[EUID] && PATH = this[OBJ];
    }
end write3;

trans write4(OPEN_WTC)
  <- start;
  -> final;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && this[OBJ_OWNER] != this[EUID] && PID = this[PID] &&
        EUID = this[EUID] && PATH = this[OBJ];
    }
end write4;

end unwanted_writes;

```

The pattern looks complex, but is essentially very simple. It detects any writes to a file that has an owner field (OBJ_OWNER) that differs from the current effective user ID (EUID). If so, then the pattern reports the write as being suspicious.

Discussion

This pattern is very simple. If the owner of a file differs from the effective user ID of the process writing to the file, then the post action reports this. Note, see the description for `writing-to-executable-files` for more details on how the audit trail represents write events.

3.2 Written but untested patterns

This section describes patterns that are written but untested. These patterns can be tested in the current IDIOT implementation, but they are being shipped “as is” without any testing.

These patterns can be found in the `other_C2_patterns` directory under the main IDIOT distribution.

3.2.1 PATTERN: `lpd_delete_files`

This pattern attempted to detect the CERT vulnerability outlined in CERT Advisory CA91:10.a. The `lpd` line printer daemon can be made to delete files outside of the usual `/var/spool` directory by exploiting a race condition. The race condition exists between the time the file is copied into the spool directory and the time the file is removed from the directory. By changing the file to a link, it was possible to remove any file on the system (as `lpd` ran as root).

This pattern cannot be tested on our machines, because our `lpd` daemon has the fix in place and we cannot replace it without seriously disrupting the local printing environment in COAST.

However, the core transition in the pattern detects a delete (an `UNLINK` event) occurring with a destination outside of a specified directory tree. It uses the `inTree()` external function (found in `utilities.C` to match the file being deleted with the path prefix `/usr/spool`. If no match is found, then we conclude that `lpd` is trying to delete a file outside of the print spool directory.

```
trans delete(UNLINK)
  <- after_lpd_exec;
  -> after_delete;
  |_ {
    this[ERR] = 0 && this[PID] = PID && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
      (inTree("/usr/spool", FILE) = 0);
  }
end delete;
```

3.2.2 PATTERN: `failed_su`

This is a very simple pattern that reports all failed `su` attempts. Most system consoles also report similar information. The pattern simply looks for `SU` events in the audit trail that have an `err` attribute of 1, indicating that they have failed.

3.2.3 PATTERN: `finger`

This pattern attempts to detect the `finger` program spawning a program other than `finger`. This was motivated by the Internet worm attack where the stack for the `finger` daemon was overwritten and caused a new program to be spawned.

This pattern cannot be tested because it hard codes the inode value for the `finger` daemon `fingerd` and the `finger` program `finger` into the pattern. This will change from site to site, and from system to system. The pattern should be rewritten to allow a more portable specification of the location of the daemon program.

3.2.4 PATTERN: **priv-pgm-in-userspace**

This pattern attempts to detect a privileged program executing in user space. It does this using the `inUserSpace()` external function.

3.2.5 PATTERN: **rcw**

This pattern attempts to verify integrity using Clarke-Wilson triples. More information on this pattern and Clarke-Wilson integrity triples can be found in Section 4.8.9 of the `taxonomy.ps` file in the `doc/IDIOT` directory of the distribution.

3.2.6 PATTERN: **shell-script-attack**

Certain classes of attack make a shell execute and pass it strange command line arguments. A favourite attack is to run a shell with a command line argument of `-i`. This gives an interactive shell. If, somehow, a root shell can be spawned from a program with the `-i` option, an intruder has an interactive root shell on the system.

The key to this pattern is this transition:

```
trans exec(EXECVE)
  <- start;
  -> after_exec;
  |- {
    this[ERR] = 0 && RUID = this[RUID] && PROG = this[PROG] &&
    islink(this[PROG]) && shell_script(this[PROG]) &&
    (Basename(this[PROG]) =~ "^-");
  }
end exec;
```

The `Basename()` external function gets the actual name of the program being executed, with the leading path component stripped off. If this name starts with a `-` symbol, the pattern indicates that something suspicious has occurred.

3.2.7 PATTERN: **tftp**

This pattern attempts to detect the `tftp` program accessing files outside of the `tftpboot/` directory. This could indicate an attacker using the TFTP protocol as an attack vector.

This pattern has too many hardcoded constants to be useful in its current form. It hardcodes the inode numbers for the `tftp` program into the pattern. This should be changed to a more natural way of specifying the name of the program.

3.2.8 PATTERN: **bin-mail**

This pattern attempts to detect the `/bin/mail` program writing to a file that has its `setid` bit on, or is executable. The pattern is very straightforward. The execution of the mail program is checked by the transition on the `EXECVE` event. This is coded rather awkwardly — it detects the execution of the mail program by looking at the *inode* of the argument to the `exec()` call. This is very system dependent, and should be fixed.

It then checks to see if that program opens any files for writing that have their execute bit set (using the `isexec()` utility function) or have their setid bit set (using the `issid()` function). In either case, the pattern triggers, indicating that the mail program probably has been subverted.

The invariant deletes any tokens associated with a process when that process exits. Thus, as a mail program runs it generates a token in the machine, and once that program exits, all tokens associated with it are deleted.

3.2.9 PATTERN: **setid-pgms-cant-spawn-shell**

A setuid program is not allowed to spawn a program with the effective user id unchanged. This would allow attackers to subvert (say) the mail program, and make it spawn a shell with an effective user id of root.

This pattern is conceptually simple — if an `EXECVE` occurs of a shell program and the EUID changes after the call, then trigger the pattern. However, because of a weakness in Sun BSM auditing, this information is not available. Instead, the pattern must monitor on a *per-user* basis — if a user executes a setid program that then spawns a shell with a user id different from the user's, it triggers the pattern. This is less flexible than the generic pattern, but is workable under Sun BSM auditing.

3.3 Theoretical patterns

This section describes theoretical patterns. These patterns cannot be tested in the current IDIOT implementation, and are written for instructive purposes only.

These patterns can be found in the `other_C2_patterns` directory under the main IDIOT distribution.

3.3.1 PATTERN: **access-open-to-same-path-diff-inodes**

The general problem that this pattern tries to detect is that of an attacker to exploit the small window of opportunity that exists between programs checking the validity of the files and the actual opening of the file for writing. If an attacker can slow down the system, by running the program with a very high nice value, for example, he can replace the file that has been validated with another of his choosing.

`passwd -F` Attack In SunOS

The `passwd` command can be directed to treat another file as the password file using the `-F` option. Before opening this file for writing, and depending on the version of Unix one is using, the `passwd` program will attempt to determine that the user can indeed read and write to the file by either opening it for read, calling the `access` system call or calling the `stat` system call. If after this check has been completed, and before the file is actually opened for writing, the user changes the path name to point to the real system password file, the `passwd` program will operate on this file assuming it is still working with the original file.

xterm Logging Attack

xterm needs to run as root because it needs to chown the tty it allocates to interact with the user. Logging is a security hole because of the race condition between access check permissions to the logging file and the logging itself. When given the `-lf` option, xterm creates a file by calling the `creat` system call and immediately changes the uid and gid of the file to match that of the user running the program and start logging.

The problem appears when a user gives the following sequence of commands:

```
mknod foo p # foo is the FIFO named pipe
xterm -lf foo # creat will open the FIFO and block because there
               # is no process reading the other end of the pipe
mv foo junk
ln -s /etc/passwd foo
cat junk # Now that there is a reader at the other side of the
         # named pipe, the creat system call returns and
         # the next statement executed is the chmod system
         # call that will change the permission of the /etc/passwd
         # file so that the user can add and delete entries.
```

Although more difficult to exploit, the patched version of xterm continues to have a similar problem. The code described above got replaced by:

```
1 if(access(screen->logfile, F_OK) != 0) {
2   if (errno == ENOENT)
3     creat_as(screen->uid, screen->gid, screen->logfile, 0644);
4   else
5     return;
6 }
7
8 if(access(screen->logfile, F_OK) != 0
9    || access(screen->logfile, W_OK) != 0)
10  return;
11
12 if((screen->logfd=open(screen->logfile, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0644))<0)
13  return;
```

The `creat` system call was replaced by the `creat_as` routine. This routine forks a child process that changes its permissions to that of the user *before* it attempts to create the file, effectively eliminating the previous race condition. Unfortunately, a race condition, although much harder to exploit, still exists between the `access` call in line 8 and the `open` call in line 12. If a user can slow down this program and time things right, after the `access` call succeeds, the log file can be replaced by a link to the real `/etc/passwd` file. The xterm process will open the `/etc/passwd` for writing, and append to it the information that it is supposed to log.

Vulnerabilities detected

CA-93:17 xterm Logging Vulnerability.

8lgm 5/11/1994 The `passwd` command takes a `-F` option in SunOS.

Pattern State Machine

The state machine is shown in Figure 3.8.




Figure 3.8: Attack state machine

Pattern code

```
/*
 * passwd 8lgm advisory, xterm CA-93:17 advisory
 *
 * Detects the classic "window-of-opportunity" exploitation. Used in
 * passwd program and xterm logging bug.
 *
 * Mark Crosbie   Nov. 1995
 * Ivan Krsul     Nov. 1995
 */

extern int inode(str); /* returns the inode for this particular file */

pattern aotspdi "access-open-to-same-path-diff-inodes" priority 7
state start;
nodup state after_access;
nodup state after_create;
nodup state after_open;
state after_exec;
state violation;

int PID, INODE, EUID, RUID;
str FILE, PROG;

post_action {
    printf("Violation\n");
}

/*
 * this invariant states that the patterns are matched as long as this
 * process is running
 */
neg invariant inv /* negative invariant */
state start_inv, final_inv;

trans proc_exit(EXIT)
    <- start_inv;
    -> final_inv;
    | _ { this[PID] = PID; }
end proc_exit;
end inv;

/*
 * This transition is taken if the execve does not result in an error and the
 * program executing is setuid root. Well.... not quite. We are testing this
 * program but don't want to introduce a vulnerability... or at least not a big
 * one, so we will check for those programs whose effective user id is not the
 * same as the real user id.
 */
trans execl(EXECVE)
    <- start;
    -> after_exec;
    | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && PROG = this[PROG]
        && EUID = this[EUID] && RUID = this[RUID] && EUID != RUID ; }
end execl;

trans exec2(EXEC)
    <- start;
    -> after_exec;
    | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && PROG = this[PROG]
        && EUID = this[EUID] && RUID = this[RUID] && EUID != RUID ; }
end exec2;

/*
 * This transition is taken when a program creates a file calling the create
 * system call
 */
trans create(CREAT)
    <- after_exec;
    -> after_create;
    | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && INODE = this[OBJ_INODE]
        && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end create;

/*
 * Programs can also create files by calling the OPEN_WC or OPEN_WTC call and
 * closing them. The next three transitions are designed to catch this.
 */
trans opencreatel(OPEN_WC)
    <- after_exec;
    -> after_open;
    | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && INODE = this[OBJ_INODE]
        && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end opencreatel;
```

```

trans opencreate2(OPEN_WC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> after_open;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && INODE = this[OBJ_INODE]
        && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end opencreate2;

trans close(CLOSE)
  <- after_open;
  -> after_create;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && INODE = this[OBJ_INODE]; }
end close;

/*
 * After a file has been created, if the same file path was used as a
 * parameter to the chown or chmod routine but the inode is different
 * then we have a violation!
 */
trans chmod(CHMOD)
  <- after_create;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] &&
        INODE != this[OBJ_INODE] && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end chmod;

trans chown(CHOWN)
  <- after_create;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] &&
        INODE != this[OBJ_INODE] && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end chown;

/*
 * The following transitions are taken after a successful exec if a file is tested
 * for existence with the stat or access call
 */
trans access(Access)
  <- after_exec;
  -> after_access;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && INODE = this[OBJ_INODE]
        && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end access;

trans stat(STAT)
  <- after_exec;
  -> after_access;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && INODE = this[OBJ_INODE]
        && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end stat;

/*
 * If the same file that was opened for read is now opened for write
 * and the inode number has changed then we have a problem
 */
trans writel(OPEN_W)
  <- after_access;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && INODE != this[OBJ_INODE]
        && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end writel;

trans write2(OPEN_WC)
  <- after_access;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && INODE != this[OBJ_INODE]
        && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end write2;

trans write3(OPEN_WT)
  <- after_access;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && INODE != this[OBJ_INODE]
        && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end write3;

trans write4(OPEN_WTC)
  <- after_access;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && INODE != this[OBJ_INODE]
        && FILE = this[OBJ]; }
end write4;

end aotspdi;

```

Discussion

This pattern can detect the attack by seeing if the inode for the file has changed. How does this happen? When the file is first opened, it will have an inode given by the destination of the link. If an attacker moves the original file and creates in its place a link that points to another file, this inode will change. Thus, by detecting this change in inode value, the attack can be detected.

Unfortunately, this pattern cannot be used as is with the Basic Security Module C2 logging provided by Sun with Solaris 2.4. For this pattern to work, the audit trail would need to provide, at least, the following information:

1. `execve`: ERROR, EUID, RUID, PID, and program name
2. `creat`: ERROR, PID, initial file name, final file name, and inode number
3. `open`: ERROR, PID, initial file name, final filename, and inode number
4. `close`: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
5. `chown`: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
6. `chmod`: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
7. `access`: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
8. `stat`: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name

The only items that require explanation are the file names. If we have a symbolic link `sym1` that points to a file `fill` then a call to `chmod("sym1", mode)` would require an audit trail record that would indicate that the `chmod` system call was executed on the initial file name `sym1` and the final file name `fill`. The inode should be the one corresponding to the final name.

The audit trail generated by the Basic Security Module provided with Solaris 2.4 violates the file names requirement. To see why this is important, consider the following fragment of a setuid C program called `xtermbug`:

```
/* Create a log file called xtermbug.log */
if( creat("xtermbug.log",0) > -1 ) {
  /* The permissions of the created file were set to 0x00000. Change them
  to something more reasonable */
  if( chmod("xtermbug.log",S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) == -1 ) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Could not change the permission of file xtermbug.log\n");
  }
} else {
  fprintf(stderr, "Could not create log file xtermbug.log\n");
}
```

and an attack script that will exploit the vulnerability described in this document is called `xtermbug.exploit`:

```
#!/bin/sh
mknod xtermbug.log p
xtermbug &
sleep 1
mv xtermbug.log junk
ln -s /homes/krsul/break_me xtermbug.log
cat junk
cat /homes/krsul/break_me
```

This attack can not be detected by the pattern described in this document *if* you are using the Basic Security Module logging in Solaris 2.4. The audit trail generated for this session, reformatted for clarity and brevity, with the attacker called *gollum*, and the victim called *krsul*, is:

```

1  execve(2) - path,/home/gollum/xtermbug.exploit - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
2  execve(2) - path,/usr/sbin/mknod - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
3  mknod(2) - argument,2,0x11b6,mode - argument,3,0x0,dev
4      path,/.mordor/home/gollum/xtermbug.log - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
5  chown(2) - argument,2,0x341,new file uid - argument,3,0x341,new file gid
6      path,/.mordor/home/gollum/xtermbug.log - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
7  execve(2) - path,/homes/krsul/bin/xtermbug - EUID krsul - RUID gollum
8  execve(2) - path,/usr/bin/sleep - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
9  execve(2) - path,/usr/local/bin/mv - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
10 rename(2) - path,/.mordor/home/gollum/xtermbug.log
11      path,/.mordor/home/gollum/junk - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
12 execve(2) - path,/usr/bin/ln - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
13 symlink(2) - text,/homes/krsul/break_me - path,/.mordor/home/gollum/xtermbug.log
14      EUID gollum - RUID gollum
15 execve(2) - path,/usr/bin/cat - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
16 creat(2) - path,/.mordor/home/gollum/xtermbug.log - argument,3,0x2,stropen: flag
17      EUID krsul - RUID gollum
18 chmod(2) - argument,2,0x1fff,new file mode - path,/homes/krsul/break_me
19      EUID krsul - RUID gollum
20 execve(2) - path,/usr/bin/cat - EUID gollum - RUID gollum

```

Notice that in line 20, the audit trail indicates that the `chmod(2)` system call was made to the file `/homes/krsul/break_me`. While this is ultimately true, it does little to help detect the exploitation of the vulnerability. The pattern design specifically looks for a `chmod` or `chown` to the same file name as the `creat` but with different inode numbers. The audit trail should mention that the original call was made to file `xtermbug.log`.

3.3.2 PATTERN: 3-failed-logins

This pattern attempts to detect failed login attempts. Specifically, it looks for more than 3 failed login attempts in a 3 minute time period. This could indicate that a password attack is occurring against a user account.

This pattern cannot be tested because `IDIOT` currently does not support a `CLK` event. The idea behind a `CLK` event is to allow timing information to be incorporated into the pattern. Consider the code for the pattern:

```

/* CLK has not been implemented yet */
neg invariant inv
state start_inv, final_inv;

trans clk(CLK)
  <- start;
  -> final;
  | _ { this[TIME] - time > 180; }
end clk;
end inv;

/* pattern description follows */
trans fail1(LOGIN)
  <- start;
  -> after_fail1;
  | _ {
    this[ERR] = 1 && ruid = this[RUID] && time = this[TIME];
  }
end fail1;

trans fail2(LOGIN)
  <- after_fail1;
  -> after_fail2;
  | _ {
    this[ERR] = 1 && ruid = this[RUID];
  }
end fail2;

trans fail3(LOGIN)

```



```

<- after_fail2;
-> after_fail3;
|_ {
  this[ERR] = 1 && ruid = this[RUID] && this[TIME] - time < 180;
}
end fail3;

```

The first failed login attempt sets the `time` attribute of the token. This is taken from the timestamp information in the audit trail. The third failed login attempt can use this to make a transition if less than 180 seconds (3 minutes) has passed. The `CLK` event occurs at predictable time intervals (say every second). It is used in the invariant to delete any tokens that have been in the state machine for longer than 3 minutes.

The `CLK` event should be simple to add to `IDIOT` and would provide great flexibility in writing patterns to detect failed login, network access and other object creation attempts.

3.3.3 PATTERN: `dir_browser`

This pattern detects a user browsing through directories. It does this by counting the number of `change-directory` events in the audit trail. Normally a user executes a few `chdir` commands in a session, but an abnormally high number of these commands could indicate someone browsing where they shouldn't be.

This pattern cannot be tested because it uses the `CLK` event as described in the previous section. However, it illustrates a useful way of detecting if someone is browsing through sensitive directories. It uses the `inode` of a shell process to identify which process to monitor — most users browse using their shell. It then counts the number of `CHDIR` (change directory) events in the audit trail. If this count exceeds a threshold, it triggers the pattern.

3.3.4 PATTERN: `le`

This pattern tests to see if an ethernet device was put into promiscuous mode. In the words of the comments to the pattern:

```

Establishing a hardlink to /dev/le and opening the hardlink is not
possible because hard links cannot be established across devices. Don't
know how to test for promiscuity yet.

```

This pattern may not be possible to implement at all, but is included as an example.

3.3.5 PATTERN: `port_walk`

This pattern attempts to detect a port walk attempt. It uses `accept` events in the audit trail to detect an intruder connecting to ports across the machine in an attempt to see what services are running. It cannot be tested or implemented as `IDIOT` does not support the `accept` event yet. If it were extended to handle such events, then a wide variety of network attack patterns could be detected. See the section on limitations of auditing for more information.

3.3.6 PATTERN: `dont-follow-sym-links`

This pattern attempts to detect a `setuid` root program following a symbolic link. This is a potential vulnerability as an attacker could replace the link with a link to another file, and subvert the operation of the `setuid` root

program.

This pattern contains a subtle flaw. Consider the following code snippet:

```
trans open5(OPEN_R)
  <- start;
  -> after_open;
  |_ { this[ERR] = 0 && this[EUID] = 0 && islink(this[OBJ]) &&
      FILE = this[OBJ] && PID = this[PID]; }
end open5;
```

This code detects if a file was opened for reading by a process running with root privileges. It uses the `islink()` call to test whether the file was a link. This is a mistake — the state of the file system may have changed between when the audit data was generated and the pattern is being run. This is explained in the section on External declarations in the technical documentation.

This pattern is an example of how *not* to use external functions to carry out computations. External functions should *never* query system state that may change between when the audit trail was generated and when the pattern is run.

3.3.7 PATTERN: timing-attack

This pattern also uses the CLK event, but to detect a race condition attack where a file is unlinked and relinked to a new destination before being accessed. This is a classic “time-to-check-to-time-to-use” attack.

The first transition records the time that shell script starts to execute a program pointed to by a link. The next transition is taken when the same file is unlinked within 1 second. The final transition is taken if that same file is relinked to a different location within 1 millisecond. This triggers the pattern — an attacker is attempting to relink a setuid link to point at a file he/she wishes to gain access to.

The invariant in this pattern deletes any tokens that have been in the state machine for longer than 5 seconds. As the CLK event is not implemented, this invariant won’t compile under the current version of IDIOT.

Chapter 4

Users Guide

4.1 The C2_appl Application

Testing a pattern is a straightforward procedure. It involves compiling the pattern, linking the pattern into a program that can process the pattern and running the pattern with an audit trail. In IDIOT the three steps are performed using the same program: C2_appl.

The patterns can be stored in arbitrary directories. The example shown here assumes that the pattern is stored in a directory called \$IDIOT_HOME/C2_patterns. Note that the descriptions of these patterns are normally not located in this directory.

To compile a pattern run the C2_appl application and type the command “parse <pattern name>”. The following figure is an example of compiling a pattern from the C2_appl application:

```
$ cd $IDIOT_HOME
$ ./C2_appl
tini> parse C2_patterns/setuid-writes-setuid

tini> parse C2_patterns/setuid-writes-setuid
-----
Inside stmt reduced expr: printf("...\n")
-----

Pushing state "start_inv" into the invariant
Pushing state "final" into the invariant
The states in this invariant are 2, which are:
start_inv
final
-----
Inside stmt reduced expr: unified_tok->assign_PID(eve->PID())
-----

Parsing invariant transition exit

.
<some states deleted>
.

Parsing transition mod11
-----
Inside stmt reduced expr: (((eve->ERR() == 0) &&
unified_tok->assign_PID(eve->PID())) &&
unified_tok->assign_FILE(eve->OBJ())) &&
((isexec(eve->OBJ_MODS()) == 1) ||
(issid(eve->OBJ_MODS()) == 1))
-----
```

```

Parsing transition mod12
-----
start          -> exec
               <-
after_exec     -> mod3, mod4....
               <- exec
violation      ->
               <- mod3, mod4....
-----

CC -pic -G -g -o setuidwritessetuid.so setuidwritessetuid.C
.
.
<some warnings deleted>
.
.
11 Warning(s) detected.
Done compiling setuidwritessetuid.C
Inside create pattern.
Instantiated new pattern instance for setuidwritessetuid
tini>

```

After compilation of the pattern you should be able to see the C++ and relocatable files produced in the \$IDIOT_HOME directory. The files generated will have the name that was indicated in the first line of the pattern description. For example, in the following pattern the name given to the pattern is setuidwritessetuid and hence the resultant files will be setuidwritessetuid.C and setuidwritessetuid.so

```

pattern setuidwritessetuid "setuid writes to a setuid file" priority 10
int PID;
str FILE;
str PROGRAMME;
state start, after_exec, violation;

.
.
<portion of the pattern deleted>
.
.

trans mod12(OPEN_RC)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
        (isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1 || issid(this[OBJ_MODS]) = 1); }
end mod12;
end setuidwritessetuid;

```

After you have compiled the pattern you must link it to the C2_appl program by issuing the “dlink <pattern name>” command. Note that the pattern needs to be compiled only once and can be linked many times in many different runs. In the following example the pattern compiled earlier in this section is linked in a different session.

```

$ cd $IDIOT_HOME
$ pwd          # where are we?
/homes/gollum/IDIOT
$ ./C2_appl
tini> dlink /homes/gollum/IDIOT/setuidwritessetuid.so
Inside create pattern.
tini>

```

Running the pattern on an audit trail involves giving the “run <audit trail file>” command. The following figure shows an example of running a pattern on a C2 audit trail.

```

$ cd $IDIOT_HOME

```

```

$ pwd
/homes/gollum/IDIOT
$ ls -l /homes/gollum/trails/writes-setuid.audit_trail
-rw-rw---- 1 gollum 15496 Dec  2 16:34 trails/setuid-writes-setuid.audit_trail
$ ./C2_appl
tini> dlink /homes/gollum/IDIOT/setuidwritessetuid.so
Inside create pattern.
tini> run /homes/gollum/trails/writes-setuid.audit_trail
Showaudit: will execute the following command:
tail +0 trails/setuid-writes-setuid.audit_trail | praudit -r |
setuid program /home/gollum/vulner/test1 created/opened for write \
the setuid or executable file /.mordor/home/gollum/test1.c1.
setuid program /home/gollum/vulner/test2 created/opened for write \
the setuid or executable file /.mordor/home/gollum/test2.c1.
setuid program /home/gollum/vulner/test2 created/opened for write \
the setuid or executable file /.mordor/home/gollum/test1.c1.
Showaudit: No of dropped events = 56
tini>

```

You can turn on debugging on the C2_server that C2_appl application runs by issuing the command “server debug 1”. The following figure illustrates turning on debugging.

```

$ cd $IDIOT_HOME
$ pwd
/homes/gollum/IDIOT
$ ls -l /homes/gollum/trails/writes-setuid.audit_trail
-rw-rw---- 1 gollum 15496 Dec  2 16:34 trails/setuid-writes-setuid.audit_trail
$ ./C2_appl
tini> dlink /homes/gollum/IDIOT/setuidwritessetuid.so
Inside create pattern.
tini> server debug 1
tini> run /homes/gollum/trails/writes-setuid.audit_trail
Showaudit: will execute the following command:
tail +0 trails/setuid-writes-setuid.audit_trail | praudit -r |
FORK, TIME(817581176),RUID(833)..... OBJ_INO = 0
CLOSE, TIME(817581177),RUID(833)..... OBJ_INO = 0
CLOSE, TIME(817581177),RUID(833)..... OBJ_INO = 0
.
.
<debug information deleted>
.
.
setuid program /home/gollum/vulner/test1 created/opened for write \
the setuid or executable file /.mordor/home/gollum/test1.c1.
CLOSE, TIME(817581179),RUID(833)..... OBJ_INO = 4113
CLOSE, TIME(817581179),RUID(833)..... OBJ_INO = 4113
EXIT, TIME(817581179),RUID(833)..... ERR(0),RET(0)
Showaudit: No of dropped events = 56
tini>

```

4.2 Writing IDIOT Patterns

This section will take a step-by-step approach to writing a pattern. Along the way, each element of a pattern will be described. This will enable you to read an IDIOT pattern and understand what it is doing, and to write your own patterns.

As an example, we will use the other_C2_patterns/lpr_copy_files pattern. We will explain each part of the pattern as it is developed.

4.2.1 Basic structure of a pattern

A pattern consists of four key components:

1. A *name* for the pattern — `lpr_copy_files` in our case. The name is found just after the `pattern` keyword.

2. A *post action* which is executed when the pattern is matched.
3. An *invariant* which specifies when tokens are to be deleted.
4. A set of *transitions* between states, with associated guard expressions.

Of these, the post action and invariant are optional. A pattern without a post action doesn't make much sense as it won't be able to report to the outside world. A pattern need not have an invariant if it does not need to delete tokens.

The general structure for a pattern is as follows:

```
<external declarations>
pattern <pattern name> ["optional comment"] priority <priority value>
    <state declarations>
    <token color declarations>
    [post_action { <post action code> }]
    [neg invariant <invariant name> /* optional invariant */
     <invariant state declarations>
        trans <transition name>(<event>)
          <- <transition from state name>;
          -> <transition to state name>;
          |_ { <guard expression>;}
          end <transition name>;
        end <invariant name>;]
    /* actual pattern transitions start here */
    trans <transition 1 name>(<event>)
      <- <transition from state name>;
      -> <transition to state name>;
      |_ { <guard expression>;}
      end <transition 1 name>;
    trans <transition 2 name>(<event>)
      <- <transition from state name>;
      -> <transition to state name>;
      |_ { <guard expression>;}
      end <transition 2 name>;
    ...
end <pattern name>;
```

There can be more than one invariant. Each invariant is given a unique name. An invariant is specified like a real pattern — it can have multiple states.

The external declarations refer to functions that will be used to perform computations in the pattern. They are covered in detail in Section 5.2.

The pattern name follows the `pattern` keyword. This must agree with the name at the end of the pattern following the `end` keyword. This will be the name of the pattern C++ code generated when this pattern is parsed. So in our case, `lpr_copy_files` will generate `lpr_copy_files.C` which will be compiled to `lpr_copy_files.so`. Note, the pattern name and the name of the file containing the pattern do not have to agree. The pattern name is what is used.

4.2.2 State declarations

The state declarations section is where the states of the pattern are listed. This is similar to declaring a variable — the `state` keyword specifies that the variable names following it are actually states in the IDIOT pattern. For example,

```
state start, after_lpr_exec, after_lpr_copy;
```

specifies three states — the start state, and two other named states. These names are used in the transition section to specify what transitions connect what states. Note, the start state does not have to be explicitly denoted as such — when the transitions are parsed, the start state is deduced.

States can be declared `nodup`. This means that tokens will *not* be duplicated when they move from that state. Typically, a token which satisfies a guard will be duplicated into the state after the guard, leaving a token behind. A `nodup` state means that the token moves into the new state, and no token remains in the source state. The start state cannot be `nodup`'d. To declare a state `nodup` do:

```
nodup state this_is_a_nodup_state;
```

4.2.3 Token color declarations

Tokens have bindings associated with them that can carry values along as the token moves through the machine. For example, in our pattern, we might want to record the user id of the person who executed the `lpr` command and the process id of the command itself. We declare two variables to store these values: `RUID` and `PID`:

```
int RUID, PID;
```

These variables can now be used in the guard expressions. Once assigned to, they will store a value that is bound to that token as it moves through the state machine — consider them as “local variables” to a token. Each token will have a unique pair of these variables as every execution of the `lpr` command will have a unique `PID` assigned to it.

How are these variables set and used? We will discuss this when we describe transitions.

4.2.4 The post action

The post action code is executed when the pattern is matched. It is usually used to inform the system operator that a potential intrusion has occurred, or it could take active steps to halt the intrusion (such as shutting down the system). The post action code is normal C code, and it can reference any of the local variables declared in the pattern.

4.2.5 The invariant

Every time a pattern is evaluated, the invariant is also evaluated. This controls the deletion of tokens from the machine. Why is this necessary? Consider our example pattern again. Every time the `lpr` program is executed, a token will move from the start state to the `after_lpr_exec` state. But this invocation of `lpr` may be completely innocent. Thus that token will remain in the `after_lpr_exec` state. Over time, tokens will accumulate in the machine increasing processing time and causing memory overflow. Thus we need a mechanism to delete tokens that are no longer necessary.

For every token that is placed in the start state of the main pattern, a token is placed in the start state of the invariant state machine. Events drive the tokens through both the main pattern and the invariant pattern. If a token reaches the final state in the invariant state machine, the corresponding token, and *all* its

descendants, are deleted from the main pattern state machine. To do this, IDIOT maintains a link between tokens in the main pattern machine and those in the invariant machine. This deletion happens automatically.

An invariant is specified using the same syntax as a normal pattern transition. In our example, there are only two states to the invariant machine, with one transition between them. The following code shows the invariant:

```
neg invariant first_inv /* negative invariant */
state start_inv, final;

trans exit(EXIT)
  <- start_inv;
  -> final;
  | _ { PID = this[PID]; }
end exit;
end first_inv;
```

The transition is named `exit` and it leads from state `start_inv` to state `final`. These states are declared prior to the transition specification. This transition is taken when an `EXIT` event occurs in the audit trail — when a process has exited. The `PID` attribute is available in this event, and it gives the process id of the exiting process. Our invariant guard states that any token whose `PID` color matches the `PID` attribute from this event will be deleted. In simple terms, all tokens created by this process will have the same `PID` value. When the same process exits, we will delete all these tokens using this invariant. The guard expression in the `| _ . . .` section will be explained in Section 4.2.7.

This is a very common invariant. A lot of patterns will delete tokens associated with a process once that process exits. Another common invariant is deleting tokens that no longer can form part of an intrusion attempt. For example, in the `other_C2_patterns/3-failed-logins` pattern, the invariant deletes any tokens that have been in the system for longer than 3 minutes. This pattern looks for 3 failed login attempts within the space of 3 minutes, so keeping tokens around for any longer is pointless.

```
neg invariant inv
state start_inv, final_inv;

trans clk(CLK)
  <- start_inv;
  -> final_inv;
  | _ { this[TIME] - time > 180; }
end clk;
end inv;
```

The `CLK` event has not been implemented yet.

4.2.6 Unification - binding values to tokens

Before we can discuss transitions and guards, the concept of *unification* must be discussed. IDIOT uses unification to test guard expressions. An expression is unifiable if the value on the left hand side and that on the right of the `=` sign can be combined. The reader is referred to standard textbooks on this topic: [Set89] for example. Simply put, an expression of the form `x = y` is unifiable if `x` and `y` both have the same value. If one of `x` or `y` does not have a value bound to it, it assumes the value of the other variable. This allows *assignment* to occur, without requiring unique assignment and equality operators.

4.2.7 Pattern transitions

After the invariant comes a list of the transitions. There is no special order to each transition, as IDIOT computes the placement of the states based on the transition specifications. Each transition is contained within a `trans . . . end` block.

A transition is associated with a particular audit event. In our example pattern, the two transitions are associated with EXECVE and CREAT respectively. A transition will only be taken if its corresponding event occurs, and its guard is satisfied.

A guard is a boolean expression that must be satisfied before a token can transit a guard. The boolean expressions in IDIOT are expressed in a C-like syntax. They are evaluated left-to-right with short circuit evaluation. This means that if a component of the guard causes the whole guard to evaluate to false, evaluation halts. Most guards are specified in *conjunctive normal form* — a conjunction of clauses. Conjunction is specified using the AND operator, which is && in C (and IDIOT).

The guard for the transition `exec_lpr` looks as follows:

```
|_ {
  this[ERR] = 0 && PID = this[PID] && PROG = this[PROG] &&
  RUID = this[RUID] &&
  (strmatch(".*lpr", this[PROG]) = 1) && this[EUID] = 0;
}
```

This guard is composed of six clauses each separated by a && operator. The full guard is only true if each of the clauses are individually true. If any clause evaluates to false, the value of the conjunction of these clauses is false, so evaluation halts and the guard evaluates to false.

The first clause checks the ERR attribute of the event. This is a very common test, and can be seen in just about every guard. If ERR is 0 the event occurred successfully, if it is 1 the event failed for some reason. So if we had `this[ERR] = 1` in the clause, we would be testing for *failed* EXECVE events. In the clause, `this` refers to the attributes of the current event.

The second clause extracts the PID attribute from the audit record, and *binds* it to the current token. This now becomes a local variable available to all other guards in other transitions. Effectively, we have tagged this token with the process id of the process that caused the token to enter the state machine.

The third clause does the same but for the name of the program which is stored in the PROG attribute of the EXECVE event. This is the full pathname of the executable associate with this event. Again, we bind this to a token color (i.e. a local variable to the token) called PROG.

Similarly, the fourth clause extracts the real user id of the process that caused with audit event and binds it to the token color RUID. This will be used later in the post action to identify which user attempted to copy over a file. This is a common occurrence in patterns — some identification information is extracted from the events and bound to a token color. This information is usually process id, user id or file name information. This can be used to pinpoint who attempted an intrusion, and what they were using or trying to access.

These bindings are actually used in the second transition. The guard for the second transition looks as follows:

```
|_ {
  this[ERR] = 0 && this[PID] = PID && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
  (inTree("^var/spool/", this[OBJ]) = 0);
}
```

The == operator is not used in IDIOT. Instead, the = operator is used to *unify* the values on the left and right of the operator.

Notice how the order of the terms around the = sign is reversed. We are now unifying in the opposite direction. Each clause will evaluate to true if the value of the specified attribute from this audit event matches the corresponding color for the token. IDIOT will match the PID attribute for this event with the PID color for every token in the `after_lpr_exec` state. This color was bound in the first transition.

This enables us to tie audit records together that belong to the same process. If another process called the `creat ()` system call, there would be a `CREAT` event in the audit trail — but the `PID` field would *not* match the token's `PID` field. Only the process that first introduced the token into the state machine will match the `PID` field.

We then bind the file name in the `OBJ` attribute of the event to the token color `FILE`. This is used in the post action to identify which file is the target of the attack.

Chapter 5

Technical Details

5.1 How IDIOT works

As with most sizable projects, IDIOT consists of a fairly complex file structure. Determining how the components of the program integrate and work together can be a challenging task. This section is presented as an overview of the structure of IDIOT, discussing its major components and how they cooperate to form an intrusion detection system.

IDIOT consists primarily of four components: the audit trail, `showaudit.pl`, the `C2_Server`, and the pattern descriptions. Of these four, both the audit trail and `showaudit.pl` are machine dependent, while the `C2_Server` and patterns are portable. A fifth component, `C2_appl`, provides an interactive user interface to IDIOT; this is also portable.

5.1.1 Audit Trail

While technically quite separate from IDIOT, the audit trail is obviously an extremely important part of this intrusion detection system. Without an audit trail, there would be no record of activities against which patterns could be matched, and this system would be rather useless. Currently IDIOT has only been used with Solaris 2.4 and the Sun BSM audit trail. However, the system design should work equally well with virtually any other OS and audit trail. Difficulties arise from the fact that, while most operating systems provide some manner of audit trail, they each have a different format. This leads to portability problems. IDIOT deals with this problem by working with a canonical form of the audit trail, rather than the raw audit trail itself.

5.1.2 `showaudit.pl`

`showaudit.pl` is IDIOT's solution to handling different audit trail formats. The current `showaudit.pl` is simply a PERL script that converts a Sun BSM audit trail into the canonical format necessary for IDIOT. If IDIOT is moved onto a new platform, only `showaudit.pl` need be rewritten to accommodate the new audit trail format. Similarly, if IDIOT were to be expanded on an existing system to examine more detailed

information from the audit trail, `showaudit.pl` would need to be extended to include the new information in the canonical audit trail.

`showaudit.pl` accepts either raw binary input files or ASCII files generated using the `praudit` command. It can be run from the `C2.appl` interpreter (discussed later) to parse audit files, or it can be run manually to view an audit trail in canonical form. By utilizing command-line options, the audit trail can be printed either with or without symbolic names for events.

As the inner workings of `showaudit.pl` are discussed in Section 5.3, we will not go into any more detail here.

5.1.3 C2_Server

The `C2_Server` is the core of IDIOT. It is actually a C++ class, an instance of which is instantiated to perform the intrusion detection. An object of type `C2_Server` has several methods associated with it; the most interesting of those are listed here:

`int run_praudit(char *audit_file)` — primary method, described below

`C2_Pattern *parse_file(char *patternfile)` — parse an IDIOT pattern file

`C2_Pattern *dllink_file(char *file)` — dynamically link a compiled pattern description into the server object

As shown above, `run_praudit()` simply takes the name of the audit file as input. `run_praudit()` calls `showaudit.pl` to transform the audit trail information into canonical form. Then it goes into a loop, reading one audit event at a time from the transformed audit file. If run against a static audit trail, this loop continues until it reaches end-of-file. Otherwise, `run_praudit` only exits upon encountering some kind of failure.

For each event, `run_praudit()` steps through the list of patterns which are requesting events. For each of these patterns, it executes the method `PatProc()`, passing the current event as a parameter. `PatProc()` is a method for each pattern, and thus knows the current state of matching for that pattern. It takes the current event and performs the operations that should result from the occurrence of that event. These include operations such as token unification and transition firing.

5.1.4 Patterns

Finally, of course, the patterns play a major role in the workings of IDIOT. Patterns are written in a language that describes a known method of attack as a set of states and transitions between them. As indicated above, transitions are based on audit trail records, or events.

To be used by IDIOT, patterns must be translated into C++, compiled into shared objects, and linked into the `C2_Server` object. This can all be done at startup time, or patterns may be added to the server dynamically.

Figure 5.1 depicts the basic component structure of IDIOT.




Figure 5.1: Structure of IDIOT

5.1.5 C2_appl

C2_appl provides an interactive interface into IDIOT. It allows the user to compile patterns, dynamically link pattern objects and instantiate server objects, as well as several other related activities. Listed below are some of the major commands available:

parse — parse a pattern file

dlink — dynamically link a compiled pattern into the server

server — perform operations on the server (set infile to binary or ascii, exercise patterns, change debug level, or print the server queue)

debug — debug a pattern description

run — initiates run_praudit, described above

time — display time accumulated in C2_appl

5.2 Referring to external functions

External utility functions are used to compute results that cannot be expressed in IDIOT pattern form. For example, the pattern `lpd_delete_files` checks to see if a file is being deleted outside of a specific directory tree. A function called `inTree` will check to see if a given filename is below a specified directory point. It returns TRUE if this is so.

How can this be incorporated into an IDIOT pattern? The following example shows how:

```
extern int inTree(str, str);

pattern lpd_delete_files "lpd deletes files not under spool dir" priority 7

state start, after_lpd_exec, after_delete;
str PROG, FILE;
.....
|_ {
  this[ERR] = 0 && this[PID] = PID && FILE = this[OBJ] &&
  (inTree("/usr/spool", FILE) = 0);
}
.....
```

The function `inTree` is declared external to the pattern. The declaration states that it takes two string arguments, and returns an integer. When the function is used, we pass two string arguments: `/usr/spool` and the token attribute `FILE`.

The `extern` keyword behaves similarly to C, but there are slight differences. The external declaration is parsed by IDIOT to see if it matches an internal type. If we examine the actual declaration for `inTree`, we see it takes two strings as arguments, which is declared in `utilities.C` as:

```
int inTree(char *dir, char *file);
```

However, this will cause an error in IDIOT. Instead, the built in string type is used: `str`. IDIOT will parse this and emit C++ code as follows:

```
extern int inTree(Str , Str );
```

This uses the inbuilt string class which is then translated into a `RWCString`.

The allowable parameter types for external declarations are as follows:

1. `int` Integer type — equivalent to C `int`.
2. `bool` Boolean type — equivalent to C `int`.
3. `str` String type — equivalent to C `char *`.

NOTE it is important that any external C function be used to compute data that will not change over time! For example, if an external function was written which computed the number of users on the system, an IDIOT pattern which was parsing an audit trail and called that function would probably get a different result every time it was run.

This problem occurs because IDIOT patterns get *all* their information about the system from the audit trail. If an external function computes a value that changes over time (such as number of processes, average system load, disk utilization) then the values being returned by the external function are not what they would have been at the time the audit trail was generated. Instead, they will reflect the system state when the pattern is run, which may be *completely* different from the state when the audit file was generated.

For example, see the pattern `other_C2_patterns/dont-follow-sym-links`. This pattern uses a function `islink()` to see whether a specified file is a symbolic link. However, the state of the file system may have changed between the time when the audit data was generated and the time the pattern is run.

In all the patterns provided with IDIOT, the utility functions perform computations that cannot be easily done in a pattern specification. For example, a pattern can check to see if a file name exists in a specified path component (this is a string match — it does not check the state of the file system). Or it can see if a file permission mask has the execute bit set (a simple bit-wise computation).

5.3 Audit trail canonicalization

A problem faced by any intrusion detection system is portability — every vendor and system has its own unique audit trail format. Indeed, this format often changes across OS families from the same vendor (SunOS vs. Solaris, for example). A well designed intrusion detection system should be able to accomodate multiple audit trail formats with little modification.

5.3.1 The role of `showaudit.pl`

IDIOT achieves this platform independence by splitting the intrusion detection engine into two parts: a **front end** tool that reads a system-dependent audit trail and generates a platform independent intermediate form and a **back end** that performs the pattern matching. The `showaudit.pl` script is a PERL [WS92] script that converts a Sun BSM audit trail [Sun] into a canonical audit format that IDIOT can handle. The back end pattern matching engine will take this canonical form and run the patterns against it. If the IDIOT

system is ported to a new system with a different audit trail format, only the `showaudit.pl` script has to be rewritten. Similarly, if IDIOT is expanded on an existing system to monitor more detailed information from the audit trail, the `showaudit.pl` script has to be extended to include this new information in the canonical audit trail.

The `showaudit.pl` script can accept either raw binary input files or ASCII files generated using the `praudit` command. Typically, `showaudit` is run from the `C2_appl` interpreter to parse audit files when running IDIOT patterns. However, it can also be run manually to view an audit file in canonical form. The script will run the `praudit` script to preprocess the audit trail. If the `-r` option is given, the audit trail is printed in *raw* format — no symbolic names for events are printed. The `praudit` command runs faster in raw mode. By default, the script prints symbolic names for events.

As an example, the output when the script is run with the audit trail for `writing-to-executable-files` is:

```
execve Tue Feb 20 18:53:34 1996 mcrosbie mcrosbie mcrosbie mcrosbie -2
0 20085 failure: No such file or directory -1 + ARRAY(0xfd564) 0
execve Tue Feb 20 18:53:34 1996 mcrosbie mcrosbie mcrosbie mcrosbie -2
0 20085 failure: No such file or directory -1 + ARRAY(0xfd594) 0
execve Tue Feb 20 18:53:34 1996 mcrosbie mcrosbie mcrosbie mcrosbie -2
0 20085 success 0 + ARRAY(0xfd534) 193080
open - read mcrosbie mcrosbie mcrosbie mcrosbie -2 0 20085 success 4
+ ARRAY(0xfd54c) 193085
exit Tue Feb 20 18:53:34 1996 mcrosbie mcrosbie mcrosbie mcrosbie -2 0
20085 success 0
fork Tue Feb 20 18:53:41 1996 root root root root -2 0 10116 success 0
...
```

As can be seen, the script prints a symbolic name for events — for example, `execve` is the `execve()` system call used to overlay a process with an executable image. Parameters to the system call are displayed after each event name. Identification information for the user calling the command is also printed. In this case, the user id, effective user id, group id and effective group id is printed. This is described in more detail in the Sun BSM audit trail documentation. In contrast, the raw output from `showaudit.pl -r` looks as follows (for the same audit trail):

```
23 824860414 727 727 727 727 -2 0 20085 2 -1 +
/.ector-2/pl9/X11R6/sun4-sos5/exploit 0
23 824860414 727 727 727 727 -2 0 20085 2 -1 +
/.ector-2/pl7/hotjava-1.0a3/exploit 0
23 824860414 727 727 727 727 -2 0 20085 0 0 +
/home/mcrosbie/myIDIOT/audit_data/exploit 193080
80 824860414 727 727 727 727 -2 0 20085 0 4 +
/home/mcrosbie/myIDIOT/audit_data/executable 727 0100711 193085
1 824860414 727 727 727 727 -2 0 20085 0 0 +
2 824860421 0 0 0 0 -2 0 10116 0 0 +
...
```

The same information is encoded in the raw format as the ASCII format, but the symbolic names are replaced by their corresponding integer codes from the audit trail. For example, the last line shows a user and group id line of `0 0 0 0` which corresponds to the root user and group id.

5.3.2 Operation of `showaudit.pl`

The script takes three command line arguments: `-i` controls what type of audit file format `showaudit` expects. `-i ascii` processes ASCII audit trails and `-i binary` processes binary audit trails. `-f` makes it follow the audit trail as it is generated.

The script starts by opening a pipe to a command to parse the raw, kernel generated audit file. This is usually a `tail -f` of the output of `praudit` run on the command-line supplied audit filename. The audit file is then parsed record by record by the `showaudit` script and each record is printed in canonical form to `stdout`. When `showaudit` is used from within `C2_app1`, this output is redirected into the `C2_Server` to drive the IDIOT patterns.

An audit trail is composed of a series of records each of which is a sequence of tokens. Figure 5.2 shows a typical audit record layout. These tokens contain information such as the time the audit record was generated, the event it represents and user IDs associated with the audit event. Before the actual event token is decoded, the surrounding header and informational tokens must be decoded. `showaudit` processes each type of token as described below, and then it generates output for the actual audit event in the audit record.



Figure 5.2: Layout of a typical audit record

The script must handle binary and ASCII input formats so the `$opt_r` flag is checked while parsing audit record tokens. If the flag is true, the numeric value associated with an event is tested, of not, an ASCII string can be tested. For example, the file token gives the pathname to the next audit file. It's numeric event number is 17, and its ASCII string representation is "file". The code to determine whether the current record is a file record looks as follows:

```
if (($opt_r && $_[0] == 17) || (!$opt_r && $_[0] eq "file")) #file
trailer, (event 17) {
  my ($next_file_pat, $cnt, @files, $next_audit_file, $dirname);
  if(@_ < 4 || $_[3] !~ /.*(1995\d+)\.*/) {
    print "No of dropped events = $dropped_events", "\n";
    exit 0;
  }
}
```

`showaudit` handles the following types of audit tokens:

File token — a file token indicates that the current audit trail has ended and it points to where the next audit file can be found. `showaudit` will parse this token and extract the file name for the new audit file and make three attempts to open the new audit file. If it cannot open it after 3 attempts, it gives up and exits. Furthermore, a file token must mark the *start* of a new audit file — if `showaudit` does not find a file token, it complains that the audit file is invalid and gives up.

Header token — a header token marks the beginning of an audit record. A corresponding trailer token marks the end of the audit record. The header token encodes the length of the audit record, the event type the record encodes and a timestamp for when the audit record was generated. `showaudit` extracts the type of the audit event and the timestamp from the header token. It then starts to parse the remaining tokens in the audit record.

Path token — a path token contains access path information for an object (typically a file). The pathname is encoded as a length field and an arbitrary length character string. `showaudit` stores the pathname component. There can be multiple path tokens if a link is being followed.

Attribute token — an attribute token contains information from the file's i-node entry. This includes the user and group id of the file's owner, the file system the file resides on, the inode for the file and the device id for the file system device. `showaudit` extracts this information.

Argument token — an argument token contains system call argument information. `showaudit` extracts the argument values. Note, there can be multiple argument tokens — one for each argument to a system call.

Subject token — a subject token describes a subject (i.e. a process). The fields of interest to `showaudit` are the real and effective user and group id's, the process id of the process that generated the audit event, and an audit session id.

Socket token — this records information about an Internet socket. `showaudit` extracts the type, local port and address and remote port and address information from the token.

Return token — this stores the return value of a system call and the returned error code for the system call (the `errno` value in UNIX). `showaudit` extracts both these fields.

Text token — this contains an arbitrary text string which is extracted.

Once the header and informational tokens have been processed, `showaudit` has enough information to start generating a canonical form for the audit record. It calls the `print_C2_record` routine to print out the audit record in canonical form. This routine does not handle every audit event — a variable `dropped_events` records how many events were ignored from the audit trail. For each audit event type, it calls `print_base_C2_record` to print the basic information about the audit record. This routine prints the user and group id's, audit session id, process id and the return value and error number from the system call.

Then the `print_C2_record` prints information about certain audit events. This uses the information stored while parsing the tokens. For example, the code to print a `chmod()` event looks as follows:

```
C2_10:
print_base_C2_record();
#chmod has 3 args, path, inode & the newmods on the file, in type 0x...
$arg{"path"} = ["<>"] if ! exists $arg{"path"};
print " ", $arg{"path"}[0];
if (exists $arg{"obj"})
  { print " ", $arg{"obj"}{"inode"}; }
else
  { print " 0"; }
print " ", $arg{"args"}[0];
print "\n"; return;
```

The C2_10 is the branch of the case statement that handles this audit record type. The path and inode information was stored earlier in the associative array `arg` when the tokens were being parsed. These fields are now accessed and printed out, separated by spaces.

5.4 Adding new audit events to IDIOT

IDIOT does not handle all audit events in the Sun BSM trail. It is possible to enhance IDIOT to extract information about audit events and provide extra information to patterns. Before attempting to modify IDIOT to add new events you should read all the documentation shipped with IDIOT and (for Solaris machines) the Audit Record Description section of the BSM answerbook.

There are three components of the IDIOT system that must be modified to handle a new audit record. 1) The `showaudit.pl` script must parse the audit trail and extract the relevant information out of the audit record tokens; 2) The `C2_Server` module must know how to interpret the data and generate the correct class; 3) The `C2_Server::parse` method defined in `pat.y` must add the event names to the parsing symbol table.

To add a new event (or add attributes to an existing event) edit the `showaudit.pl` file and remove the event you are going to add from the dropped events list (if it's there) and add the event to the appropriate group. Events are grouped together according to the information they print. All events print the base record. Groups of events print additional information. The event number can be extracted from the `/etc/security/audit_event` file. For example, the `link` system call is event number 5. The entry in the `audit_event` file for `link` is:

```
5:AUE_LINK:link(2):fc
```

Then edit the `C2_events.h` file and add the code for your event (or the attribute you added). As in `showaudit.pl`, events are grouped into classes of similar events. A `GENERIC` event in this file is only a class definition that encompasses many events. For example, the class `"C2Event_GENERIC_EXEC"` represents all execute events that have the same format. The individual instances are defined by the lines:

```
typedef C2Event_GENERIC_EXEC C2Event_EXEC;
typedef C2Event_GENERIC_EXEC C2Event_EXECEVE;
```

Similarly, the class `"C2Event_GENERIC"` represents all the audit events that share the same format but are not a logical group (similar to execs). From the declaration:

```
typedef C2Event_GENERIC C2Event_CLOSE;
typedef C2Event_GENERIC C2Event_ACCESS;
typedef C2Event_GENERIC C2Event_CHDIR;
typedef C2Event_GENERIC C2Event_FORK;
typedef C2Event_GENERIC C2Event_LSTAT;
typedef C2Event_GENERIC C2Event_STAT;
typedef C2Event_GENERIC C2Event_UNLINK;
typedef C2Event_GENERIC C2Event_VFORK;
```

we gather that the events `CLOSE`, `ACCESS`, `CHDIR`, `FORK`, `LSTAT`, `STAT`, `UNLINK`, and `VFORK` have been grouped together by the `showaudit.pl`.

Finally, edit the `pat.y` file and search for the `C2_Server::parse` method. It should resemble:

```

int C2_Server::parse(char *pat)
{
    static int pushed_event_decls = 0;

    if(!pushed_event_decls)
    {
        server_evName2Type = C2_evName2Type;
        szApplname = "C2";
        symtab.pushlevel();
        symtab.push(new sym_tab_entry("ACCESS",    -1, symtyp_event, symattr_none, NULL));
        symtab.push(new sym_tab_entry("CHMOD",     -1, symtyp_event, symattr_none, NULL));
        /* Lots of lines deleted..... */
        symtab.push(new sym_tab_entry("SYMLINK",   -1, symtyp_event, symattr_none, NULL));
        symtab.push(new sym_tab_entry("VFORK",    -1, symtyp_event, symattr_none, NULL));
        pushed_event_decls = 1;
    }

    /* Some more code deleted */
}

```

Add another line to this routine to push the name of the event you are defining.

5.4.1 Events Supported in Shipped Version

The following tables have a list of the events that can be used in IDIOT patterns with the system as shipped.

| Events: EXEC, EXECVE | |
|----------------------|--|
| Attributes: | TIME (time_t), RUID (uid_t), EUID (uid_t), RGID (uid_t), EGID (uid_t), AUID (uid_t), SID (uid_t), PID (int), ERR (int), RETVAL (int), PROG (const char *), PROG_INODE (int), OBJ_MODS (int) |
| Description: | TIME: Time the event took place RUID: Real user ID EUID: Effective user ID RGID: Real group ID EGID: Effective group ID AUID: User audit ID SID: Session ID PID: Process ID ERR: Return status of system call RETVAL: Process return value PROG: Name of program executed PROG_INODE: Program inode number OBJ_MODS: Permissions of program executed |

| Events: LINK, SYMLINK | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Attributes: | TIME (time_t), RUID (uid_t), EUID (uid_t), RGID (uid_t), EGID (uid_t), AUID (uid_t), SID (uid_t), PID (int), ERR (int), RETVAL (int), OLDPATH (const char *), NEWPATH (const char *) |
| Description: | TIME: Time the event took place RUID: Real user ID EUID: Effective user ID RGID: Real group ID EGID: Effective group ID AUID: User audit ID SID: Session ID PID: Process ID ERR: Return status of system call RETVAL: Process return value OLDPATH: Pathname of the object linking to NEWPATH: Pathname of new object |

| Events: MKNOD | |
|---------------|---|
| Attributes: | TIME (time_t), RUID (uid_t), EUID (uid_t), RGID (uid_t), EGID (uid_t), AUID (uid_t), SID (uid_t), PID (int), ERR (int), RETVAL (int), OBJ (const char *), DEV_MODE (int) |
| Description: | TIME: Time the event took place RUID: Real user ID EUID: Effective user ID RGID: Real group ID EGID: Effective group ID AUID: User audit ID SID: Session ID PID: Process ID ERR: Return status of system call RETVAL: Process return value OBJ: Name of special file DEV_MODE: Permissions of the special file |

| Events: LOGIN, SU, EXIT | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Attributes: | TIME (time_t), RUID (uid_t), EUID (uid_t), RGID (uid_t), EGID (uid_t), AUID (uid_t), SID (uid_t), PID (int), ERR (int), RETVAL (int) |
| Description: | TIME: Time the event took place RUID: Real user ID EUID: Effective user ID RGID: Real group ID EGID: Effective group ID AUID: User audit ID SID: Session ID PID: Process ID ERR: Return status of system call RETVAL: Process return value |

| | |
|--|---|
| Events: OPEN_R, OPEN_RC, OPEN_RT, OPEN_RTC, OPEN_RW, OPEN_RWC, OPEN_RWT, OPEN_RWTC, OPEN_W, OPEN_WC, OPEN_WT, OPEN_WTC | |
| Attributes: | TIME (time_t), RUID (uid_t), EUID (uid_t), RGID (uid_t), EGID (uid_t), AUID (uid_t), SID (uid_t), PID (int), ERR (int), RETVAL (int), OBJ (const char *), OBJ_INODE (int), OBJ_MODS (int), OBJ_OWNER (int) |
| Description: | TIME: Time the event took place RUID: Real user ID EUID: Effective user ID RGID: Real group ID EGID: Effective group ID AUID: User audit ID SID: Session ID PID: Process ID ERR: Return status of system call RETVAl: Process return value OBJ: Name of file being opened OBJ_INODE: Inode number of file opened OBJ_MODS: Permissions on file opened OBJ_OWNER: User ID of file owner |

| | |
|--|--|
| Events: ACCESS, CHDIR, CLOSE, FORK, LSTAT, STAT, UNLINK, VFORK | |
| Attributes: | TIME (time_t), RUID (uid_t), EUID (uid_t), RGID (uid_t), EGID (uid_t), AUID (uid_t), SID (uid_t), PID (int), ERR (int), RETVAL (int), OBJ (const char *), OBJ_INODE (int) |
| Description: | TIME: Time the event took place RUID: Real user ID EUID: Effective user ID RGID: Real group ID EGID: Effective group ID AUID: User audit ID SID: Session ID PID: Process ID ERR: Return status of system call RETVAl: Process return value OBJ: Name of file being opened OBJ_INODE: Inode number of file opened OBJ_MODS: Permissions on file opened OBJ_OWNER: User ID of file owner OBJ: Name of object OBJ_INODE: Inode of object |

| Events: CREAT | |
|---------------|---|
| Attributes: | TIME (time_t), RUID (uid_t), EUID (uid_t), RGID (uid_t), EGID (uid_t), AUID (uid_t), SID (uid_t), PID (int), ERR (int), RETVAL (int), OBJ (const char *), OBJ_INODE (int), OBJ_MODS (int) |
| Description: | TIME: Time the event took place RUID: Real user ID EUID: Effective user ID RGID: Real group ID EGID: Effective group ID AUID: User audit ID SID: Session ID PID: Process ID ERR: Return status of system call RETVAL: Process return value OBJ: Name of file being opened OBJ_INODE: Inode number of file opened OBJ_MODS: Permissions on file opened OBJ_OWNER: User ID of file owner OBJ: Name of file created OBJ_INODE: Inode of file created OBJ_MODS: Permissions of file created |

| Events: CHMOD | |
|---------------|--|
| Attributes: | TIME (time_t), RUID (uid_t), EUID (uid_t), RGID (uid_t), EGID (uid_t), AUID (uid_t), SID (uid_t), PID (int), ERR (int), RETVAL (int), OBJ (const char *), OBJ_INODE (int), NEW_MODS (int) |
| Description: | TIME: Time the event took place RUID: Real user ID EUID: Effective user ID RGID: Real group ID EGID: Effective group ID AUID: User audit ID SID: Session ID PID: Process ID ERR: Return status of system call RETVAL: Process return value OBJ: Name of file being opened OBJ_INODE: Inode number of file opened OBJ_MODS: Permissions on file opened OBJ_OWNER: User ID of file owner OBJ: Name of file for which the permissions are being changed OBJ_INODE: Inode of file being changed NEW_MODS: New permissions for file |

| Events: CHOWN | |
|---------------|--|
| Attributes: | TIME (time_t), RUID (uid_t), EUID (uid_t), RGID (uid_t), EGID (uid_t), AUID (uid_t), SID (uid_t), PID (int), ERR (int), RETVAL (int), OBJ (const char *), OBJ_INODE (int), OBJ_NEWUID (int), OBJ_NEWGID (int) |
| Description: | TIME: Time the event took place RUID: Real user ID EUID: Effective user ID RGID: Real group ID EGID: Effective group ID AUID: User audit ID SID: Session ID PID: Process ID ERR: Return status of system call RETVAL: Process return value OBJ: Name of file being opened OBJ_INODE: Inode number of file opened OBJ_MODS: Permissions on file opened OBJ_OWNER: User ID of file owner OBJ: Name of file for which the ownership is being changed OBJ_INODE: Inode of file being changed OBJ_NEWUID: New user id for file OBJ_NEWGID: New group id for file |

5.5 A sample IDIOT program

`jig.c` was written as an example of how to run IDIOT non-interactively. It instantiates a `C2_Server` object, sets the desired debug level, loads the specified patterns, and attempts to match all patterns against the specified audit trail.

Following is the usage summary for `jig.c`:

```
Usage: jig [options] <auditfile> <patternfile>+  
Options:  
-d n  -- Set debug level to n (defaults to 0 if option not given)  
-l    -- Link in precompiled patterns (patterns parsed by default)  
      - Pattern files on command line should be *.so versions
```

As can be seen, the current defaults are to generate no debugging information and to parse all patterns. For most cases, it would likely be preferable to have `jig.c` link precompiled patterns by default. This would be a minor change within the code.

It should be noted that `jig.c` was written as an example program and assumes some degree of experience on the part of the user. No error-checking is performed on the command-line arguments; they are assumed to be accurate and complete.

5.6 Debugging

The original debugging options for IDIOT were quite simple: debugging was either on or off, and the only debugging information that could be automatically generated came from the server. Pattern debugging

information had to be manually inserted into the pattern itself. We decided that more flexibility would be helpful. There are now three levels of debugging:

Level 1 — Only generate server debugging information

Level 2 — Only generate pattern debugging information

Level 3 — Generate both pattern and server information

We also decided that the ability to separate the pattern debugging information from the server debugging information would be quite useful. A PERL script, `view_debug.pl`, was developed for this purpose; it is also described below.

5.6.1 Debugging the server

Debugging within the `C2_Server` is fairly basic. If the debug level is appropriately set, the server generates information about each audit event it processes. This information includes the type of event, time of occurrence, RUID, EUID, PID, return value, and various event-dependent information, such as program name. This information is now only generated when the debug level is set at 1 or 3. Also, each line of debug output has been prepended with a `%S` to distinguish it from pattern debugging information.

5.6.2 Debugging patterns

This section describes how to debug patterns written in the IDIOT pattern language. As the language is especially tailored to specifying pattern transitions, it is difficult to use regular tools such as `gdb` to debug patterns. To aid debugging, we have provided some rudimentary output routines. The main utility routine we have provided is `true_print()`, which takes a string as a parameter, prints the string to `STDOUT`, and returns `TRUE`.

As mentioned above, debugging information for patterns originally had to be generated manually. We decided that having some debugging information generated automatically could be useful, if it were governed by the debug level. To achieve this goal, we modified `pat.y` to insert the following code into every pattern as it is parsed and translated to C++:

```
int debug;
extern int true_print(Str );

...
debug = S->debug; // executed within pattern constructor

...
if (debug > 1)
    true_print(`<pattern name> -- <transition name> transition fired');
```

We decided to only insert calls to `true_print()` at the completion of each transition to allow the user to maintain a fine grain of control over debugging output.

If more debugging information is desired, there are a couple of options. Note that IDIOT uses short-circuit evaluation of guards, so if any one of the conjunctive clauses is false, then evaluation of the whole clause stops and the transition is not taken. Thus, if a `true_print()` call is placed within a clause, all the preceding clauses must be true before the print will occur. `true_print()` itself returns `TRUE`, which is the identity element for logical-and and has no effect on the evaluation.

For example, if we were interested only in the occurrence of an OPEN_W event (from the `writing-to-executable-` pattern), whether or not it was successful, we could do:

```
trans mod8(OPEN_W)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { true_print("Matched OPEN_W event...") && / event occurred */
        this[ERR] = 0 && /* if this operation succeeded */
        PID = this[PID] && /* and this PID matches that of the exec */
        FILE = this[OBJ] && /* remember this filename */
        isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]); /* if this file is executable */
  end mod8;
```

Note that this call to `true_print()` would **always** be executed, regardless of the debug level. If the statement should be conditional upon the debug level, it could be inserted as follows:

```
trans mod8(OPEN_W)
  <- after_exec;
  -> violation;
  | _ { ( (dbug > 1) ? true_print("Matched OPEN_W event...") : 1) && /* event occurred */
        this[ERR] = 0 && /* if this operation succeeded */
        PID = this[PID] && /* and this PID matches that of the exec */
        FILE = this[OBJ] && /* remember this filename */
        isexec(this[OBJ_MODS]);
  end mod8;
```

As with an ordinary call to `true_print()`, this would leave the value of the guard unchanged. In addition, the debugging information would only be generated if the debug level was set appropriately (> 1).

One item to note is that each string passed to `true_print()` is prepended with `%P` before being printed, distinguishing it from the server debugging information.

5.7 Interactive debugging

The `C2_appl` program can be used to run IDIOT interactively. This can sometimes be useful for debugging purposes. The debug level is initialized to 0. To change the debug level, issue the following command:

```
server debug <debug level>
```

The specified debug level will cause the appropriate debugging information to be printed to `STDOUT`.

We mentioned above that each pattern's `dbug` variable is initialized only once, within the pattern constructor. Thus, the `dbug` variable retains the value of the server debug level *at the time the pattern was instantiated*. This allows the user to dictate which patterns generate debugging information.

For example, if you only wished to debug the `executing-particular-pgms` pattern while matching several, you would do the following:

```
> ./C2_appl //start C2_appl, debug_level set to 0
tini> dlink <pattern1.so>
tini> dlink <pattern2.so>
//link in N patterns without debug info
...
tini> dlink <patternN.so>
tini> server debug 2
tini> dlink ex_prt_pgms.so
tini> run <audit trail>
```

All of the included patterns would be utilized, but only the `executing-particular-pgms` pattern would generate debugging information.

5.8 Viewing debug information

As an aid in viewing and understanding debugging information, we developed `view_debug.pl`. This PERL script separates pattern debugging information from server debugging information. Furthermore, it allows both sets of output to be viewed simultaneously with the debugging statements synchronized.

To run it simply type `./view_debug.pl`, followed by the command line you wish to have passed to `jig`. `view_debug.pl` will execute `./jig` with the specified command line and separate the debugging output into the files `pat_debug.out` (pattern debug information) and `C2_debug.out` (server debug information). (**NOTE:** `view_debug.pl` currently assumes it is in the same directory as `jig`.) The output is separated according to the presence of the `%P` at the beginning of pattern debugging output and the `%S` preceding server debugging output. For each line of output the following occurs:

- if preceded by `%P`, the line is numbered and written to `pat_debug.out`, minus the `%P`, and a blank line (numbered identically) is written to `C2_debug.out`
- if preceded by `%S`, the line is numbered and written to `C2_debug.out`, minus the `%S`, and a blank line (numbered identically) is written to `pat_debug.out`
- all other lines are simply printed to `STDOUT`, without affecting the numbering

After `view_debug.pl` has finished, `pat_debug.out` and `C2_debug.out` may be viewed side by side, allowing the user to see exactly what sequence of events is causing each transition to fire. The line numbers allow easy synchronization while viewing the files.

NOTE: While `view_debug.pl` will not currently work with the `C2_appl` interface, this could be changed with a fairly simple alteration of the PERL code.

Chapter 6

Limitations of C2 Audit Trails

6.1 Auditing socket calls on System V (Solaris)

In SunOs, the abstraction of sockets is built into the kernel. Calls such as `socket`, `connect` and `accept` must cross the system call boundary, and will generate audit records.

However, in System V, the communication abstraction is *streams*. A stream is a data flow path between two endpoint entities. Streams are a generic abstraction for data flow — they are used to implement terminal drivers, sockets and FIFOs in System V versions of UNIX. In particular, the abstraction of sockets is provided by a library built on top of the kernel. Socket calls in this library execute a series of `getmsg`, `putmsg` and `ioctl` calls to interface with System V streams. No audit data is generated that specifically mentions that a socket call has occurred. The audit data only shows the System V stream interface calls.

This makes it difficult to write patterns to detect such simple network based attacks as port-flooding and port-walking. A port-flood is where an abnormally high number of connections are received on a single port. The idea is to use up kernel socket resources and denying network access to any other users. A port-walk is a series of connections to ports which attempts to find services running on ports which may be exploited.

Both of these attacks could be detected from an audit trail which contained records for `connect` and `accept` events. To simulate this, a wrapper library for the socket library must be written. This wrapper library will generate an audit record to be placed in the audit file, and will then call the original socket library call.

An example below shows how this is done:

```
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <bsm/libbsm.h>

/* the _connect routine is the system call */
extern int _connect(int s, struct sockaddr *name, int namelen);

/* write our own connect routine that will generate an audit record */
int connect(int s, struct sockaddr *name, int namelen) {

    struct socket sock;
    int token;
    token_t *m;

    token = au_open(); /* allocate an audit token to write info to */

    /* generate a socket token that records the information */
```

```

m = au_to_socket(sock);
/* write that socket token to the audit trail */
return(_socket(domain, type, protocol);
}

```

6.2 Auditing operations on symbolic links on System V (Solaris)

Many of the patterns devised at the COAST lab needed information about system calls that were operating on symbolic links. The pattern that detects the exploitation of the `xterm` bug, for example, can detect exploitations by seeing if the inode for the log file has changed between the creation and accessing of the file.

Unfortunately, this pattern cannot be used as is with the Basic Security Module C2 logging provided by Sun with Solaris 2.4. For this pattern to work, the audit trail would need to provide, at least, the following information:

1. `execve`: ERROR, EUID, RUID, PID, and program name
2. `creat`: ERROR, PID, initial file name, final file name, and inode number
3. `open`: ERROR, PID, initial file name, final filename, and inode number
4. `close`: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
5. `chown`: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
6. `chmod`: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
7. `access`: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
8. `stat`: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name

The only items that require explanation are the file names. If we have a symbolic link `sym1` that points to a file `fill` then a call to `chmod("sym1", mode)` would require an audit trail record that would indicate that the `chmod` system call was executed on the initial file name `sym1` and the final file name `fill`. The inode should be the one corresponding to the final name.

The audit trail generated by the Basic Security Module provided with Solaris 2.4 violates the file names requirement. To see why this is important, consider the following fragment of a setuid C program called `xtermbug`:

```

/* Create a log file called xtermbug.log */
if( creat("xtermbug.log",0) > -1 ) {
/* The permissions of the created file were set to 0x00000. Change them
to something more reasonable */
if( chmod("xtermbug.log",S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) == -1 ) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not change the permission of file
xtermbug.log\n");
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not create log file xtermbug.log\n");
}
}

```

and an attack script that will exploit the vulnerability described in this document is called `xtermbug.exploit`:

```
#!/bin/sh
mknod xtermbug.log p
xtermbug &
sleep 1
mv xtermbug.log junk
ln -s /homes/krsul/break_me xtermbug.log
cat junk
cat /homes/krsul/break_me
```

This attack can not be detected by the pattern described in this document *if* using the Basic Security Module logging in Solaris 2.4. The audit trail generated for this session, reformatted for clarity and brevity, with the attacker called *gollum*, and the victim called *krsul*, is:

```
1  execve(2) - path,/home/gollum/xtermbug.exploit - EUID gollum - RUID
gollum
2  execve(2) - path,/usr/sbin/mknod - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
3  mknod(2) - argument,2,0x11b6,mode - argument,3,0x0,dev
4          path,/.mordor/home/gollum/xtermbug.log - EUID gollum - RUID
gollu
m
5  chown(2) - argument,2,0x341,new file uid - argument,3,0x341,new file
gid
6          path,/.mordor/home/gollum/xtermbug.log - EUID gollum - RUID
gollu
m
7  execve(2) - path,/homes/krsul/bin/xtermbug - EUID krsul - RUID gollum
8  execve(2) - path,/usr/bin/sleep - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
9  execve(2) - path,/usr/local/bin/mv - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
10 rename(2) - path,/.mordor/home/gollum/xtermbug.log
11          path,/.mordor/home/gollum/junk - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
12 execve(2) - path,/usr/bin/ln - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
13 symlink(2) - text,/homes/krsul/break_me - path,/.mordor/home/gollum/xte
rmbug
.log
14          EUID gollum - RUID gollum
15 execve(2) - path,/usr/bin/cat - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
16 creat(2) - path,/.mordor/home/gollum/xtermbug.log -
argument,3,0x2,strope:n:
flag
17          EUID krsul - RUID gollum
18 chmod(2) - argument,2,0x1fff,new file mode - path,/homes/krsul/break_me
          EUID krsul - RUID gollum
19
20 execve(2) - path,/usr/bin/cat - EUID gollum - RUID gollum
```

Notice that in line 20, the audit trail indicates that the `chmod(2)` system call was made to the file `/homes/krsul/break_me`. While this is ultimately true, it does little to help detect the exploitation of the vulnerability. The pattern design specifically looks for a `chmod` or `chown` to the same file name as the `creat` but with different inode numbers. The audit trail should mention that the original call was made to file `xtermbug.log`.

6.3 Write events are not audited

Some patterns need to detect WRITE events. However, in the Solaris BSM audit trail the write events are subsumed under the OPEN event. So the audit trail for a write looks as follows (output of `praudit`):

```
header,136,2,open(2) - read,write,,Tue Feb 20 18:53:34 1996, + 846005000 msec
path,/home/mcrosbie/myIDIOT/audit_data/executable
attribute,100711,mcrosbie,mcrosbie,8388638,193085,0
subject,-2,mcrosbie,mcrosbie,mcrosbie,mcrosbie,20085,0,0 0 0.0.0.0
return,success,4
```

The audit trail was gathered with the `fw` audit mask flag. This gathers data about file writes. The `open` call is recorded, but the `write` call is not. The above audit trail corresponds to the following code fragment:

```
if( (fd=open("./executable", O_RDWR) < 0) {  
    perror(" open: ");  
    exit(1);  
}  
  
printf("Exploit: writing to executable...\n");  
if( write(fd, "abcdef", 6) < 6) {  
    perror(" write: ");  
    exit(1);  
}
```

Thus, we are forced to detect writes to executable files by detecting the opening of the file, and not the actual write.

Chapter 7

Source Code

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